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Abstract 
This study assesses the changing judicial approach to national security concerns in 
the half century preceding the First World War. This era of jurisprudence has been largely 
neglected by legal historians, most studies assuming that the modem judicial approach to 
national security developed only after the first rumbles of the guns of August 1914. 
However, pre-war jurisprudence demonstrates the judiciary's increasing familiarity 
with national-security concerns, through their exposure to what may be described as 
'modem' national-security legislation, from the mid-Victorian era onwards. This study 
therefore considers the judicial approach to such ill-considered statutes as the Foreign 
Enlistment Act 1819 and its successor the Foreign Enlistment Act 1870, and the Defence 
Acts 1842-73 (and related enactments). This thesis also examines the judicial response to 
the application of aspects of nineteenth-century commercial, contract and customs law to 
protect security concerns. Through detailed examination of each of these areas of law, this 
study will ascertain the degree of influence that national-security concerns exerted upon 
judicial interpretation in the years 1860-1914. 
It is contended that the cumulative weight of this jurisprudence indicates that the 
First World War was not the turning point in judicial attitude that it has been widely 
proclaimed to be, and that the supine approach to national-security concerns characteristic 
of the twentieth-century jurisprudence can be traced into the Victorian era. Superficial 
variations in jurisprudence, including shifts from positivist to normative "packaging" of 
security concerns should not disguise the judiciary's adoption, long prior to the First World 
War, of a functionalist interpretative approach to national-security arguments. 
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[1] 
Have the Judiciary Ever Known their Place? 
'By the Constitution the defence of the realm is entrusted to the 
Crown, ... the law has entrusted the person of His Majesty with the 
care of this defence, [and] in this business of defence the "suprema 
potestas" is inherent in His Majesty as part of his Crown and 
kingly dignity. ' 
Mr Justice Avory ( 1915) 
The Executive, the Judiciary and the Security of the State 
Judicial deference to the executive with regard to matters of national security enjoys 
a distinguished heritage. From Hyde CJ's assertion that 'we trust [the Crown] in great 
matters,' 1 through Lord Atkinson's conclusion that providing for the defence and security 
of the realm had ever amounted to 'the special trust and duty of the King'2 and into the 
modern day with Lord Diplock's ruling that where action undertaken subject to the 
'national security prerogative' conflicts with the procedural impropriety head of judicial 
review, public law 'must give way,' 3 judges have seemingly ensured that the executive has 
been only loosely fettered by the law in providing for the security of the state. 
This consistent interpretive approach overarches the evolution of national security 
law through the centuries, as recognition of the limitations upon Crown's war prerogative 
_ 
1 Darnel's Case (The Case of the Five Knights) [1627] 3 Howell's State Trials, I 
2 Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel [1920] AC 508, 538 
3 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister of State for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 412 
1 
and in its ability to impose martial law obliged governments to seek statutory interventions 
to complement these national security powers.4 Prerogative and statutory powers therefore 
long co-existed in the national security sphere, with the executive careful to safeguard its 
capacity to employ the prerogative in response to threats when drafting "emergency" 
legislation. 5 Such efforts were intended to shield activities undertaken in the interests of 
national security from judicial review, by making it possible for the executive to claim that 
it was exercising power under recognised prerogatives.6 But national security statutes have 
proven to be a particularly pervasive plant in the United Kingdom's constitutional garden. 
As early as the Victorian era, when Dicey presaged Avory J's appraisal that both the 
common law and the prerogative furnish the executive with powers that allow it to provide 
for defence, 7 he saw fit to caveat that in this field 'the rigidity of the [common] law 
necessitates the intervention of Parliament.' 8 Today, the prerogative lies buried underneath 
successive accretions of 'necessary' national security legislation; not simply supplemented, 
but supplanted. 
Nonetheless, the modern statutory elements of the Crown's national security powers 
are not merely 'a substitution of the despotism of Parliament for the prerogative of the 
Crown. '9 They left the judiciary a gateway through which to adjudicate upon the legality of 
executive action in this field. This study considers the judiciary's willingness to unbolt this 
gate in the half century preceding the First World War. This introductory chapter places 
the period in historical context and examines why its significance has been overlooked. 
4 See Simpson, A., Human Rights and the End of Empire, (200 1, Oxford), 58-71 
5 For example, the Irish Coercion Acts from 1798 onwards each provided that 'nothing in this Act contained 
shall be construed to take away, abridge or diminish, the acknowledged right of the Crown to exercise martial 
law,' 39 Geo. III, c.ll (Irish). See also 43 Geo. III, c.ll7, 3 & 4 Wm IV, c.4, s.40 
6 The judiciary traditionally accepted that the manner of exercise of a prerogative power was unreviewable, at 
least until Laker Airways v Department ofTrade [1977] QB 643, 705, per Lord Denning 
7 In the Matter of A Petition of Right [1915] 3 KB 649, 651 
8 Dicey, The Law ofthe Constitution, (1960, lOth Ed., London), 412 
9 ibid., 413 
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The Age of Treason 
The special trust invested in the executive is exemplified by the pedigree of statutes 
extending the state's ability to respond to threats to national security. Enacted in Norman-
French and passed by the first Parliament to sit 'after the interruption of all legal and public 
business by the great pestilence called the Black Death, dO the Statute of Treasons 1351 is 
not simply 'the oldest criminal statute on our law books,' 11 but detailed what, until very 
recently, remained 'a uniquely serious crime.' 12 Treason and piracy were the last offences 
to carry the death penalty in the United Kingdom, as late as the dying days of the twentieth-
century. 13 For all practical purposes the offence of treason, and the related common law 
offence of sedition, 14 have been sidelined by modern legislative developments. 
This should not eclipse the Statute's achievement. With little more than minor 
alterations, notably at the time of the French Revolution, 15 from 1351 until the Victorian era 
national security law in England existed in the "Age of Treason," with successive 
incarnations of "the establishment" relying upon this statute through the centuries to protect 
the social and political order from changing threats. However, the longevity of the Statute 
of Treason owed less to the prescience of fourteenth-century draftsmen and more to the 
successive generations of judges who strove to maintain the country's national security law 
in an operative state. Into the nineteenth century the judiciary incrementally extended the 
10 Stephen, J., A History of the Criminal Law of England, (1883, London), vol. II, 248 
11 Lustgarten, L. & Leigh, I., In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy, (1994, 
Oxford), I97 
12 Wharam, A., 'Treason in Rhodesia,' (I967) Camb LJ I89, I89 
13 s.37(4) Crime and Disorder Act I998 amended s.I Treason Act I814, replacing the penalty whereby a 
person convicted of high treason 'shall be hanged by the neck until such person be dead.' Under the amended 
p,rovision 'such person shall be liable to imprisonment for life.' 
4 
'Sedition is a crime against society, nearly allied to that of treason and it frequently precedes treason by a 
short interval,' R v. Sullivan (1868), II Cox CC 44, 45, per Fitzgerald J 
15 Most notably the expansive Treason Act I795 (36 Geo. III, c. 7), made perpetual by the Treason Act 1814 
(57 Geo. III, c.6). The 1795 Act was repealed in s.37(3) Crime and Disorder Act 1998. 
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bailiwick of these offences through the development of so-called "constructive treasons," 16 
expansions which received belated legislative approval whenever threats to the 
establishment warranted a new Treason Act. 
National security law does not simply provide the mechanism by which the state 
tackles those who threaten the stability of the nation; it also establishes how the state gains 
resources necessary to safeguard against or overcome threats. From the outset of the Age 
of Treason until the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution the power to appropriate property 
to provide for national defence fell under the King's War Prerogative. Thereafter, outside 
the exigencies of the Napoleonic Wars, ad hoc legislation provided for each specific 
acquisition of land required for the defence of the realm until the enactment of the 
permanent provisions of the Defence Act 1842. Security requirements can furthermore 
oblige the executive to maintain the necessary powers to keep the country from being 
drawn into conflicts that are not of its own making. In the Age of Treason such 
requirements were serviced by temporary statutory prohibitions upon arms exports or upon 
enlistment in foreign armies. 17 
Nevertheless, the existence of these limited knots of security law is hardly 
indicative of a general understanding of this law in legal circles. The term 'adherence to 
the King's enemies' might have entered legal parlance in the Statute of Treasons, but this 
does not signify a modern concept of "national security" within the fourteenth-century 
English law. And whilst it may be interesting to postulate that as late as the eighteenth and 
early-nineteenth century the judiciary maintained a broad interpretation of the Royal 
16 Stephen, op. cit. n.l 0, 281 
17 Holdsworth, W., History of English Law, (1938, London), vol. X, 365 
4 
Prerogative permitting the Royal Navy to press-gang sailors, this indicates nothing more 
than an embryonic recognition of a particular requirement of national security. 18 
The Age of the Emergency Code 
The tracts of legislation, both in times of emergency and in times of relative 
security, that the judiciary have been called upon to interpret since the outbreak of the First 
World War contrast markedly with the spartan legislation of the Age of Treason. 
Uncomfortable with the potential impact of their decisions upon security policy, the courts 
adopted a doctrine of 'judicial passivity' 19 throughout the great emergencies of the first half 
of the twentieth century, under which they would avoid 'any significant role in the business 
of state security. ' 20 The passivity enunciated in those wartime decisions inevitably polluted 
the law outside emergency situations, despite the prescient efforts of some judges to ring-
fence this wartime jurisprudence. In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, Lord 
Sumner forewarned those Crown lawyers who would later seek to rely upon the wartime 
authorities that 'it must never be forgotten that much was voluntarily submitted to [by the 
judiciary] which might have been disputed, and that the absence of contest and even of 
protest is by no means always an admission ofthe right.' 21 The warning went unheeded. 
Of course, this protracted period of supine jurisprudence was punctuated by some of 
the most forceful dissents ever uttered by senior English judges (indeed, Lord Aktin' s 
'classic dissent' 22 in Liversidge v. Anderson23 is so famous and so often repeated that 
18 Chitty, J., A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown, (1820, London), 47 
19 Simpson, A., 'The Judges and the Vigilant State,' (1989) Denning LJ 145, 157 
20 Simpson, A., In the Highest Degree Odious: Detention Without Trial in Wartime Britain, (1992, Oxford), 
419 
· · · -
21 De Keyser's Royal Hotel, -op. cit. n.2, 563 
22 R. v. Home Secretary, ex parte Khawaja [1984] AC 74, 110, per Lord Scarman 
23 [I 942] AC 206, 244 
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Dyzenhaus has commented that 'it seems difficult to recall that his judgment was a lone 
dissent')?4 Indeed, despite the efforts of such (actually) isolated voices, the judiciary have 
little deserved their Diceyan mantra as the 'guardians of liberty.' 25 From the outbreak of 
the First World War until the dawn of the twenty-first century they persistently failed to 
exercise any meaningful restraint on executive action taken in the interests of national 
security, or to question executive perceptions of such interests. Instead, in cases involving 
such concerns, the judges have steadfastly 'declined to sit as Court of Appeal from the 
executive. ' 26 Yet this is hardly a criticism unique to the English judiciary. Across the 
common law world, including the United States,27 'when issues of national security arise, 
judges almost invariably defer to the executive's determination of what is in the national 
interest. ' 28 
The enduring impotence of twentieth-century national security jurisprudence has 
piqued the interest of various legal academics. In search of the touchstone of this 
interpretive approach Simpson,29 Rubin,3° Foxton,31 Ewing and Gearty32 have all 
disregarded Dicey's injunction that 'the function of a trained lawyer is not to know what 
the law was yesterday ... or what it ought to be tomorrow, but to state and explain what are 
the principles of law actually existing in England during the present year of grace. '33 
24 Dyzenhaus, D., 'Intimations of Legality Amid the Clash of Anns' (2004) 2 Int'l. J Canst. L. 244,245 
25 Dicey, op. cit. n.8, 137 
26 Scrutton, T., 'The Law and the War,' (1918) 34 LQR 116, 130 
27 See Issacharoff, S. & Pildes, R., 'Emergency contexts without emergency powers: The United States's 
constitutional approach to rights during wartime,' (2004) 2 Int 'I. J Canst. L. 296, 298. The American system 
does have the advantage that judicial deference is to two distinct political branches, 'each with different 
democratic pedigrees, different incentives, and different interests to which they respond,' rather than 'the 
unified executive-legislative powers of a parliamentary regime.' 
28 Dyzenhaus, op. cit. n.24, 246 
29 Simpson, op. cit. n.20. This definitive study of internment in the Second World War returns to consider the 
legacy of First World War cases in its opening chapter. 
30 Rubin, G., War, Law and Labour: The Munitions Acts, State Regulation and the Unions 1915-21, (1987, 
Oxford) & Private Property, Government Requisition and the Constitution, 1914-27, ( 1994, London) 
31 Foxton, D., 'R. v. Halliday, ex parte Zadig in Retrospect,' (2003) 119 LQR 455 & 'Corporate Personality in 
the Great War,' (2002) 118 LQR 428 
32 Ewing, K. & Gearty, C., The Struggle for Civil Liberties, (2000, Oxford) 
33 Dicey, op. cit. n.8, (1887, 2"d Ed.), 14-15 
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Instead, they have obeyed Napoleon's dictum and followed the sound of the guns, in this 
case the evolving judicial approach to national security concerns in the wake of the guns of 
August 1914. 
Logic appears to dictate that a war that had such a cataclysmic effect upon the 
United Kingdom and the British political system34 would have a particularly convulsive 
effect upon national security law. Simpson, taking this cue, asserts that during the First 
World War 'a comprehensive code of emergency powers was developed, and became the 
model both in colonial territories and in the United Kingdom itself.'35 In the Defence ofthe 
Realm Act 1914 (DORA) the executive created a new mechanism with which to protect the 
security of the state. This enactment, with its clutch of attendant regulations, or as Clarke 
described them, 'vexatious orderings, '36 would form the model for later emergency 
legislation. 37 
DORA therefore became as significant in the development of twentieth-century 
national security law as the Statute of Treasons had been in an earlier era. Upon its 
enactment on 8th August 1914 onwards, national security law entered the "Age of the 
Emergency Code." Thereafter, the ability of twentieth-century governments to call upon an 
emergency code transcended peace and war; Allen reminding his readers that peacetime 
emergencies could be tackled using regulations promulgated under the Emergency Powers 
Act 1920.38 
34 Griffith, J., 'The Political Constitution,' (1979) 42 MLR 1, 3-5 
35 Simpson, A., Human Rights and the End of Empire, (2001, Oxford) 80 
36 Clarke, S., 'The Rule of DORA,' (1919) I JCLIL (3rd series) 36,36 
37 Stammers notes that through the 'War Emergency Legislation Sub-Committee' of the Committee for 
Imperial Defence, government used the DORA and regulations as the basis for draft codes of emergency 
regulations in the inter-war years. Stammers, N., Civil Liberties in Britain During the Second World War: A 
Political Study, (1983, London), 7-8 
38 Allen, C., Law and Orders, (1965}, Oxford, 378. The EPA 1920 was repealed under Schedule 2 Civil-
Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA). See in particular s.20-23 CCA 2004 regarding the present powers for 
making of emergency regulations. 
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The First World War therefore remains 'the most significant period [in the twentieth 
century] in terms of its impact and the legacy it bequeathed to the law and practice of civil 
liberties,'39 and moreover, the DORA jurisprudence remains of 'particular doctrinal 
importance' to the resultant era of national security law.40 
Adherents to this position draw support from Scrutton LJ's Rhodes Lecture of 
February 1918; part wistful remembrance of the judiciary's historical and ceremonial 
functions, upon which the conflict had inconveniently 'pressed heavily,' 41 part hard-nosed 
defence of the wartime judiciary's performance. This eminent judge accepted that the legal 
system had required adaptation to meet the exigencies of the conflict, asserting that it was 
'obvious' that 'novel problems would arise ... when it is remembered that it is over sixty 
years since Great Britain was engaged in a European war. ' 42 Whilst the country found 
itself in this perilous situation, Scrutton LJ considered that 'the judges are empowered to 
make any alterations they think right in the legal obligations to do justice to the particular 
circumstances of the case as caused by the war.' 43 This empowerment resulted in the 
emergence of "judicial passivity" towards national security concerns during the course of 
the First World War. 
An Age of Transition? 
This focus upon the First World War is therefore built upon the assumption that at 
the mid-Victorian zenith of Britain's splendid isolation, no threats challenged the security 
of Britain's position in the world sufficiently to disturb the nation's jurists; that the First 
39 Ewing & Gearty, op. cit. n.32, 90 
40 Lowry, D., 'Terrorism and Human Rights: Counter-Insurgency and Necessity at Common Law,' (1977-78) 
53 Notre Dame Lawyer 49, 53 
41 Scrutton, T., 'The Law and the War,' (1918)34 LQR 116, 118 
42 ibid., 120 
43 ibid., 132 
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World War marked the development of modem national security legislation and that with 
this change to the rules of the game, consequent jurisprudence must therefore have 
abandoned any historic approach to security concerns and adopted an interpretive approach 
commensurate with these new realities. This study proceeds on the basis that this received 
logic may prove flawed. 
The emphasis upon the First World War has left little room for consideration of 
national security law in the preceding half century. But it is worth remembering that at one 
point this conflict was also regarded as the great turning point in English administrative 
law, an area considered to be 'of mainly speculative interest' 44 in preceding years. 
However, closer inspection revealed that 'administrative structures did not suddenly 
emerge during World War I or after.' 45 Rather, as Maitland asserted in 1908, 'if you take 
up a modem volume of the reports of the Queen's Bench Division, you will find that about 
half the cases reported have to do with rules of administrative law. ' 46 The most that can be 
said for the wartime period was that there was 'a sudden flowering' 47 of ministerial orders. 
Indeed this significance was not in relation to the degree of delegation, but rather as to 
scope.48 Although the perceived threat of delegated legislation only came to Lord Hewart's 
none-too-adept legal mind49 in the aftermath of the conflict (a period when there was no 
need to reach for the King's Bench reports for evidence of the sheer weight of executive 
action authorized by Orders in Council), 5° this did not oblige commentators such as Willis51 
44 Ambrose, W., 'The New Judiciary,' (1910) 26 LQR 203,214 
45 Lindseth, P., 'Reconciling the Past: John Willis and the Question of Judicial Review in Inter-War and Post-
War England,' (2005) 55 U. T.L.J. 657, 657 
46 Maitland, F., Constitutional History of England, (1908, Cambridge), 505 
47 Willis, J., The Parliamentary Powers of English Government Departments, (1933, Cambridge), 5 
48 The amount of government business which was carried out by delegated legislation did not vastly increase 
prior to the post-war coalition government. Allen giving figures of 'just over a thousand' orders made yearly 
from 1894-1900, of an annual average of 1 ,349 from 1901-1914 and of 1,459 during the war years. Allen, op. 
cit. n.38, 32 
49 Jackson considered Lord Hewart to be 'the worst English judge in living memory.' Jackson, R., The 
Machinery of Justice in England, (1977, 7th Ed., Cambridge), 475 
50 Hewart, Lord, The New Despotism, (1929, London) 
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or Jennings52 to give credence to the suggestion that such delegation of authority 
constituted a novel development. 
Similarly, when Townshend asserts that the mid-Victorians subsumed discussion of 
the 'concepts of public order and public security .. . [within] common law language as "the 
rule of law" and "keeping the peace",' 53 it is possible to read such statements as confirming 
that the era gave rise to little interesting comment upon national security concerns. 
However, this should instead encourage even closer consideration of the Diceyan analysis 
of the rule of law. Such examination reveals that this analysis is shot through with specific 
references to legal aspects of security issues. His conclusion, for example, that government 
under the law would prevent the executive from detaining or deporting foreign anarchists 
on the basis of the demands of national security without first charging them with an 
offence,54 provides some evidence that Dicey believed that the constitution brooked no 
special consideration of such concerns. The same can be said of the significance that he 
attached to the dismissal of the executive's attempt to act without legislative authority in 
order to protect public order in Entick v. Carrington. 55 
Yet legal historians have long distrusted this Whiggish view of the constitution.56 
Rather than Dicey faithfully 'represent[ing] the situation as he found it,' 57 the suspicion 
lingers that he was unable 'to divorce totally his political prejudices from his constitutional 
51 Willis would continue his fight against 'the ghost of The New Despotism' into the mid-1970s. See 
Lindseth, op. cit. n.45, 659 
52 Jennings, 1., The Law and the Constitution, (1959, 5th Ed., London), 239-254 
53 Townshend, C., Making the Peace: Public Order and Public Security in Modern Britain, (1993, Oxford), 4. 
See Dicey, op. cit. n.8, 284-311 
54 Dicey, op. cit. n.8, 226-227 
55 Entick v. Carrington ( 1765) 19 St Tr 1030, see Dicey, op. cit. n.8, 193 
56 Frankfurter memorably described Dicey's Law of the Constitution as an 'instance of sociological error 
surviving through charm and style.' Frankfurter, F., 'Foreword,' in Jennings, 1., 'The Courts and 
Administrative Law- The Experience of English Housing Legislation,' (1936) 49 Harv.LRev. 426, 426 
57 McEldowney, J., 'Dicey in Historical Perspective- A Review Essay,' in McAuslan, J. & McEldowney, J., 
Law, Legitmacy and the Constitution, (1985, London), 56 
10 
and legal analysis. ' 58 Ewing and Gearty go to the effort of debunking Dicey's view that 
authorities such as Entick v. Carrington indicate of the common law's protection of civil 
liberties from encroachment by the executive. They reappraise this celebrated case as little 
more than a puffed-up judgment predicated upon property concerns. 59 And even if Dicey 
cannot be proven to be pernicious or misguided, he was the first to recognise that he was at 
the very least careless with authorities, admitting that 'I have not a good memory for cases; 
no one has read so many and remembers so few.' 60 
But if The Law of the Constitution suggests that Dicey considered that the judiciary 
should not give special regard to national security concerns in peacetime, this does not 
mean that in wartime he complaisantly believed 'that liberty in Britain was effectively 
protected by the common law and an independent Parliament. ' 61 In Dicey's view 
Parliament could subordinate "liberty" in the context of an emergency as grave as the First 
World War. Ford notes that in relation to the ex parte Zadil2 decision upon internment of 
British residents and subjects of hostile origin or association, 'Dicey felt that the danger 
posed by the war justified such Crown action. ' 63 Dicey's support for this House of Lords 
decision was however qualified by his concern, expressed in the last weeks of his life, that 
'the court had not given enough thought to [permitting] a vague parliamentary authorization 
to severely curb individual rights. ' 64 Whilst his many critics may consider that Dicey was 
trying to have his cake and eat it to the very last, it is worth remembering that he clearly 
conceived of still greater scope for executive action in emergencies more dire than the First 
58 Barendt, E., 'Dicey and Civil Liberties,' (1985) PL 596, 596 
59 Ewing & Gearty, op. cit. n.32, 29-33 
60 Letter to Mrs Bryce, 28th September 1895. See McEldowney, op. cit. n.57, 54 
61 Ewing & Gearty, op. cit. n.32, 36 
62 R. v. Halliday, ex parte Zadig [ 1917] A.C. 260 
63 Ford, T., 'Albert Venn Dicey; The Man and His Times,' (1985, Chichester), 295. See also Cosgrove, R., 
'The Rule of Law: Albert Venn Dicey,' (1980, London), 275-278 
64 Letter to Rait, gth March 1922, in Rait, S., ed., 'Memorials of Albert Venn Dicey,' (1925, London), 286 
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World War, in 'times of tumult or invasion when for the sake of legality itself the rules of 
law must be broken. ' 65 
These may be good reasons to distrust Dicey's appraisal of how the judiciary should 
account for national security. Nevertheless, this study will proceed on the basis that in 
1885 Dicey was not expounding principles that were 'more froth than ale. '66 It appears 
implicit in Lord Sumner's dicta that the wartime judiciary had adapted its interpretive 
approach to the circumstances,67 and in Scrutton LJ's assertion that for the duration of the 
war the judiciary regarded themselves as 'serving alongside their sons,'68 that the First 
World War decisions saw a judiciary voluntarily curtailing the interpretive approach that 
they would follow in peacetime. Following these leads, this study will examine whether 
any evidence indicates the existence of a distinct judicial approach to national security 
concerns in the period between the twilight years of the Age of Treason and the summer of 
1914. 
65 Dicey, op. cit. n. 8, 412 
66 Ewing & Gearty, op. cit. n.32, 32 
67 De Keyser's Royal Hotel, op. cit. n.2, 563 
68 Scrutton, op. cit. n.41, 117 
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[2] 
Pre-War National Security Law in Context 
'Confidence waned and prospects clouded over, as the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century saw Britain slipping from the sunny 
uplands of mid-Victorian liberal capitalism towards the valley of the 
shadow of socialism and war. ' 
Bernard Porter (1987) 
Introduction 
The academic focus upon the First World War jurisprudence would have been 
nugatory had it not been for the later generations of judges who found their bearing in 
national security cases, both in emergency and in peacetime, by revisiting the interpretive 
approach established in these wartime decisions. 1 This study counters that it was not 
assured that these decisions would dictate the tone of national security jurisprudence for the 
remainder of the century. 
Instead, in the wake of the First World War the courts could have clearly demarked 
peacetime from wartime security jurisprudence, an equilibrium the Australian courts would 
later attain through the 'celebrated triumph of constitutionalism and the rule of law over 
1 Lustgarten, L. & Leigh, 1., In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy, (1994, 
Oxford), 320-359. Lustgarten and Leigh provide a detailed discussion of the ongoing influence of the First 
World War jurisprudence. 
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national hysteria'2 in the Communist Party case.3 The existence of any relevant body of 
peacetime domestic security decisions in the pre-war era should have provided fertile soil 
for this ultimately uncultivated line of jurisprudence. 
However, it will not be the purpose of this chapter to undertake a counterfactual 
analysis of how the law might have developed, but to probe the existence of a pre-war 
judicial conception of national security in order to determine whether it should have been 
so easily dismissed or forgotten. This requires an investigation of the interrelated questions 
of whether there existed a modem conception of national security within the legal 
establishment prior to the First World War, and if so whether this conception was confined 
to unmemorable knots of jurisprudence or coursed through a modem range of national 
security law. Only if prima facie evidence can be found supporting both of these 
preconditions will it be necessary to establish a structure under which to examine the pre-
war jurisprudence in more detail. 
The Development of Modern National Security Law 
The cumulative effect of the reform, replacement or decline into disuse of many of 
the traditional elements of security law characterising the "Age of Treason" over the course 
of the nineteenth century puts pressure upon the traditional acceptance of the First World 
War as the turning point in this field. In the decades preceding 1914, a new generation of 
national security legislation was enacted, including measures designed to protect national 
security during times of peace and stability, and others intended to be animated by the 
2 Winterton, G., 'The Significance of the Communist Party Case,' (1992) 18 Mel. ULR 630, 630. As 
Winterton notes, the decision to rule the Communist Party Dissolution Act invalid was 'remarkable at a time 
of anti-Communist hysteria fanned by the Korean War.' 
3 Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth (1950-51) 83 CLR I. Despite Australian troops being in 
combat in Korea at the time of this decision the High Court set these circumstances apart from a grave 
emergency. See 193-195, 197-198,202,206 and 227. 
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executive in order to respond to an emergency. Whilst in scope and focus such security 
legislation was undeniably a product of its time,4 it was nevertheless well developed long 
prior to the First World War. 
This pre-war development of national security infrastructure is attributable to the 
state of flux of British society and Britain's position in the world in the half century before 
1914. Throughout the confident and liberal mid-Victorian era 'ambiguity about the 
individual and institutional meaning of security was fundamental [to society].' 5 Indeed, 
until the late nineteenth century legislators clung dogmatically to the belief that the liberties 
enjoyed by British subjects should not be secured through statutory defences against threats 
to the nation. This resulted partly from the fear that the state might abuse such powers, and 
partly from the liberal belief that 'laws and agencies created in order to repress subversion 
had the very opposite effect. They made people aggrieved, and consequently rebellious. ' 6 
This 'flawed equipoise' 7 gradually collapsed under the weight or the mounting threats 
facing the United Kingdom and the British establishment from the 1860s and 1870s 
onwards.8 By the turn of the twentieth century, many feared that if these threats could not 
be overcome, 'it would not merely be a question of decline or contraction, but probably of 
invasion and enslavement too. '9 
These fears generated a clamour for a legislative response to threats as disparate as 
the danger of being drawn into foreign wars, of resurgent Irish republicanism, of foreign 
dissidents, of espionage, and of the emergence of rival powers which facilitated the state's 
experimentation with novel means of protecting national security. In this vein, the existing 
4 Holdsworth, W., 'The Relation between Commercial Legislation and National Defence Historically 
Considered,' (1918) 30 Jurid. Rev. 293,293 
5 Townshend, C., Making the Peace: Public Order and Public Security in Modern Britain, (I 993, Oxford), 4 
6 Porter, B., Origins of the Vigilant State, (I 987, London), 3 
7 Townshend, op. cit. n.5, 36 
8 See Porter, op. cit. n.6, 1-35. This chapter's opening epigram is taken from page 23. 
9 Porter, op. cit. n.6, 151 
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political offences were sidelined (treason becoming effectively moribund, despite a brief 
swansong in the 1880s, beyond its application against those adhering to the enemy in 
wartime)10 through the Explosive Substances Act 1883 and through the Official Secrets 
Acts 1889 and 1911. Unresponsive neutrality laws were reformulated in the Foreign 
Enlistment Act 1870, outlawing both the production of armaments for belligerents that 
might draw the United Kingdom into war and the enlistment of British subjects in foreign 
armed forces. A standing legislative mechanism for the expropriation of land was 
established through the Defence Act 1842. 
Moreover, the decades from the 1870s onwards are notable for the progressive 
accretion of statutory provisions detailing the extraordinary powers that the British 
government possessed in time of 'imminent national danger or great emergency,' 11 in 
addition to the residual powers bound up in the royal prerogative of defence. Such powers 
were evidently capable of being exercised in broader circumstances than those of 'actual or 
apprehended invasion.' 12 They can be found in legislation such as the Regulation of the 
Forces Act 1871, the Militia Act 1882, the National Defence Act 1888, the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1894 and the Aerial Navigation Acts 1911 and 1913, and call into question 
Dicey's assertion that English law knew no equivalent to the French etat de siege. 13 Whilst 
the common law included no such concept, the string of statutes cited above built up an 
impressive array of powers that could be, and were, exercised in circumstances short of 
war.
14 
10 R. v. Ahlers [1915] 84 LJKB 901, R. v. Casement [1917] I KB 98, Joyce v. DPP [1946] AC 347 
11 s.l8 Militia Act 1882 
12 An ability to call out the Volunteers on the basis of 'imminent national danger or great emergency' was 
substituted in place of this phraseology, found in s.17 Volunteer Act 1863, by s.1 Volunteer Act 1900. 
13 Dicey, A., Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, (1960, lOth Ed., London), 230-31 
14 Baty & Morgan list numerous proclamations issued under these powers made in the crucial early days of 
August 1914, many of which predated the declaration of war which became effective at 1lpm, 4th August 
1914. Baty, T. & Morgan, J., War, Its Conduct and Legal Results, (1915, London), 429-436. 
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Evidently, by the early years of the twentieth century, the mid-Victorian confidence 
that had artificially suppressed the development of national security law had been replaced 
by insularity, uncertainty and no small degree of fear. In this climate, successive 
governments laid the foundation stones of the modem 'secret state' by establishing the 
'organisations and legislation that are concerned with British national security policy.' 15 
With the laying of these ample foundations the "Age of Treason" drew to a close, well 
within Queen Victoria's long reign. 16 
Following the outbreak of the First World War, Baty and Morgan undertook the 
first comprehensive evaluation of the multifarious domestic legal implications of Britain's 
fighting a major war in Europe. They considered that previous constitutional jurists had 
suffered a collective blind-spot obscuring the nature of emergency powers under the maxim 
inter arma silent leges. 17 Looking beyond this failure of legal scholarship, they saw that 
'the common law has much to say ... of the safety of the realm and the prerogative in 
relation thereto.' 18 Not only did modem national security legislation exist prior to the First 
World War, but that the judiciary had encountered these enactments and developed 
sophisticated jurisprudence in relation to them. 
The Emergence of the term "National Security" 
Before turning to analyse the maturity of the judicial conception of national security 
concerns in the decades preceding the First World War, it is necessary to establish that the 
judiciary had developed at least the language of security analysis. This requires an 
15 Rogers, A., Secrecy and Power in the British State, (1997, London), 3 
16 The brief exposition above is by no means comprehensive. In the late 1890s Crown lawyers painstakingly 
amassed fully 576 pages of disparate statutes affecting military operations. See Townshend, op. cit. n.S, 46 
17 Cicero, Oralio Pro Annio Milone, 54 BC 
18 Baty & Morgan, op. cit. n.l4, x 
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explanation of this study's seemingly anachronistic focus upon "national security" concerns 
in a pre-war period. Whilst this period pre-dates the use of the term in legal circles, a 
variety of corresponding parlance was used from the mid-Victorian era onwards, and can be 
shown to overlap with, and ultimately coalesce into, this modem terminology. 
Unsurprisingly, the media would coin the phrase long before it premiered in the 
rarefied air of the courtroom. One early reference came in relation to the Channel Fleet's 
calamitous manreuvres during its summer voyage to Norway in June 1908, The Times 
describing Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, whose negligent orders almost resulted in a 
collision at sea, as 'a serious menace to our national security.' 19 
In legal circles the use of the expression likely emerged as an umbrella term 
covering the subject matter of the various enactments, regulations and proclamations of the 
initial weeks of the First World War. As Lord Shaw stated in his famous dissent in ex parte 
Zadig, 'after the outbreak of war ... it is plain from the Statute-book that Parliament was 
much engrossed in the subject of national security and defence. ' 20 Through such 
promptings, counsel would with time have doubtless recognised the advantages of 
truncating the unwieldy statements of the purpose laid down in the wartime legislation and 
regulations.21 However, the importance of one soon-to-be 'much-quoted'22 obiter dicta 
would ensure that the term "national security" was on the lips of those practitioners, 
academics and judges engaged in this sphere. 
Delving into the historical use of "national security" in legal circles, Lustgarten and 
Leigh traced the etymology of the term to the Privy Council decision in The Zamora. In 
what was certainly the most intriguing assertion of"national security" in a First World War 
19 Massie, R., Dreadnought, (1992, London), 533 
20 R. v. Halliday, ex parte Zadig [ 1917] AC 260, 278 
21 s.1(1) Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act 1914 stated that the Act permitted the issue ofregu1ations 
for 'securing the public safety and the defence of the realm.' 
22 Lustgarten & Leigh, op. cit. n.1, 326 
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case, Lord Parker asserted that 'those who are responsible for the national security must be 
the sole judges of what the national security requires. It is obviously undesirable that such 
matters be made the subject of evidence in a court of law. ' 23 It may well be that the 
repetition of this key phrase, a cornerstone of the Crown's arguments in the remaining 
wartime cases,24 did much to cement the phrase "national security" in legal parlance across 
the common law world, 25 to the detriment of its plethora of predecessors. 
The use of "national security" as a legal concept therefore emerged during the First 
World War as an umbrella term formed 'from earlier notions of the defence of the realm 
and war powers. ' 26 Indeed it emerged as a usurper just as the term 'defence of the realm' 
appeared to be in the ascendant, replacing the previous label "war powers," most likely 
because politicians and draftsmen of the time regarded the assumption of extraordinary 
"defensive" powers 'as having a less aggressive and more morally appealing 
connotation. '27 
However, the pedigree of "national security" can perhaps be directly traced to the 
National Defence Act 1888?8 Contemporary jurisprudence saw reference to issues of 
'national safety,'29 'defence of the country,'30 or statutes that granted the Monarch powers 
in relation to 'matters affecting the peace and safety of her people and her forces. ' 31 With 
the judiciary still adapting to the mounting assertions of "public interest" made by the 
23 The Zamora [1916] 2 AC 77, 107, per Lord Parker 
24 In Lipton v. Ford, for example, Sir F.E. Smith, A-G asserted, supposedly on the basis of ex parte Zadig (for 
reasons of precedent value), but in the language of The Zamora, that 'the powers conferred upon those 
responsible for national security are of the widest possible character.' Lipton v. Ford [1917] 2 KB 647, 651 
25 Within a matter of months Lord Parker's conception of the Executive's "national security" powers was 
eagerly incorporated into Australian jurisprudence; Farey v. Burvett (1916) 21 CLR 433,456, per Isaacs J 
26 Lustgarten & Leigh, op. cit. n.1, 323 
27 ibid., 326 
28 The emergent term 'national defense' is also found in U.S. enactments in the pre-war era. See for example 
the fourth clause of the Defense Secrets Act 1911. 
29 R. v. Rumble (1864) 4 F & F 175,201 per Cockburn CJ 
30 Hawley v. Steele (1877) LR 6 Ch. D. 521, 527, per Jessel MR 
31 Hunter v. Coleman (1914) 2 IR 372, 381, per Dodd J 
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increasing interventionism of the state of this era, national security issues were even 
packaged as matters of 'urgent public importance. ' 32 
Probably the best known, and the most venerable, forerunner of "national security" 
is Cicero's "sal us populi" maxim. 33 In the hands of English jurists, the assertion that sal us 
populi suprema lex, morphed into a Latin forerunner to Lord Parker's assertion in The 
Zamora. Whilst literally translated as 'the good of the people is the supreme law,' Grotius 
adapted the phrase to encapsulate the argument that in cases of 'extreme and inevitable' 
peril for the nation, even individual resistance to the sovereign could be justified.34 Kahn 
cogently asserts that the history of the maxim in English law dates to the adaptation of 
Grotius's writings to form the basis of the "reasons of state" arguments prevalent in Civil 
War-era parliamentarian treatises on the right to resist the Monarch.35 Ironically this 
totemic phrase would inform both sides of the legal debate presaging the Civil War, 
seemingly underpinning the majority opinion in the Ship-Money case36 and the Royalist 
arguments that the King could not be stripped of the powers necessary to defend the 
nation.37 
During the First World War the English courts vigorously reasserted this maxim, 
and employed its attendant pre-Civil War jurisprudence, to explain their generous 
interpretation of state powers to deal with emergencies. 38 But this does not mean that it 
was utterly neglected in the intervening three hundred years. The re-discovery of this rule 
32 Blundell v The King [ 1905] 1 KB 516 
33 Cicero, 'De Legibus,' III, 3 
34 Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, (1625) Book I, Chap. IV, Sect. VII and Haakonssen, K., ed., Grotius, The 
Rights of War and Peace, (2005, Indianapolis), 356 
35 Kahn, V., Wayward Contracts: The Crisis of Political Obligation in England, 1640-1674, (2004, 
Princeton), 34 & 37 
36 R v. Hampden (1637) 3 Howell's State Trials 825. See Chapter 5 below. 
37 Wentworth to Hutton J, 1639, 'The power of levies of forces at sea and land for the very, not feigned, relief 
and safety of the publick, is such a property of sovereignty, as were the crown willing, yet it cannot divest 
itself thereof: sa/us populi suprema lex.' See Holdsworth, W., History of English Law, (1924, London), vol. 
VI, 75 
38 In the Matter of A Petition of Right [1915] 3 KB 649,652, per Avory J 
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of interpretation in relation to state action can be traced to the case of The International, 
where Phillimore J considered the significance of 'interest reipublicce' 39 in relation to the 
British government's active assertion of the neutrality laws to prevent the country from 
being drawn into the Franco-Prussian War.40 
Therefore, from the mid-Victorian era onwards the legal establishment relied upon a 
variety of expressions that roughly equate to the modem term "national security." 
Moreover, they applied these expressions across a broad swathe of modem security-
oriented legislation. This study must therefore establish a structure facilitating analysis of 
the judicial application of salus populi, and the associated development of the interpretive 
approaches, from the maxim's mid-Victorian reappearance to its wartime zenith.41 
The Structure of this Study 
The remainder of this chapter constitutes a brief explanation of how the substantive 
body of this study will dissect the diverse tracts of law involving national security concerns 
in this pre-war transitional era. Unfortunately, the limitations upon this study prevent the 
comprehensive appraisal of significant elements of pre-war national security jurisprudence, 
such as the judiciary's changing conception of martial law. However, a combination of the 
mid-Victorian anathema towards martial law,42 the controversial cases of Nelson & 
Brand,43 Eyre44 and Marais45 spanning the Victorian and Edwardian eras, and the 
39 Interest reipublicre being applied as an alternative to the sa/us populi maxim to denote an interest of state. 
40 
'The International' (1871) 3 A&E 321, 333 
41 eg; Norman v. Mathews (1916) 32 TLR, 303, 304, per Lush J and Micheals v. Block (1918) 34 TLR 438, 
438 per Darling J 
42 Townshend states that discussion of the topic was a 'public taboo;' Townshend, op. cit. n.5, 47 
43 R. v. Nelson & Brand(1867), Cockburn's Special Report 
44 R. v. Eyre ( 1867-68) LR 3 QB 487 and Phillips v. Eyre (1870) 6 QB 1 
45 Marais v. The General Officer Commanding the Lines of Communication and the Attorney-General of the 
Colony, ex parte Marais [ 1902] AC I 09 
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contemporary academic debate between Finlason,46 Dicey,47 Pollock48 and Baty & 
Morgan49 as to the nature of martial law as a rule ofthe common law or the prerogative and 
its role during emergencies or wartime, have ensured that a lasting intrigue has surrounded 
the topic. Townshend has undertaken detailed consideration of the social and political 
implications of the changing attitude towards martial law in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, 50 whilst Simpson has briefly analysed the topic from a legal 
standpoint.51 This existing analysis of the pre-war judicial approach to martial law 
therefore provides justification for its omission from this study. 
Readers should also note the want of an analysis of repressive legislation in 
Victorian Ireland, including the "Westmeath Act,"52 the "Coercion Act,"53 the Prevention 
of Crime (Ireland) Act 1882 and the ruthlessly applied "Irish Crimes Act."54 However, of 
these, the 1871 and 1881 Acts carried 'ouster' clauses; judicial supervision of detentions 
being effectively excluded through the statutory provision that all arrest warrants carried 
'conclusive evidence of their own legitimacy. ' 55 By contrast the 1882 and longer-lived 
1887 Acts were procedural in effect, removing rights to jury trial in relation to certain 
offences. Dicey's failure to evaluate the effects of all of this legislation properly has 
certainly not gone unnoticed; 56 Ewing and Gearty alleging that his analysis was influenced 
by the fact that this repressive legislation 'was oriented against those with whose opinions 
46 Finlason, W., A Treatise on Martial Law, as Allowed by the Law of England in Time of Rebellion, (1866, 
London) 
47 Dicey, op. cit. n.l3, 287-290 
48 Pollock, F., 'What is Martial Law?' (1902) 18 LQR 151 
49 Baty & Morgan, op. cit. n.14, 3-7 & 17-25 
50 Townshend, C., 'Martial Law, Legal and Administrative Problems of Civil Emergency in Britain and the 
Empire 1800-1940,' (1982) Historical Journal 25 
51 Simpson, A., Human Rights and the End of Empire, (2001, Oxford), 58-71 
52 1871, 34 Viet. c.25; This legislation lapsed in 1875. 
53 1881, 44 Viet. c.4; This legislation lapsed in September 1882 after the dramatic events of the Kilmainham 
Treaty. 
54 Criminal Law and Procedure (Ireland) Act 1887 
55 Simpson, op. cit. n.51, 80 
56 Dicey, op. cit. n.13, 231-232. 
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he was in profound disagreement, in a part of the Kingdom that happened not to be 
England.' 57 Perhaps the Irish judiciary's silence over these Acts is in itself deafening, but 
this potentially rich seam will have to await another miner. 
Yet the most obvious area of pre-war security law neglected in this study concerns 
successive governments' efforts to contain the threats posed by foreign anarchists and 
communards, home-grown socialism, Irish republicanism and espionage. This area is not 
disregarded for lack of interesting jurisprudence. The need to appease foreign governments 
angered by the use of the United Kingdom as a refuge, 58 produced the dramatic Freiheit 
prosecutions, where the defendants were convicted of libel for 'eulogising' the Phoenix 
Park murders,59 and for incitement to murder for 'exulting' the murder of the Tsar in 1880 
in terms likely to encourage further killings of Heads of State. 60 The judiciary accepted that 
'libels which bring persons into hatred or contempt may apply to persons outside the 
dominions of the King, because they are likely to bring the peaceful relations existing 
between states to an end.'61 
Significantly, whilst the government response to socialist rioting in Trafalgar 
Square in 1886 was to bring charges of sedition, for exciting ill will between different 
classes, against the speakers at the earlier rally (including future cabinet minister John 
Bums),62 Cave J responded with a balanced jury direction that Ingraham described as 'the 
high water mark of English judicial liberalism. '63 
51 Ewing, K. & Gearty, C., The Struggle for Civil Liberties, (2000, Oxford), 332 
58 The indictment in R. v. Most citing 'the great danger of [dissident incitements] creating discord between our 
said Lady the Queen, and the said sovereigns and rulers of Europe.' (1880-81) L.R. 7 Q.B.D. 244, 245 
59 R. v. Mertens (unreported). See Stephen, J., A History of the Criminal Law of England, (1883, London) vol. 
II, 362 
60 Most, op. cit. n.58, 251-252, per Lord Coleridge CJ. See Porter, B., The Refugee Question in mid-Victorian 
Politics, (1979, Cambridge), 208 
61 R. v. Antonelli and Barberi (1905) 70 JP 6, per Phillimore J 
62 R. v. Burns and others (1886) 18 Cox CC 355 
63 Ingraham, B., Political Crime in Europe: A Comparative Study of France, Germany and England, (1979, 
Berkeley), 209 
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Moreover, the 18 80s saw the first London underground bombings. 64 Conducted in 
1883 by Irish Republicans, they were part of a wave of terrorist activity across the United 
Kingdom. Emergency legislation was rushed through Parliament in a single sitting.65 A 
radical overhaul of the state security system was undertaken. 66 Prominent figures 
prophesied the 'massacre of thousands' at the hands of the bombers,67 and lambasted 
moderates amongst the terrorists' community for failing to prevent such outrages. 68 And, 
significantly, a string of treason-felony cases were brought against suspected bombers, in 
which the judiciary struggled to maintain the relevance of the dilapidated offences of 
treason and sedition in order that they remained viable tools to counter the rapidly changing 
threats to national security in this era.69 
Lustgarten and Leigh contend that the Official Secrets Acts 1889 and 1911 
amounted to the somewhat unlikely legislative successor to sedition. 70 With a government 
increasingly eager to protect information/1 and the country increasingly paranoid about 
espionage, 72 a quiescent judiciary did not demur in the face of efforts to tighten the law by 
shifting burdens of proof onto defendants. 73 
However, the shift away from 'a state of law [which] seemed more appropriate to 
Gilbertian utopia than to modern England,' 74 has already received comprehensive attention 
64 The bombs, exploding on board trains near Praed Street and Westminster Bridge stations, injured seventy-
two. See, Short, K., The Dynamite War: Irish-American bombers in Victorian Britain, (1979, Dublin), 160-
163 
65 The Explosive Substances Act 1883 completed its passage through Parliament on 9th April 1883 
66 The Irish Special Branch was formed as part of the response to this campaign. See Porter, B., The Origins 
of Britain's Political Police, Warwick Working Papers in Social History, No. 3 (1985) 
6 Stevenson, R., The Dynamiter, (1885, London), 59. 
68 ibid., 1. Stevenson attacked the silence of Irish nationalist leader C. S. Parnell in the wake of these attacks. 
69 R. v. Gallagher and others (1883) 15 Cox CC 291, 315, per Lord Coleridge CJ; 'If three men with these 
explosive materials did the same acts with the same objects as it required 3,000 men to do in an earlier period 
when it was a levying of war ... the acts of three men today were equally a levying of war.' 
70 Lustgarten & Leigh, op. cit. n.1, 198 
71 Hooper, D., Official Secrets: The Use and Abuse of the Act, (1987, London), 17-31 
72 Porter, op. cit. n.6, 149-180 
73 SeeR. v. Parrott (1913) 8 Cr App Rep 186. See Williams, D., Not in the Public Interest: The Problem of 
Security in Democracy, (1965, London), 16-38 
74 National Archives, KV 1/35. See Ewing & Gearty, op. cit. n.57, 37-43 
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from legal writers and historians. Whilst it is hoped that the above precis of the relevant 
jurisprudence will provide a point of reference for readers, the attention of this study will 
instead focus upon a series of vignettes, each involving significant, but hitherto neglected, 
bodies of jurisprudence. These cases saw the judiciary, from the 1860's onwards, 
undertake (or eschew) consideration of their decisions' national security implications. All 
of these areas of law primarily relate to national security being used as an interpretive tool 
rather than as a justification for state action. These vignettes were also chosen for their 
ability to showcase the law in a state of flux, with the judiciary attempting to keep pace 
with the demands of an ever-expanding sphere of national security policy and legislation. 
The first body of case law resulted from foreign conflicts from the early 1860s 
onwards, and involved the interpretation of the opaque Foreign Enlistment Act 1819, a 
criminal statute intended to protect Britain from being pulled into a conflict through the 
involvement of British mercenaries or due to her shipyards building warships for one of the 
belligerents. In the Foreign Enlistment Act cases, at the height of the American Civil War, 
the mid-Victorian judiciary considered whether the requirements of national security could 
influence the interpretation of statutory provisions with implications for the defendant's 
liberty and property rights, fully half a century before the outbreak of the First World War. 
Such decisions on the scope of Britain's neutrality laws continued after the 1819 
Act was superseded by the Foreign Enlistment Act 1870. Parliament intended this 
legislation to seal the loopholes that had emerged in the earlier jurisprudence. The second 
substantive chapter will therefore evaluate these legislative reforms and the jurisprudence 
that they spawned during the Franco-Prussian War and beyond, culminating in the 
application of this legislation in the aftermath of the Jameson Raid. 
Property interests are at the heart of the third body of jurisprudence examined 
within this study. The interplay between such interests and national security is especially 
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significant in the period under consideration. The provisions of the Defence Acts and their 
sister statutes permitted the compulsory purchase of land required for the defence of the 
realm.75 Their attendant cases involve a clash between the tum-of-the-century judiciary's 
emerging conception of national security and their supposed proclivity towards property 
interests.76 This clash arose both in the courts' assessment ofthe breadth of the executive's 
discretion to acquire land under the Defence Acts and in terms of the compensation 
awarded where land was expropriated under these Acts by comparison to other statutory 
schemes. 
The final substantive analysis focuses upon miscellaneous cases involving national 
security concerns, tied together by their link to the armaments industry. This disparate pre-
war case law throws the judiciary's evolving attitude towards national security concerns 
into stark relief. Moreover, Hunter v. Coleman77 provides an opportunity to examine the 
divided loyalties of an Irish judiciary called upon to evaluate orders preventing the import 
of arms into Ireland as the "Ulster Crisis" peaked. This long-overlooked authority brings 
this study up to the summer of 1914. 
By this point, whether the wartime jurisprudence involved the judiciary ploughing 
an existing furrow, or marked a new point of departure for judicial interpretation, will be 
evident. However, in concluding this study attention must focus upon the influence of the 
pre-war national security decisions upon the direction of the wartime legislation and on 
providing a comprehensive explanation for the erosion of the mid-Victorian judiciary's 
apparent liberalism. 
75 Rubin, G., 'The Royal Prerogative or a Statutory Code? The War Office and Contingency Legal Planning, 
1885- 1914,' in Eales, R. & Sullivan, D., eds., The Political Context ofthe Law, (1987, London), 147; The 
Defence Act 1842 contained one of the first legislative references to the phrase 'defence of the realm.' 
76 Denning, Freedom Under the Law, (1949, London), 67; 'The judges in England in the nineteenth century 
were inclined to protect these [property] freedoms with as much vigour as they protected a man's personal 
freedom or his freedom of speech. In this they were wrong. They weighted the scales too heavily in favour 
of the rights of man.' 
77 Hunter, op. cit. n.31 
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[3] 
Neutrality in Judicial Hands: 
The Foreign Enlistment Act 1819 
'In the present enlightened state of the civilised world, it may turn 
out that the doctrine and those principles are to be preferred which 
would make us prosperous in peace rather than those that would 
make us successful in war . ' 
Chief Baron Pollock (1864) 
Introduction 
Today the assertion, barely a decade old, that 'cases involving national security, 
directly or merely as an undertone, do not bulk large in the judicial calendar,' 1 might be 
considered more truism than truth. In time of national emergency, the prominent and 
controversial role of lawyers and judges in shaping the law regarding national security 
belies the numerical insignificance of the associated case load. However, this role does not 
stretch back into time immemorial. Indeed, whilst it might appear that few periods in 
recent British history would forgive the above excerpt from the florid judicial hyperbole of 
Pollock CB,2 it appears to sit perfectly in the supreme self-confidence of the mid-Victorian 
era from which it came. Prior to this era it is impossible to trace even the origins of many 
1 Lustgarten, L. & Leigh, 1., In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy, (1994), 
Oxford, 320 
2 Attorney-General v. Sill em (1864) 159 ER 178, 221 
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aspects of the modem judicial approach to national security concerns, relevant case law 
being scarce since the Glorious Revolution.3 
Yet it is to this era that this study turns for its beginning, in an effort to trace and to 
place in context, the course of a little-known stream of jurisprudence where salus populi 
did not outweigh all opposing concerns, even in the face of 'imminent danger' to the nation 
and of the furore in Parliament.4 This was an era when Britain's role as the world's great 
maritime power came close to dragging the country into conflicts in which it sought to 
remain neutral, and when Britain's legal defences against this threat to her neutrality lay in 
the hands of the judiciary. 
Use of the Foreign Enlistment Act Prior to the American Civil War 
Whilst its preamble characterises the purpose of the Foreign Enlistment Act 1819 
(FEA) as preventing mischief that "may be prejudicial to, and tend to endanger, the peace 
and welfare of this Kingdom," modem jurists might consider the Act's 'two distinct and 
several objects' 5 to involve matters only indirectly relevant to the requirements of national 
security. The legislation's first concern, found in s.2, was 'the enlisting or engagement 
without licence of British subjects to serve in foreign service. ' 6 Its second object, found in 
s. 7, concerned 'the fitting out or equipping in British dominions of vessels for warlike 
purposes.' 7 Indeed, many of the legal arguments presented in the case law that arose from 
attempts to seize ships under this provision would be recognised today as disputes over 
3 Burmah Oil v. Lord Advocate (1965) AC 75, 99, per Lord Reid 
4 Cobden, R., Speeches on Public Policy by Richard Cobden, MP., (1908, 3'd Ed., London), Vol II, Speech I, 
24th April1863; calling for a robust application of the Foreign Enlistment Act 1819. 
5 Sillem, op. cit. n.2, 230, per Channell B 
6 ibid, 230 
7 ibid, 230 
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whether the as yet unarmed hulls of vessels that were clearly men-of-war could yet be 
considered to be dual-use goods.8 
However, in order to appreciate the significance of the case law relating to these 
provisions, both the aim of the legislation and the executive's use of it must be considered 
in context. The involvement of British mercenaries in the insurrections that swept Spain's 
South American colonies in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars obliged Parliament to enact 
legislation to prevent the actions of British subjects from dragging the country into war 
with other powers. 9 Eager to establish these restrictions, known to history as the "neutrality 
laws,"10 before relations with Spain were seriously undermined, the government modelled 
its legislation on an Act of the United States Congress of 1793 which had been introduced 
in order to prevent the United States from being drawn into the Napoleonic Wars due to 
French attempts to commission privateers to prey on British shipping from ports such as 
Baltimore and Boston. During the passage of the 1819 Act, Canning acknowledged that 'if 
I wished for a guide in the system of neutrality, I should take that laid down by America in 
the days of the Presidency ofWashington.' 11 
Thereafter, as the upheaval of the Napoleonic era gave way to a century of 
"splendid isolation," the FEA served as a legislative affirmation of the preoccupation of 
Victorian statesmen with avoiding entanglement in disputes between and within foreign 
powers. Whilst the very effectiveness of the pax Britannica largely stripped the FEA of 
purpose, even when the opportunity did arise to invoke its provisions, infractions went 
unchallenged. A notable early example of ignorance of the FEA is the service of Admiral 
8 This modem term could be equated to the nineteenth-century international law doctrine of ancipitis usus, 
under which an item could be treated as contraband 'where it becomes essential or greatly helpful to the 
belligerent for his warlike purposes.' Christie, J., 'Contraband of War,' (1898) Jurid Rev. 296, 301 and Baty, 
T., 'Some Questions in the Law of Neutrality,' (1902) 4 J. Soc. Camp. Legis. (n.s.) 128, 128 
9 Macdonell, J., 'Some Notes on Neutrality,' (1899) I J. Soc. Camp. Legis. (n.s.) 62,67 
1° Cook, A., The Alabama Claims: American Politics and Anglo-American Relations, 1865-1872, (1975, New 
York), 16 
11 Canning's Speeches, vol. V, 50 
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Sir Charles Napier during the struggles for the Portuguese Crown as commander of the 
Portuguese Queen's fleet which broke the blockade of her forces at Oporto in 1833.12 
Porter has noted that as late as the early 1860s the Act was 'very conspicuously neglected 
by the government' 13 in light of contraventions by those seeking to find recruits for the 
Polish insurgency or for the British Legion of Garibaldi's army. 14 As late as September 
1860, government officials felt secure in the view that such recruitment was 'illegal no 
doubt, but this is a law which may be enforced or not according to circumstances.' 15 Porter 
conjectures that the bases for this laissez-faire attitude included a fear amongst officials that 
trials would only serve to publicise such recruitment, an eagerness amongst politicians not 
to be seen to support illiberal European powers in their struggles against insurgencies 
which enjoyed the support of the public, and a disgruntled effort to balance these activities 
against the recruitment amongst Irishmen to fight at the behest the Pope. 16 The FEA 
languished in this virtually mothballed state, largely unconsidered by the judiciary, until the 
actions of the Confederacy during the American Civil War of 1861-65 forced the British 
government to resurrect its provisions in order to uphold Britain's neutrality. 17 
12 See Dobree v. Napier 2 Bing NC 781 for an example of judicial disregard for this offence when raised by 
the owners of a British ship seized by Napier's forces whilst running contraband to the forces of Don Miguel. 
13 Porter, B., The Refugee Question in mid- Victorian Politics, ( 1979, Cambridge), 207 
14 When one prominent recruiter for the Polish cause, Captain Alfred Styles, was brought to trial under the 
FEA it was by the Russian and not the British government; National Archives, HO 4517514 & TS 2511281 
(14th September 1863) 
15 Waddington to Home Office, 5th September 1860, National Archives, HO 4517019 
16 Porter, op. cit. n.l3, 204-208 
17 Some evidence suggests that earlier authorities on the interpretation of s.7 FEA may simply have been lost 
due to the inefficient system of law reporting prior to the establishment of the Incorporated Council in 1865. 
Daniel cites a section of a pamphlet of the era, agitating for a system of official Law Rep01ts, which asserts 
that there had been a decision as to the construction of this provision by Coleman J in the early 1850s, but that 
'of this no other than a newspaper report could be found.' Daniel, W., The History and Origin of the Law 
Reports, ( 1884, London), 87 
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Early Civil-War Foreign Enlistment Act Cases 
On the 13th May 1861, exactly a month after the fall of Fort Sumter and the collapse 
of the United States into civil war, the Royal Proclamation of neutrality was publicly read 
from the steps of the Royal Exchange by the Serjeant-at-Arms and Common Crier of the 
City of London, in accordance with ancient custom. The majority of third states adopted a 
similar position of neutrality, allowing them 'to prevent the war's spread to Europe, and to 
continue peaceful trade relations with each of the warring parties.' 18 
The secessionist states, possessing no fighting ships and little shipbuilding industry, 
were quickly (if, initially, quite ineffectively) blockaded by the Federal navy. 19 The 
Confederacy therefore looked overseas for shipyards that might provide warships capable 
of breaking this strangle-hold on her trade. In Britain, shipyards in ports such as Liverpool, 
a city which the Foreign Secretary, Lord Russell, described as 'specially addicted to 
Southern proclivities, foreign slave trade and domestic bribery,'20 were eager to service 
such requirements.21 
Initially the British government was slow to react to this Confederate shipbuilding 
programme, largely conducted under the auspices of Fraser, Trenholm & Company, and in 
1862 the CSS Florida and the famed CSS Alabama were allowed to slip down the Mersey 
and into history. Lord Russell was initially only prepared to acknowledge that the 
construction of such vessels 'contravened the spirit if not the letter of the neutrality laws,'22 
18 Chadwick, E., 'Back to the Future: Three Civil Wars and the law of Neutrality,' (1996) 1 J. Armed Conflict 
L. 1, 1 
19 Lincoln declared the Federal blockade on 19th April 1861, but Lord Russell refused to officially recognise 
the blockade as effective until February 1862. 
20 Russell to Lyons (Britain's representative in Washington), 24th October 1863 
21 See Merli, F., Great Britain and the Confederate Navy, 1861-1865, (1970, Indiana). This is the most 
comprehensive historical analysis of the attempts of Confederate agents to build a navy in European shipyards 
and the efforts of Federal diplomats to thwart them. 
22 See Adams, D., Great Britain and the American Civil War, (1926, New York) vol. II, 118-119 
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and the government declined to take any action until it was too late. This lackadaisical 
attitude was born of the uncertainty surrounding international law and whether 'the duty of 
impartiality [upon neutrals] should extend to state control over private commercial 
activities such as shipbuilding performed "to order" for belligerent naval operations. ' 23 
When it was belatedly accepted by the Law Officers that the construction of the then 
unnamed vessel No. 290 at Laird Brothers' shipyard in Birkenhead constituted a possible 
breach of domestic law under s. 7 FEA 1819, after considerable evidence had been gathered 
by United States agents,24 a series of tragi-comic blunders delayed the order for her seizure 
until 29th July 1862.25 She had sailed the day before.26 The Alabama went on to capture 
nearly sixty Northern merchantmen, making her numerically 'the most successful privateer 
of modem times. ' 27 
By 1863, with the Confederate commerce raiders inflicting an increasing toll on the 
North's shipping and with the construction at the Laird shipyard of two next-generation 
1,500-ton ironclad-rams posing an immediate threat to the North's naval supremacy,28 the 
23 Chadwick, op. cit. n.18, 7 
24 Atherton & Palmer to Earl Russell, 29th July 1862, in The Case of Great Britain to be Laid Before the 
Tribunal of Arbitration, Convened at Geneva, (1872, Washington), Vol. I, 445-446. Details of the evidence 
~athered by Dudley, US Consul in Liverpool, can be found from 486-496. 
5 The sudden insanity of the Queen's Advocate, Sir John Harding, of whom Russell sought advice, caused a 
delay of a crucial four days in the moves to detain the vessel. See Palmer, R, Memorials, (1896, London), Part 
I, Vol. II, 427 
26 See (1893) 94 LT News 490 for the story of how Confederate agents intercepted the opinions of one of the 
Law Officers, who had dispatched them through a rural post office in South Wales whilst on a fishing trip, 
and accelerated Alabama's putting to sea. 
27 Cook, op. cit. n.1 0, 15 
28 It is difficult to appreciate how revolutionary the ocean-going Laird Rams were at their inception, or the 
gravity of the threat that they posed to the "wooden-walled" navies of the era. With their great iron prows 
they resembled updated triremes rather than modem warships. However, in the wake of the iron-clad CSS 
Virginia's action at Hampton Roads, on 8th March 1862, when she had rammed and sank the 1,700 ton 
corvette USS Cumberland (the corvette's shells being seen to bounce off its armoured assailant) it was evident 
that iron-clads were the weapon with which the Confederacy could end the North's stranglehold on her trade. 
Confederate commissioning officer Captain Bulloch wrote that 'I designed these ships for something more 
than harbour or even coast defence, and I confidently believe ... they could sweep away the entire blockading 
fleet of the enemy.' See Adams, op. cit. n.22, vol. II, Chapter XIII, 116-151 
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Federal government became increasingly vociferous in their complaints?9 The intended 
recipient of these vessels may have been common knowledge, but the Liberal government 
again insisted that there were no grounds on which such a seizure could be warranted.30 
Adams, Lincoln's ambassador in London, bitterly remarked in correspondence with Lord 
Russell that 'it would be superfluous in me to point out to your Lordship that this is war.' 31 
Whilst Baty regarded such posturing as an 'absurd position,'32 in his recent study of these 
events, Lord Bingham notes that 'the message was meant and understood as a serious 
threat. ' 33 Thereafter the vessels were indeed placed under surveillance and subsequently 
seized,34 although when the lawfulness of this seizure was challenged, 'the outcome of the 
trial was regarded as ... so uncertain' that the government instead brought an end to the 
legal proceedings by purchasing the rams for £220,000 for the Royal Navy.35 
The government's avoidance of a trial not simply out of concern for public 
opinion36 but was more importantly a by-product of the vagaries of s. 7 FEA 1819. In full 
this section ran to a phenomenal five hundred words. Yet even at this length this was an 
overloaded provision, attempting to create offences of not only equipping, furnishing or 
fitting out with intent, but also of attempting or endeavouring to equip (with intent), 
procuring to be equipped (with intent) and furthermore aiding, assisting or being concerned 
in equipping (with intent). The operative part this provision asserts; 
29 Chadwick, op. cit. n.l8, note 43; It is ironic to note that less than a decade earlier the U.S. refused to sign 
the 1856 Paris Declaration respecting Maritime law on the basis that it needed privateers. 
30 TS 25/1270 (24th Jul~ 1863) & TS 25/1274 (19th August 1863) 
31 Adams to Russell, 51 September 1863. See Adams, op. cit. n.22, vol. II, 144 
32 Baty, op. cit. n.8, 208 
33 Bingham, Lord, 'The Alabama Claims Arbitration,' (2005) 54 ICLQ 1, 8 
34 It must be noted that correspondence of 3 rd September 1863 indicates that 'Russell had already decided to 
stop the Laird rams before the United States' ultimatum of 1863 reached him.' Cook, op. cit. n.l 0, 27 
35 Bingham, 'The Alabama Claims Arbitration,' (2005) 54 ICLQ 1-25, 8 
36 Which certainly played a role, Bingham noting that 'Russell was very keen to avoid a trial in Liverpool;' 
Bingham, op. cit. n.33, 8 
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'That if any person, within any part of the United Kingdom, or in 
any part of His Majesty's dominions beyond the seas, shall, without 
the leave and licence of His Majesty for that purpose first had and 
obtained as aforesaid, equip, furnish, fit-out or arm, or procure to be 
equipped, furnished, fitted-out, or armed, or shall knowingly aid, 
assist, or be concerned in the equipping, furnishing, fitting-out, or 
arming of any Ship or Vessel with intent or in order that such Ship 
or Vessel shall be employed in the service of any Foreign Prince, 
State, or Potentate, or of any Foreign Colony, Province, or part of 
any Province or People, . . . as a Transport or Store-ship, or with 
intent to cruise or commit hostilities against any Prince, State, or 
Potentate, ... with whom His Majesty shall not then be at war, ... 
every such person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanour ... ' 
The difficulty that the Crown would face in enforcing s. 7 FEA during the Laird-
rams debacle, and thereafter against the other recalcitrant shipyards of the Thames, the 
Clyde and the Mersey, became apparent following the seizure of the 300-ton screw sloop 
Alexandra as she approached completion at the Miller and Son yards in April 1863. 
Decisions upon the resulting case, Attorney-General v. Sillem31 run to nearly one hundred 
pages in the law reports. The trial, and subsequent appeals, testify to the authorities' 'face-
about on declared policy' 38 when contrasted with their previous studied ambivalence 
towards the construction of suspected Confederate cruisers in British shipyards. But 
37 Sillem, op. cit. n.2 
38 Historian Douglass Adams referred to this volte-face as the 'April Policy,' after the date of the seizure of 
the Alexandra. Adams, op. cit. n.22, Vol. IT, 144 
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paradoxically, the court decisions threw the limitations upon s.7 FEA into sharp relief, and 
were undoubtedly influential in averting a high-profile trial in the Laird-rams case. 
It was contended that the Alexandra had been equipped with the intent that she be 
employed by the Confederate States of America, and naval authorities certified 'that her 
build was apparently for a gun-boat with low bulwarks, over which pivot guns could play 
and ... that she was not qualified for mercantile purposes.' 39 However in her unfinished 
condition, there had been no attempt, and no evidence of intent, to arm the Alexandra with 
pivot guns or cannon, and her builders attempted to invoke this loophole in the law to resist 
the seizure in the courts. 
The hearing, which took place in late June 1863, was moved to London because of 
local feeling. However this relocation could not protect government policy from the 
ravages of the redoubtable Pollock CB. His jury direction adopted a narrow interpretation 
of s. 7 FEA, which he justified on the basis that as the provision did nothing to prevent the 
sale of weapons of war other than ships. Instead, this provision only singled out the fitting-
out belligerent vessels due to the danger of their coming 'into hostile communication before 
they passed the neutral line; ' 40 thereby bringing the war to British waters. Moreover, a 
broad reading of the Act would conflict with his interpretation of international law, which 
'did not prohibit the sending of armed vessels, as well as munitions of war, to foreign ports 
for sale.' 41 Therefore the only question left for the jury was whether the defendants 
intended to fully fit her out at a British port, enabling her immediate engagement in hostile 
action. The defendants were found not guilty of such an offence without the jury even 
leaving the courtroom to deliberate.42 
39 Si/lem, op. cit. n.2, 237, per Pigott B (referring to the evidence of Captain Englefield of HMS Domestic) 
40 ibid.' 182 
41 The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheaton's Amer. Rep. 240,283, per Story J 
42 The Times, 25th June 1863 
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The Crown's appeal against this decision was heard in November 1863. The 
resulting decision may well be considered something of a showcase for the quirks of the 
English legal system prior to the Judicature Acts, for not only did Pollock CB give the 
leading judgment in an appeal from his own decision, but the majority decision by two 
Barons was opposed by the dissent of two Barons. Fortunately, such idiosyncrasies do not 
undermine the significance of the judgment. 
Given the circumstances in which the Alexandra was seized, and the loose language 
of s.7, the opposing lead barristers in this case, Attorney-General Sir Roundell Palmer and 
his predecessor as the Government's chief law officer, Sir Hugh Cairns, both recognised 
that the interpretation of this provision largely turned upon what the court considered to be 
the legislation's purpose. Cairns considered that 'the legislature never intended to prohibit 
the building of ships for belligerents, for it is not every description of equipment, furnishing 
and fitting out, which is forbidden, but only an equipment with intent or in order that the 
vessel may be used as a transport, or cruise or commit hostilities. '43 He further made 
comparison with s.8 FEA, which permitted the equipping or repair of a belligerent vessel 
that entered a British port, provided that she did not augment her warlike force (for 
example, by taking on additional cannon). Any lessening of the requirements of the actus 
reus for this offence would thus produce an absurdity, whereby 'the 7th section prohibits all 
equipments, whether warlike or not, and the gth section allows a ship armed with intent to 
cruise and commit hostilities to receive any equipment, provided it is not of a warlike 
character. ' 44 
By contrast, the interpretation sought by the Attorney-General attempted to conflate 
the "intention" with the "equipping," meaning that it would be possible for the intent on the 
43 Sillem, op. cit. n.2, 192 
44 ibid.' 193 
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part of the shipbuilders to colour the actual equipment of a vessel. The Crown contended 
that the seizure of an incomplete vessel would be possible if it was able to show that the 
shipyard intended to deliver to their clients a warship, even if she would be incapable of 
action on her departure from British waters. In such circumstances it was contended that 
even the laying down of a keel with such intention 'would be a misdemeanour and a 
forfeiture ofthe keel.' 45 
Whilst the four Barons who heard the case in the Court of Exchequer railed as one 
against the ineffective wording of s.7, their judgments displayed four diverse solutions to 
this problem. The interpretations of s. 7 adopted by Pollock CB and Bramwell B required 
that the state prove that there was at least an intent to arm the vessel within the United 
Kingdom or its dominions, whilst the dissenting decision of Channell B and the decision 
withdrawn by Pigott B,46 both interpreted the provision more broadly, in order that it might 
permit the seizure of the Alexandra in her existing state. 
Pollock CB based his narrow interpretation of s. 7 upon the view that the FEA had 
sought to single out vessels from any other munitions, which could be freely supplied to 
either belligerent, 'to prevent our shores from being made the points of departure of hostile 
expeditions commissioned and equipped to commit hostilities against a belligerent not at 
war with us.' 47 Thus, to contravene s.7 FEA, a shipyard would have to equip a vessel with 
the "means" to the "end" of committing hostilities, as 'in all common sense and 
understanding, if the nature of the equipment has no reference whatever to the commission 
of hostilities, it cannot be the "means to that end," and there is no breach of the statute by 
45 ibid., 192, per Sir Roundell Palmer A-G 
46 Pigott B withdrew his judgment, seemingly at the behest of the Lord Chief Baron (ibid., 242), allowing the 
government's rule for a new trial to be discharged. Interestingly, in an appraisal which appears to be 
obviously borne out in this case, Polden asserts that Pigott B was 'overshadowed by Pollock and Bramwell, 
[and] left little mark in the law reports.' Polden, P., 'Pigott, Sir Gillery (1813-1875)', Oxford DNB, (Oxford, 
2004), [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/22252, accessed 28th March 2006] 
47 Sillem, op. cit. n.2, 222 
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that sort of equipment. ' 48 Bramwell B adopted a similar approach to the question of 
equipment, considering that if s. 7 had instead made it illegal to "equip with intent or in 
order that the ship shall be employed in the service of a merchant in the whale fishery," 
then 'could it be said that any equipment or intent would be within the [scope of the] Act, 
unless the equipment was meant to be fit for whaling?'49 
Pollock CB found support for this narrow interpretation in s.8 FEA, which made it 
illegal to augment the armament of a foreign warship that entered a British or dominion 
port. The thrust of this argument,50 was that if the Crown's interpretation was accurate, 'a 
Federal vessel of war coming into our ports would be allowed, no doubt, to repair sea 
damage and to supply lost stores, in order to reach some other port, but the shipbuilder in 
our port would be equipping, furnishing, and fitting out that vessel knowing that the 
commander might cruise and commit hostilities against the so-called Confederate States.' 51 
However rather than ruminate upon the supposed 'inconsistency and absurdity, and may I 
add injustice,' 52 evident in such a comparison, Pollock CB might instead have recognised 
that this provision had its own distinct aim of encouraging reciprocal treatment of British 
warships when they required assistance from foreign powers. 
As to how the intent with which a vessel was built might affect the level of 
"equipment" that would breach the FEA, Bramwell B returned to his whaling analogy, 
stating that 'if a man builds a ship [for another person] to go on a whaling voyage, ... he 
does not build her with the intent that she shall go whaling unless he particularly adapts her 
48 ibid., 220, per Pollock CB 
49 ibid.' 224 
50 Somewhat contradicted by the dubious assertion that as s.S was not restricted to belligerent warships, the 
aim of the legislature was that 'our ports are not to be disturbed by a warlike armament at all,' ibid., 218. 
This was despite the fact that a warship could be legally built for any power with which Britain was not at 
war. 
51 ibid., 218 
52 ibid., 222 
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to that service. ' 53 Unhappy with the inevitable conclusion of this argument, the Alexandra 
being designed as a warship, he unsatisfactorily concluded that 'if "building" with intent 
that the vessel should be employed to cruise had been forbidden, I think that the forfeiture 
would have been incurred, for by her build she is particularly adapted for that purpose; but 
the word "equip" is used, and there is no forfeiture unless there is an equipment particularly 
fitting her for cruising.' 54 He further muddied the waters by conceding that it remained 
possible for 'a ship, though not armed, [to be found to be] equipped for warlike purposes,' 55 
if she had 'a fighting crew, muskets, pistols, powder, shot, cutlasses and boarding 
appliances.' 56 Some idea of the degree to which Bramwell B was merely toying with 
words, rather than offering a coherent approach towards the naval issues upon which he 
was adjudicating, can be gleaned by considering how a "warship" so equipped might fare 
against any vessel with a cannon. 
By contrast, the dissenting judgments approached the FEA very differently, 
Channell B using the preamble as 'a key to unlock the meaning of the Act where it is 
doubtfully expressed. ' 57 He took two insights from the statute's preamble that would 
colour his interpretation of s. 7, firstly that this was an Act 'aimed at the prevention of the 
offence, not at punishment merely,' 58 and furthermore, that the FEA had not the sole object 
of 'the prevention of acts which, if done, must endanger the peace of the kingdom, but ... 
[was] aimed also at acts which may possibly excite such feelings in other nations as will 
have that effect. ' 59 
53 ibid., 224, per Bramwell B 
54 ibid., 224 
55 ibid., 225 
56 ibid, 225 
57 ibid., 230, per Channell B 
58 ibid, 229 
59 ibid., 230 
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He translated these insights into a broad interpretation of s. 7, which nevertheless 
avoided many of the semantic pitfalls that plagued the majority judgments. For example, 
he considered that whether an act constituted building, which remained legal under the 
FEA, or equipping for a military purpose, which was not, should be left to the jury. He was 
prepared to entrust a jury with a broad discretion, considering that 'I do not even say that 
acts done to the structure of the vessel may not be equipments. I should say that you were 
equipping a ship for an Arctic expedition by strengthening her framework in order to enable 
it to resist the pressure of the ice. ' 60 
Furthermore, Channell B tentatively affirmed the Crown's contention that the actual 
role of equipment which may or may not be warlike may be discovered using evidence of 
the intent.61 If the jury were allowed to assess whether the Alexandra could be regarded as 
a "dual-use" good,62 requiring only the addition of armament, then should the intent to put 
guns aboard be manifest, then it would be possible for a jury to deduce 'that when her guns 
are on board, the mainsail with which she has been equipped in Liverpool may assist her in 
chasing an enemy's vessel; ... [and] that the mainsail is an equipment in order that she may 
be employed to cruise. ' 63 
Whilst Channell B would have ordered a re-trial on the basis that 'the explanation 
given of an extremely difficult and obscure Act of Parliament was not so full or so clear as 
a jury ought to have had in a case of so great importance,' 64 Piggot B was, ironically given 
his withdrawal of his judgment, more pugnacious. Taking to its logical conclusion the 
majority argument of the need for a vessel to be using a British port as a base of hostilities, 
he concluded that the Alexandra 'might have its pivot guns on board, and yet no offence be 
60 ibid., 232 
61 ibid., 233 
62 Again relying on the doctrine of ancipitis usus, explained at n.8 above. 
63 Si/lem, op. cit. n.2, 233 
64 ibid., 233 
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committed against the statute, because without the cannon balls and powder her equipment 
would still be useless for actually committing hostilities [and] ... the 7th section would still 
not be violated. ' 65 
He was also more emphatic over the question whether intent alone could render 
equipment illegal, asserting that, 'I am of the opinion that any act of equipping, furnishing 
or fitting out done to the hull or vessel, of whatever nature or character the act may be, if 
done with the prohibited intent, is expressly within the plain language and also within the 
evident spirit of the enactment.' 66 He continued that in his view; 
'the prohibited intent is the mam ingredient, and any act of 
equipping done in furtherance of that intent, will constitute the whole 
offence; for assuming the same intent to be present in two persons, I 
do not see the difference between the agent who did put on board 
this ship the cooking apparatus sufficient for 150 or 200 man ... and 
the man who might have put on board a pivot gun ... Both would be 
acting with common object, and the part contributed by each would 
equally conduce to the fulfilment of it. ' 67 
Even if this view of the intent with which equipment was carried out was not upheld 
by his fellow Barons, it was superfluous to his arguments as he felt able to conclude solely 
from the evidence 'of the fitting stanchions for hammock racks and the cooking apparatus 
for a crew of 150 or 200 people,' 68 that the vessel was equipped as a warship. 
65 ibid., 240-41, per Pigott B 
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At this point in the examination of Attorney-General v Sillem, having analysed the 
legal arguments that carried the day, it is easy to be sympathetic with a frustrated New York 
Times' condemnation of the court for deciding so significant a case through an exercise in 
semantics.69 However, this conclusion ignores the advocates' subtle interplay of policy 
concerns with legal arguments, and how these concerns found their way into the four 
judgments. With so much dependent upon the 'obviously incorrect wording' of s.7 FEA, 
Sir Hugh Cairns looked to 'the history of the legislation and the policy of the legislature in 
passing the Act. ' 70 Under this line of enquiry s.7 FEA appeared to constitute an example of 
legislation undertaken in various states with an aim 'to restrain the subjects of a neutral 
power from doing that of which either of the belligerents might complain.' 71 However, 
Attorney-General Palmer gave short shift to the suggestion that the FEA amounted to a 
narrow 'expression of internationallaw,' 72 noting that 'apart from municipal legislation, a 
ship completely armed and equipped might be sold (to a warring party) within the neutral 
territory, and a belligerent would have no right, upon any principle of international law to 
complain of it.' 73 
However, under pressure from these arguments, the Attorney-General voiced the 
national security concerns at stake in the interpretation of s.7 FEA, which was required 'not 
because foreign powers had, by international law, a right to demand it, but because it was 
considered necessary to enable the Crown to take measures which might prevent 
entanglements with foreign powers, and preserve the peace of the kingdom. It is manifest 
that the enlistment of men and equipment of ships within the realm might involve the 
69 New York Times, 8th December 1863 
70 Sill em, op. cit. n.2, 183, per Sir Hugh Cairns 
71 ibid, 184 
72 ibid., 191 
73 ibid., 196, per Sir Roundell Palmer A-G 
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country in a war as to which it is neutral.' 74 The starkest warning of this threat was an 
assertion that 'a foreign government having cause of complaint that the ports of this country 
were made arsenals for its enemies, would not enquire whether the armament took place 
within or without the boundary line (of international waters). ' 75 Cairns countered that 'it is 
a wrong mode of construing a penal statute to extend its provisions beyond what the 
legislature intended because it may by possibility be evaded.' 76 Moreover, he contended 
that the Attorney-General's invocation of national security concerns had no basis in law, 
asserting that 'it is said that the ports of this country ought not to be used as arsenals for 
belligerent powers. If that means that the ports of this country ought not to be used for 
furnishing belligerent ships with implements of war, it is conceded; but if more than that be 
meant (i.e., the building of vessels that could, with armament, be used as warships) the 
proposition is not correct.' 77 
Any hopes that the Crown had entertained during these proceedings that Pollock 
CB, the driving force behind the Court of Exchequer, had reconsidered his appraisal of s.7 
FEA, would have been quickly dispelled when, adopting a tool that would thereafter 
become the virtual touchstone of judicial opposition to the supposed requirements of 
national security, he began his judgment by invoking the spectre of the Star Chamber, and 
declaring that 'no opinions of jurists, no decisions of foreign Courts, will enable us, or 
ought to induce us to declare, if the act be not within the words of the statute, that the scope 
and object, the spirit and intention of the statute include the case before us, though it be not 
plainly and clearly expressed by the legislature.' 78 He was indignant that the Attorney-
General had the temerity to advance arguments based upon national security, stating that 
74 ibid, 197 
15 ibid., 20 I 
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'we have nothing to do with the political consequences of our decision or the dissatisfaction 
which it may create in any quarter anywhere, and I cannot help expressing my regret, not 
unmixed with some surprise, that the learned Attorney-General has more than once 
adverted to the consequences that may arise from our holding that what the defendants have 
done is not contrary to our municipallaw.' 79 
He unconvincingly sought to resist the use of the preamble to import issues of 
national security into the Act, asserting that 'the expression "peace and welfare of the 
kingdom" ... relates, as far as "peace" is concerned, only to that tranquillity which is in the 
care of the magistracy, and has nothing whatever to do with the relations of peace or war 
with respect to other countries. ' 80 Thus he retained the steadfast view that even in the face 
of the complaints of a powerful state that considered the actions of British subjects to 
amount to acts of war, protecting the "welfare and peace" of the country constituted no 
reason to alter the construction of an Act. Rather it remains the duty of judges 'to ascertain 
the true legal meaning of the words used by the legislature and to collect the intention from 
the language ofthe statute itself.' 81 
However, Pollock CB appeared to abandon this conception of judicial duty as to 
statutory construction within a matter of paragraphs; in asserting that, as under s. 7 FEA, 
'building ships is not prohibited, even building ships for war is not prohibited, provided 
they be not "equipped, furnished, fitted out, or armed" in our ports with either of the intents 
stated,' 82 the words of this provision 'ought to be construed (if they can be so construed) so 
as to leave the commercial interests of shipbuilders untouched. ' 83 Indeed, his attitude to the 
needs of industry clearly influenced his narrow interpretation of s. 7, concluding on the 
79 ibid, 214, per Pollock CB 
80 ibid, 215 
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basis that the provision applied only to British territory, that 'the great object of the statute, 
therefore, was not to prevent the building of ships by British shipbuilders for one of two 
belligerents, with neither of whom we were at war, but to preserve the ports of this country 
from being made ports of hostile equipment against a friendly belligerent; it was not in any 
way to fetter the commerce of this country or the trade of shipbuilding beyond what was 
necessary for that purpose.' 84 
Bramwell B did at least appear more sanguine about the use of novel techniques of 
interpretation, acknowledging that 'in this, as in other cases of doubtful meaning, it is 
legitimate to resolve that doubt by ascertaining the general scope and object of the 
enactment.' 85 Yet, while he conceded that arguments on the basis of international law, the 
American Act of 1793, and the legislative history and circumstances of the enactment of 
the 1819 Act might be considered, this came with the caveat that even taken together 'they 
afford no certain clue to the meaning of this enactment,' 86 and that if a judge 'disregards 
[the wording of a statute] and decides according to its makers' supposed intent, he may be 
substituting his for theirs, and so legislating.' 87 This attitude goes far to explaining why he 
considered it 'necessary, then, minutely to scrutinize the words of our statute. ' 88 
Furthermore, Bramwell B carefully steered a course between the competing policy 
influences at issue. He dismissed suggestions 'that the interests of the shipbuilding or any 
other trade are so concerned in this matter as to afford an argument in favour of the 
defendant's construction.' 89 On the other hand, he rounded upon the Attorney-General's 
raising of national security concerns, asserting that he refused 'to be influenced by the 
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foolish threats that have been uttered. ' 90 Yet he could not avoid the policy issues at stake, 
and had 'no doubt that the vessel was building and equipping for the Confederates, and in 
order that they might use her, when armed and equipped for hostilities, against the 
Federals,' and that she might well be armed just outside territorial waters and 'thus the 
spirit of international law may be violated, and the letter and spirit of the municipal Act 
evaded. '91 Despite this realisation, he dogmatically pursued a constructivist interpretation 
of this statute, declaring that 'important as are the objects of this statute, it must be 
construed on the same principles as one regulating the merest point of practice or other 
trifling matter. '92 
Unsurprisingly, given the prevailing judicial attitudes, the dissenting judges made 
little effort to acknowledge the influence of national security concerns to their decisions. 
Channell B went so far as to decry any suggestion of judges acting as 'legislators ex post 
facto. ' 93 Instead he emphasised the use of the preamble as an interpretive tool, and only 
tacitly affirmed that this imported national security concerns by indicating that the statute 
should be interpreted as undertaking the 'prohibition and prevention of a mischief which 
may be prejudicial to and tend to endanger the peace and welfare of the kingdom. '94 The 
preamble was, moreover, used by Channell B to avoid taking the discussion of s. 7 off on 
the tangents that Sir Hugh Cairns advocated, asserting that if 'the words of the 7th section 
read with reference to the other part of the Act do, by a reasonably fair interpretation of our 
statute and the evidence, embrace the case of the Alexandra, then in my judgment it 
scarcely becomes necessary to consider what have been the decisions of the Courts of 
90 ibid.' 226 
91 ibid., 226 
92 ibid.' 225 
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America upon Acts of Congress in the main much the same, but, in not unimportant 
respects, different from our own Act. ' 95 
Pigott B was similarly reluctant to consider a multitude of novel interpretive 
techniques, asserting that arguments as to international law 'necessarily embraced a very 
wide field, and no doubt those obligations are the foundations of this legislation, but, in my 
opinion, they are pushed too far, if urged as the necessary limit of a municipal enactment. ' 96 
Therefore, instead of interpreting the FEA merely as was required by international law, 
Pigott B more openly acknowledged national security concerns as underpinning the statute, 
considering that; 
'the neutral state as between itself and its own subjects may find it 
expedient so to legislate that between the attempt to commit acts of 
hostility and the completion of them by their subjects, an opportunity 
would be afforded to arrest such completion; and where the object is 
a prevention of mischief, on which the peace of the country is 
supposed to depend, I should expect a priori that such would be the 
course adopted.' 97 
His uncompromising construction of s. 7 was evidently motivated by a desire to 
prevent the flaunting of the neutrality laws, 'either as was done by the Alabama, whose 
armaments went out in another ship, or by completing the peaceful equipments first, and 
95 ibid, 229, Author's emphasis 
96 ibid., 238, per Pigott B 
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then putting the guns on board as the last act in port, probably occupying a few hours at 
most, and giving no opportunity for seizure and prevention.' 98 
In conclusion, despite having reached a point in history when the judiciary were not 
cowed by national security concerns, the culmination of this quest is strangely 
unsatisfactory. Pollock CB' s judgment appears to be a product of his concern for the effect 
of the neutrality law on shipyards eager to profit out of the civil war rending the United 
States, rather than his concern for the rules for the interpretation of penal statutes. 
Bramwell B' s flawed and pedantic interpretation of s. 7 FEA is little improved for not being 
the result of a capitulation to policy concerns. Indeed, the vociferous rejection of national 
security concerns by these judges suggests that they might have been influenced by the 
same concerns that prevented the Palmerston administration from pushing reform of the 
FEA through Parliament. Historian Adrian Cook noted that despite the defunct nature of 
the statute, 'Palmerston's ramshackle party could not be relied upon to support an 
amending Bill created by foreign pressure. ' 99 The matter was certainly at issue in the case, 
the Attorney-General having to deny under pressure that the government had been in any 
way influenced or coerced by Federal representatives. 100 
Ironically, the dissenting opinions appear admirably logical by comparison. Clearly 
fully aware of the darkening international situation that surrounded the instant case, and 
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faced with a provision that even Pollock CB admitted 'a whole fleet of ships might sail 
through,' 101 they undertook to interpret the statute in line with the intention manifest in its 
preamble. And yet in these judgments the genesis of a later judicial approach to national 
security concerns is equally evident. Consider Channell B's declaration that 'if it is in the 
interest of the nation that the law shall be other than we interpret it, if our construction of 
this Act of Parliament may endanger the peace of the nation, then I say that it be the duty of 
Parliament to enact a new law; but it is not our duty to look elsewhere than at the present 
statute for an interpretation of it.' 102 Effectively this amounted to judicial sleight of hand, 
for his interpretation of s. 7 was indeed intended to preserve the peace of the nation, yet he 
considered himself justified in adopting such a construction of the provision because the 
preamble invited him to do so. 
The effect of the affair on government policy was profound. Foster notes that; 
'the Alexandra case and its resulting newspaper coverage ... 
brought considerable attention to Confederate operations in Great 
Britain and to the inadequate British neutrality laws. This attention 
forced the government to take decisive action to enforce neutral 
behaviour upon its citizens during later crises: policy prevailed over 
law.'I03 
This dilemma for the government was most evident in early September 1863, as 
Russell agonized over whether or not to seize the Laird rams in the face of the trial 
101 Sillem, op. cit. n.2, 222 
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judgment in Attorney-General v. Sillem, and thereafter in the action taken to avoid bringing 
the case of the rams to trial. However even the delay produced by this case was significant, 
for the three-month period of uncertainty between the Alexandra's seizure and trial resulted 
in a hiatus in Confederate shipbuilding that left the construction of the Laird rams 
sufficiently behind schedule to permit government action. 
As for the little gunboat herself, she would never enter Confederate service. This, it 
has to be noted, did not result from any farsighted interpretation of s. 7 FEA by the 
judiciary, but rather 'through the extreme slowness of the legal processes in which Russell 
had succeeded in entangling her.' 104 Further appeals by the Crown found their way up to 
the House of Lords, only to be rejected on preliminary points. 105 The same process of 
delaying proceedings in the wake of the seizure of a vessel would be used to deny the 
Confederates the use of the 1,300 ton "super-Alabama" being built on the Clyde and seized 
in December 1863. Ironically, given the naval opinion that she was unfit for mercantile 
service, she would begin a career as a blockade runner under the name Mary. She would 
end the war, if not her litigious career, 106 in Nassau in the Bahamas, in a series of cases 
resulting from her detention there under suspicion that she had been attempting to arm. 107 
The Developing Foreign Enlistment Act Jurisprudence 
The Times concluded at the end of the Alexandra trial that the Court had not been 
disposed to 'favour illegal privateering, but that a law against equipping privateers in this 
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country must be a dead letter so long as they can be built here and equipped at sea or 
elsewhere.' 108 Yet the FEA could not be reformed until 1870, lest the Government of the 
most powerful nation on Earth be accused of capitulating to foreign pressure. Therefore, in 
an effort to make government policy effective, efforts had to be made to reanimate this 
dead letter law. Central to this policy would be not simply attempting to prevent belligerent 
ships from sailing, but pursuing the returning crews of vessels in order to discourage those 
who might follow in their footsteps. 
This was certainly true for the remainder of the American Civil War, providing an 
excellent looking glass through which to view the development of the mid-Victorian 
judicial attitude to national security concerns. The first such case was that of R. v. Jones in 
which the defendants were accused under s.2 FEA 1819 of procuring sailors in Liverpool in 
order to enlist them in the navy of the Confederacy. They were partners in the shipping 
firm Jones & Co., and recruited a crew for the Japan for the ostensible purpose of a voyage 
to China. However, echoing the fears of the judges in Attorney General v. Sill em that the 
neutrality law could be openly flaunted, the Japan rendezvoused with a small steamer in 
the English Channel, off Brest, which transferred aboard guns, ammunition and officers of 
the Confederate States Navy. The vessel was renamed the CSS Georgia and the defendants 
persuaded several men to enlist before returning to England. However the defendants 
maintained that these actions were not illegal as s.2 FEA only made it an offence within the 
United Kingdom to induce a person to enlist to serve a foreign power and the Crown were 
unable to prove 'intent on the part of the persons hired to enter into the foreign service at 
the time when they were engaged by the defendants in this country.' 109 
108 Times 25th June 1863 
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However, in his jury direction, Cockburn CJ was prepared to read s.2 FEA broadly, 
asserting that the defendants would be in breach of the provision if the jury found that they 
'procured the persons mentioned in the indictment, or either or any of them, to go and 
embark from this port for the purpose of being enlisted, entered or engaged in the 
Confederate service.' 11° Furthermore he ensured that the jury were aware ofthe importance 
of their decision, instructing them 'not to deal lightly with the case,' as it involved 'a very 
important Act of Parliament, without which the neutrality of this country could not be 
maintained, or would at least be seriously jeopardized.' 111 The jury, faced with such an 
appraisal ofthe law, found the defendants guilty. 
This decision was quickly followed by the case of R. v. Rumble, which involved 
fully one hundred and sixty-six counts brought under the Foreign Enlistment Act 1819 
against the purchaser, recruiter and crew of a vessel intended for the service of the navy of 
the Confederate States of America during the American Civil War. The case involved the 
purchase from the Admiralty of the decommissioned iron steam gun-boat Victor, and its 
fitting out at Sheerness under the auspices of undertaking trade with China. Once sea-
worthy, the Victor undertook a trial voyage to Calais under the command of Rumble, where 
it hoisted the Confederate flag and where officers in grey uniform took command. Again, 
indicative of a sea change in judicial opinion, Crompton J, in delivering his charge before 
the grand jury, could 'hardly help feeling that it is of immense importance that the 
government of the country should be enabled to preserve neutrality, and take measures to 
prevent what may tend to endanger our relations of amity and peace with any foreign 
110 ibid, 35, per Cockburn CJ 
Ill ibid., 37 
52 
state.' 112 Nevertheless, this apparent shift in judicial thinking still had to overcome an 
'extremely ill-penned' statute that gave rise to 'great difficulty in construction.' 113 
In considering the troublesome s. 7, Crompton J was of the opinion 'that it cannot be 
necessary that there should be a complete equipment, or that you should wait until the last 
gun is put on board; for then you may be too late, and the scope of the Act is prevention.' 114 
Whilst he did acknowledge that 'the Act applies only to equipment necessary or useful for 
purposes of war,' 115 he thereafter sought to clarify to the grand jury what he meant by this 
by echoing Channell B's approach to the provision, stating that 'it may be difficult in many 
instances to say what would or would not be for warlike purposes. A mainsail, for instance, 
may be as useful for warlike purposes as anything else; but the great thing is the intention 
that the vessel shall be used for warlike purposes by a belligerent.' 116 
As to the provisions against enlistment in s.2 FEA, Crompton J was unwilling to 
suggest such a broad reading of the statute, noting that the Act outlawed the enlistment of 
'sailors.' The problem of the advance of technology seemingly beyond the language of the 
statute is lost today with the advantage of hindsight allowing us to see that the word 'sailor' 
resisted the onset of steam propulsion and iron ships. But in the mid-1860s Crompton J had 
a genuine concern that this seemingly increasingly dated term in the 1819 Act related 
specifically to 'a person who navigates a sailing vessel and manages the sails,' 117 and rather 
than attempt to stretch the meaning of the statute, he questioned whether the Act 'applies to 
persons engaged on board steamers, such as engineers, boiler workers or the like.' 118 
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Despite Crompton J's favourable interpretation of s.7 FEA, this case seemed to slip 
away from the Crown. Lacking evidence of the Victor's intended purpose, the Solicitor-
General, Sir Robert Collier, was forced to withdraw all charges relating to equipping. 
Indeed, Cockburn CJ appeared to adopt a stricter line towards the interpretation of s. 7 in 
concluding that as 'nothing appears to have been done to furnish or equip [the Victor], or 
supply her, with materials or munitions of war,' he could not see 'how the trifling things 
which the defendant is alleged to have done - not amounting to an "equipment" - could be 
a ground for convicting him under these counts of the indictment.' 119 Furthermore, the 
Solicitor-General was forced to concede that all of the defendants alleged to be recruits 
declined to enter into Confederate service when invited to do so at Calais. 
This left the charges of procuring recruits levelled against the named defendant, 
Rumble. Despite the jury intimating that they believed that Rumble was not party to an 
engagement of men with a view to enlistment in the Confederate service, believing his 
assertions that he had only travelled to Calais to see to the payment of his men for their 
labours in making the vessel seaworthy and completing the sea trial, verdict was still sought 
against him on the charges of enlistment. Cockburn CJ directed the jury that 'no nation 
professing neutrality ought to tolerate that its subjects should take it upon themselves to 
assist one or other of two belligerent Powers.' 120 Interestingly, he expressly disclaimed that 
the present prosecution was required to ensure 'national safety,' and with a jingoism 
possibly tailored to the prejudices of the jury, rather sought to dispel any Confederate 
sympathies or thought that the prosecution had been brought at the behest of the Federal 
government on the basis that the application ofthis Act was to uphold 'national honour.' 121 
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Whilst the terms of s.2 FEA only outlawed recruitment within the United Kingdom, 
Cockburn CJ drew their attention to the persuasive value of the 'strong and undisputed 
fact' 122 that when, to Rumble's knowledge, 'the vessel had shown her true colours ... when 
the Confederate flag was hoisted and Confederate officers were on board of her and in 
command of her . . . he neither remonstrated with those who (as it is represented) made him 
their dupe and their fool in the transaction, nor did he wash his hands of all further 
participation in the enterprise; but, on the contrary, he went on engaging men.' 123 
However, the jury either disbelieved that Rumble acted with the ulterior purpose of getting 
the crew 'into a position in which they might be induced to enlist in the Confederate 
service,' 124 or believed that this voyage was actually a sea trial and not an attempt 'to get 
out of the reach of the English authorities,' 125 for seemingly against the weight of evidence 
they found the Rumble not guilty. 
The last of the cases arising from the American Civil War that requires 
consideration is that of ex parte Chavasse, despite only being linked peripherally to the 
FEA. This case was an appeal by creditors of the bankrupt Grazebrook after their petition 
for an apportionment of the proceeds of the joint venture with Graze brook was rejected by 
a Commissioner under the Bankruptcy Act 1861. This was because the joint venture was 
an attempt in April 1862 to run the blockade of the Confederacy in the steamer Modern 
Greece with a shipment of rifles and ammunition, which the Commissioner deemed to be 
an illegal activity. 126 This proposition relied heavily upon the terms of a Royal 
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proclamation of 13th May 1861.127 Indeed the respondents went so far as to assert that 'the 
illegality of the present adventure was shown beyond all controversy by the terms of the 
Royal proclamation.' 128 
Even with the national security concerns evidenced in this proclamation Lord 
Westbury LC was dismissive of this contention, stating that 'he need not observe that it is 
the object of a proclamation to make known the existing law and it can neither make nor 
unmake law.' 129 He instead concluded that this Proclamation was intended firstly as a 
declaration 'that the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act would be strictly enforced; 
and, secondly, not to prohibit the exportation of warlike stores, but to warn the subjects of 
the realm that if any subject carried contraband of war to either belligerent he would incur 
the penal consequences of the law of nations.' 130 Lord Westbury therefore overturned the 
Commissioner's decision, describing a neutral trader's transport of munitions of war to a 
belligerent country as 'quite lawful,' 131 the conflicting and co-existent right of the 
belligerent's enemy to capture and condemn such a cargo as contraband notwithstanding. 
According to this interpretation of international law, and regardless of s. 7 FEA, Lord 
Westbury considered that 'if a British shipbuilder builds a vessel of war in an English port, 
and arms and equips her for war bona fide on his own account as an article of merchandise, 
and not under or by virtue of any agreement, understanding or concert with a belligerent 
power, he may lawfully, if he acted bonafide, send the ship so armed and equipped for sale 
127 The terms of this proclamation of neutrality amounted to a warning by the government 'to all persons 
whatsoever entitled to our protection, that if any of them shall presume, in contempt of this our Royal 
proclamation and our high displeasure, to do any acts in derogation of their duty as subjects of a neutral 
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as merchandise in a belligerent country.' 132 Lord Westbury's obiter dictum clearly sits 
uncomfortably with the FEA's preventative role, constituting either an inaccurate and 
throw-away attempt to illustrate the legality of blockade running, or an effort to undermine 
the new approach to the FEA. Odd though it may seem, given the profile of the FEA 
jurisprudence, mistake appears more likely than attempted re-interpretation. An effort to 
reinvigorate the majority interpretation from the Alexandra case would seem to be an odd 
response from a Cabinet minister, even one wearing his judicial hat. In either case, this 
decision provides an insight into how far the judiciary of this era were prepared to uphold 
the interests of commerce; 'a right to interchange the products of labour with the 
inhabitants of every other country,' 133 unless directly confronted by a conflict with an issue 
such as national security. 
After the American Civil War 
The CSS Alabama and her sisters went on to write their place in international law, 
through the celebrated Alabama Claims Arbitration, but consideration of these issues is 
beyond the scope of this study, 134 especially with domestic FEA jurisprudence continuing 
to develop through the 1860s. Burton v. Pinkerton was the first of the Foreign Enlistment 
Act cases to arise after the American Civil War, involving the war between Peru and Spain 
that began in January 1866. Interestingly the action was not brought by the government, 
employing the Act to protect the nation's neutrality, but by a mariner recruited to serve 
aboard a ship, the Thames, undertaking a supposedly commercial voyage with an initial 
132 ibid, 1075 
133 ibid, 1074 
134 An award of $15,500,000 was made against the United Kingdom, largely accounting for the predations of 
the Confederate cruisers. See Cook, op. cit. n.l 0 
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destination of Rio de Janeiro. However, the vessel soon began sailing in concert with, and 
with the commencement of hostilities as a tender vessel under the direction of, two 
powerful British-built Peruvian iron-clad rams engaged in action against Spain. The 
claimant alleged that by sailing under these circumstances, Pinkerton, the ship's master, 
had committed a repudiatory breach of contract. Not only did he allege that continuing 
aboard the Thames would expose him to risks of war to which he had not consented, but 
that the contract now involved service aboard a tender ship that stood contrary to s.2 
Foreign Enlistment Act. Surprisingly the government intervened in this case to argue for a 
narrow interpretation of s.2 FEA because, as the Thames 'was fitted out and started on her 
expedition before the commencement of war,' 135 the Crown was not interested in bringing 
charges against those involved in the voyage. 
Kelly CB, delivering judgment for himself, Martin and Pigott BB, found for the 
claimant on the basis of his first contention; that by placing his vessel under Peruvian 
orders, Pinkerton had breached the contract, because these 'orders might have been such as 
to expose her to an attack from a Spanish ship of war.' 136 However, despite the contentions 
of the Solicitor-General, who must be taken to have been fully apprised of the security 
implications of these activities, and despite consideration of the FEA being unnecessary to 
the outcome of this case, Kelly CB proceeded to consider whether this voyage was also 
illegal. He concluded that a crewing tender vessel in the service of a belligerent power was 
not only 'against the spirit and intent of that Act of Parliament,' but, under a broad reading 
of what constitutes service aboard a ship being used for a 'warlike purpose,' that those 
serving aboard the Thames had breached s.2 FEA. 137 That this approach was driven by 
Kelly CB' s appraisal of the exigencies of national security is confirmed by his stating that, 
135 Burton v. Pinkerton (1867) LR 2 Exch 340, 343, per Pollock S-G 
136 ibid., 34 7, per Kelly CB 
137 ibid' 348 
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'it is impossible not to see that, by adventures like these, this country has been brought to 
the very verge of war - first with the United States, and latterly with Spain.' 138 This 
clarification of the law was intended to close any loopholes that might have encouraged 
such adventures and can be contrasted with the doubting judgment of Bramwell B, which 
focused solely on the contractual position of the parties. 
The next authority to warrant consideration could have come from the pages of a 
Boy's Own annual. On 11th May 1869, at a time of insurrection against Spanish rule in 
Cuba, the Salvador left the Bahamas under fire from a Royal Navy cutter, loaded with 
Cuban separatists and arms and destined for the Cays on Cuba's eastern coast. Having 
landed this force, she evaded a Spanish warship and returned to Nassau, where she was 
seized by Her Majesty's Receiver-General, under warrant from the Governor alleging a 
breach ofs.7 Foreign Enlistment Act 1819. 
Whilst neither the Vice-Admiralty Court in the Bahamas, nor the Privy Council 
raised national security arguments, this case remains significant because of the broad 
interpretation of the FEA the judiciary adopted. Argument as to whether the vessel fell 
within s.7 FEA centred upon whether "equipping," as contemplated by the Act, required an 
addition or alteration to the vessel. The ship owners contended that their actions, adding 
'provisions, water, and repairing certain tools belonging to the engine do not come under 
that definition.' 139 A second line of argument concerned the Act's applicability to the 
circumstances of the instant case, as it 'contemplates a state of war between two parties in 
which England is declared to be neutral, and that the present disturbances in Cuba cannot 
138 ibid., 348 
139 The 'Salvador' (1870) [L R] 3 PC 218, 225, per Rothery J 
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be considered, ... as indicating a state of war between Spain and the inhabitants that are at 
present in a state of insurrection.' 140 
In tackling the first of these Issues, Rothery J found little assistance in the 
authorities, as 'all the cases that have yet occurred are cases of ships of war, and the 
meaning of the terms "equip, fit-out, or furnish," may be very different when applied to 
ships of war and when applied to a transport or store-ship.' 141 Nevertheless, he adopted the 
broad interpretation that equipping 'includes anything necessary for carrying out the object 
you have in view, and, as applied to a vessel, I consider it to mean supplying it with 
anything which it may require to carry out the voyage it may be engaged on. Now, what 
more necessary things can there be for a vessel, intended to be used as a transport-ship, than 
d . . ?'142 water an provisions. 
Rothery J was similarly emphatic in asserting that 'a vessel carrying over a large 
body of fighting men, with weapons ready to their hands, is a transport.' 143 Furthermore, 
he accepted that the evidence of the Salvador, 'going among the Cays at the eastern end of 
Cuba, where there was no port of entry, their evident dread of a Spanish man-of-war, and 
lastly, the fact of the passengers immediately on landing preparing for defence or attack,' 144 
indicated that she had been equipped for action against the government of Spain. Despite 
this, in the absence of sufficient evidence of actual "belligerents" that this transport was 
intended to support, he felt unable to uphold such a seizure. 
Before the Privy Council, Attorney-General Collier contended that the evidence of 
the Spanish Governor's proclamation of a state of insurrection was sufficient evidence that 
the expedition was in aid of a 'government' opposing Spanish rule by force as required by 
140 ibid' 225 
141 ibid, 225 
142 ibid' 226 
143 ibid.' 226 
144 ibid., 226-227 
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s. 7 FEA. The interesting fact is not that the court agreed with him, but that it did so 
through the leading judgment of the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Cairns. During his career 
as an advocate Cairns had picked holes in the FEA so assiduously. Yet, when confronted 
with this same statute as a judge, he acknowledged that 'the interpretation of that section is 
attended with some difficulty, mainly owing to the great quantity of words which are used 
in the clause.' 145 His decision to affirm the seizure was based upon the fact that the vessel 
in question was employed as a transport or store-ship in the service of a body of insurgents 
known to be undertaking hostilities against Spanish rule in Cuba; and that Rothery J had 
erred in confining his attention to the requirement that the insurrectionists being aided must 
be exercising powers of government. He was of opinion that there was no difficulty in 
upholding the seizure, 'because their Lordships find these propositions established beyond 
all doubt, - there was an insurrection in the island of Cuba; there were insurgents who had 
formed themselves into a body of people acting together, undertaking and conducting 
hostilities; these insurgents, beyond all doubt, formed part of the province or people of 
Cuba; and beyond all doubt the ship in question was to be employed, and was employed, in 
connection with and in the service of this body of insurgents.' 146 
Conclusion 
An overview of the FEA cases relating to the American Civil War presents the 
paradox that just as the issue of detaining Confederate raiders declined in importance as the 
Union gained the upper hand, the judiciary appear to have belatedly recognised the threat 
that building and crewing of ships for belligerents posed to national security and began to 
145 ibid., 229, per Lord Cairns 
146 ibid., 233 
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read s.7 FEA expansively in an effort to curtail these activities. Thereafter, when the 
statute was raised in relation to the "little wars" that sprang up in the 1860s, with even the 
Solicitor-General affirming that there were no national security issues at stake, the judiciary 
progressively tightened the ineptly drafted s.2 and s. 7 FEA. 
Even Pollock CB' s interpretation of the FEA in the manner demanded by 
commercial interests can be cast as a natural response to the disarray of the executive. 
The charges brought in the Alexandra case were anathema to a system of commercial law 
which from the early-nineteenth century was predicated by 'the elimination of all 
provisions based on the necessities of national defence.' 147 The resurrection of a statute 
nearly half a century old and largely overlooked in that period, was unlikely to lead a 
judiciary to abandon their regard for freedom of contract. 148 Well might Lord Bingham 
conclude that the majority opinion in Sillem 'was a tenable interpretation of the section, 
read literally, but it ignored the spirit and purpose of the enactment.' 149 Pollock CB would 
undoubtedly retort that he was reading the statute in line with the whole body of nineteenth-
century commercial law. Admiral Napier had led a Portuguese fleet in time of war. 
Widespread recruitment was under way in the United Kingdom for the causes of Polish and 
Italian independence, not to mention recruitment to the Federal and Confederate causes. 150 
None of these activities had been significantly curtailed despite their illegality under the 
147 Holdsworth, W., 'The Relation between Commercial Legislation and National Defence Historically 
Considered,' (1918) 30 Jurid Rev. 293,294 
148 Atiyah concluded that Bramwell B's interest to the historian of nineteenth-century law is that 'he made no 
secret of his political convictions, and because it is not difficult to trace the influence of these convictions on 
his legal judgments in a wide variety of cases.' Atiyah, P., The Rise and Fall of Freedom ofContract (1979, 
Oxford), 374. 'Bramwell's political principles were those of the classical school of nineteenth-century 
liberalism, and he sincerely believed that the principle of laissez-faire permeated the common law of 
England.' Taylor, M., 'Bramwell, George William Wilshere (1808-1892)', Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, (2004, Oxford), [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/3245, accessed 29th March 2006] 
149 Bingham, Lord, 'The Judges: Active or Passive?' The British Academy Maccabaean Lecture in 
Jurisprudence, 27th October 2005, 17 
150 National Archives, TS 2511267 (2nd July 1863), TS 2511355 (24th October 1864) and TS 25/1360 (19th 
November 1864); the last of these records details the detention of Brunei's famous Great Western on 
suspicion that she was ferrying volunteers to the Federal army. 
62 
FEA. So it could hardly be surprising that some judges would object to the country's 
shipbuilding interests being saddled with a burden of strict neutrality laws, in excess of the 
requirements of international law, simply because this was the interpretation demanded by 
national security concerns. 
This leaves the all-important question of why the judiciary's attitude towards these 
provisions changed so dramatically. Certainly it may simply be that different judges, more 
alive to national security concerns, abandoned the interpretation of the FEA adopted by 
Pollock CB and Bramwell B. However the later cases simply ignore the interpretive 
malaise of Sillem, rather than attempt to distinguish or overrule the decision. It appears 
possible to conjecture that this change in judicial attitude tallies with the decline in foreign 
pressure for the government to enforce the FEA, which appeared to be so contentious in the 
Alexandra case. Those laissez-faire arguments advanced by the defence in the Alexandra 
case were not accepted by the court on the basis of their legal merit, but because they 
provided a sufficient basis on which the judiciary could resist foreign and government 
pressure. Certain judges considered that such threats to national prestige outweighed the 
risks to national security attendant to their decisions. 
Yet even if the charge of jingoism can therefore be levelled against the mid-
Victorian judiciary, then at least the later FEA jurisprudence indicates that most judges had 
not closed their minds to the dangers of ignoring national security concerns. Instead, the 
efforts of the judges in these cases, particularly by Kelly CB in Burton v. Pinkerton, to 
imbue mundane cases with national security significance indicates the eagerness of 
individual judges to develop precedents that would allow of their successors, if faced once 
again with highly-charged cases, to read the provisions of the FEA broadly, without facing 
the accusation that they were bowing to foreign pressure. 
63 
[4] 
In Hot Haste: 
The Foreign Enlistment Act 1870 
'It is ridiculous to say that a builder did not know that the vessel he 
was building was for war purposes; and it is less evil that the 
shipbuilding interest should suffer a little, than that the whole 
nation should be involved in difficulties. ' 
Viscount Bury (1870) 
A New Foreign Enlistment Act ..• 
The judiciary's commitment to a new interpretive approach to the Foreign 
Enlistment Act 1819 would never be tested in circumstances equivalent to the strained 
relations between the United States and the United Kingdom in the 1860s. Aware of the 
Act's shortcomings with regard to the equipment of warships for belligerents, the Derby 
government established a Neutrality Commission, under the chairmanship of the former 
Lord Chancellor, Lord Cranworth. The Royal Commission reported in 1868,1 but this 
report was not acted upon until two years later when the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian 
war threw the inadequacies of the existing neutrality law into sharp relief. As the above 
excerpt from Viscount Bury's contribution to the debate in the House of Lords indicates, 
1 Cranworth, Lord, eta/., 'Report of the Neutrality Commission,' HC (1867-8) xxxii, 265: presented to the 
House of Commons on 28th May 1868. 
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Parliament was not prepared to run the risk of a repetition of the Alexandra debacle? 
Passing through the legislature at a speed rarely surpassed before or since,3 the Foreign 
Enlistment Act 1870 may be considered the prototypical piece of emergency legislation. In 
spite of severe criticism in The Times over this Bill being 'introduced in hot haste and 
hurried through Parliament,' to the detriment of its quality ,4 comparisons to the efforts of 
legislators facing later emergencies would be invidious given how thoroughly the ground 
work had been laid by the Neutrality Commission. 
Two words dominated the Commission proceedings and the subsequent debates in 
Parliament; Alexandra and Alabama.5 Indeed, the Commission's recommendations 
indicate the degree to which these cases coloured legal thought on the Foreign Enlistment 
Act. Laboured consideration upon the Act's shipbuilding provisions left the 
Commissioners unable to examine the provisions relating to enlistment thoroughly, despite 
their manifest failure to prevent the engagement of British citizens in foreign wars over the 
previous half century. At the Second Reading the Attorney-General, Sir Robert Collier, 
affirmed that 'with respect to enlistment, the provisions of the Bill are very much the same 
as those of the existing Act; but they are, I think, expressed in clearer language. ' 6 Many of 
these provisions, enacted in 1870 and still in force at the time of writing, have yet to result 
in a successful prosecution. 7 
2 HC Deb, 3rd Series, vol. 203, col. 1381, 151 August 1870 
3 The First Reading of the Foreign Enlistment Bill was held on 19th July and the legislation was enacted on 9th 
August 1870. 
4 The Times, 18th January 1871 
5 So much so that at least one MP is shown by Hansard to confuse the two cases; HC Deb, op. cit. n.2, col. 
1373, per Mr Staveley Hill 
6 HC Deb, op. cit. n.2, col. 1368, per Sir Robert Collier A-G 
7 Second Report of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, (3rd February 1999), HC (1998-99) 100-Il, para 92, 
asserted that the FEA was an 'antiquated piece of legislation [which] was passed on the outbreak of the 
Franco-Prussian war and makes it an offence to engage in military or naval service of "a foreign state at war 
with any foreign state at peace with Her Majesty." ... Sir John [Kerr] told us that there had never been a 
successful prosecution under the Act in connection with illegal enlistment or recruitment, and that the 
standard of proof it required was probably unattainable.' 
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As for the overhaul of the s. 7 prohibition of equipping warships for belligerents, the 
Commission proposed the 'very important addition ... that it should apply not merely to the 
arming and equipping, but to the building of a ship.' 8 In an effort to quell fears for the 
shipbuilding industry, Sir Robert Collier commended this tightening of language to the 
House on the basis that 'if such a provision were contained in the existing Act, the Alabama 
could not have escaped, and the Alexandra must have been condemned. ' 9 It is surely no 
coincidence, given the position of Bramwell B on the Commission, that in the Alexandra 
case he asserted that this wording would have allowed him to uphold the seizure.10 A 
further example of this Act being ahead of its time was the introduction of the evidential 
presumption 'that if it is shown that a vessel has been ordered to be built for a belligerent, 
and is supplied to that belligerent and used for warlike purposes, that shall be held to be 
prima facie evidence that she was built for the warlike service of the belligerent, unless the 
innocent destination of the vessel can be established.' 11 However, beyond these additions 
and the sensible deconstruction of the mammoth s. 7 into individual offences, the weight of 
change lay in enhanced punishments for defiance of the Act, leading former Commissioner, 
Vernon Harcourt MP, to lament, 'that the punitive clauses, which, in certain states of public 
feeling, could not be carried out, had been multiplied, and that the strength of the Bill had 
not been thrown into the preventative clauses.' 12 
Alteration of these provisions was certain to spark a debate about the new balance 
that had been struck between ship-building interests and national security, and it is 
interesting to note how argument in Parliament covered much the same ground as the Court 
8 HC Deb, op. cit. n.2, col. 1368, per Sir Robert Collier A-G 
9 ibid, col. 1368 
10 Attorney-General v. Sil/em (1864) 159 ER 178, 224, per Bramwell B. Bramwell B also took a leading role 
in the inquiries and discussions that preceded the Procedure Acts, the Judicature Acts and the Public 
Companies Act. See Knott, J., 'Lord Bramwell,' (1892) 4 Jurid. Rev. 347, 350-351 
11 HC Deb, op. cit. n.2, col. 1368-1369, per Sir Robert Collier A-G 
12 ibid., col. 1375 
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of Exchequer had traversed seven years earlier. Sir Robert Collier was adamant that 'Her 
Majesty's Government have been less careful to ascertain what foreign nations would be 
entitled to require from us than what we consider due to ourselves - to our own dignity and 
our own self-respect.' 13 However, that such dignity only stretched so far, is evidenced by 
the response of the Attorney-General to complaints that the shipbuilding industry was 
unfairly singled out by the FEA. In particular, figures such as former Commissioner, Lord 
Houghton, submitted that a complete prohibition upon the export of munitions of war had 
been 'advocated by some of the most experienced and distinguished members.' 14 Sir 
Robert Collier responded that, 'during the American War, large quantities of arms, 
ammunition and other contraband of war were supplied by us both to the Federals and the 
Confederates; but, although the United States complained of us for having allowed the 
Alabama to escape, they made no complaint that we did not undertake to prevent the 
exportation of contraband of war.' 15 However, the best justification for the more stringent 
restrictions upon shipbuilding was provided by the future Master of the Rolls, George 
Jessel, who stated simply that, 'if Parliament wished now to give powers which, to some 
extent at least, exceeded those hitherto claimed by the Government, it must be admitted 
that, as the world went on, modifications in what was called the Law of Nations were 
admissible.' 16 
It may appear that little of the above evaluation of the Commission Report and 
Parliamentary debate is relevant to a study of the judiciary's approach to the national 
security concerns at issue under the FEA. However, when the Attorney-General spoke of 
the Commission consisting of 'men of the greatest eminence,' 17 he was referring to a body 
13 ibid., col. 1366 
14 HL Deb, op. cit. n.2, col. 1676, 8th August 1870 
15 HC Deb, op. cit. n.2, col. 1371, 181 August 1870 
16 ibid., col. 1505, 3'd August 1870 
17 ibid., col. 1367, 151 August 1870 
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that contained no fewer than seven figures who were at some point judges, including three 
Lord Chancellors, past and future. Amongst this preponderance of judges and jurists were 
many of the leading protagonists in this saga; Sir Roundell Palmer, Lord Cairns, Phillimore 
J of the High Court of Admiralty and Bramwell B, although some attempt was made to 
offset their influence through the inclusion on the Commission of figures representing the 
interests of commerce, such as the merchant banker, Thomas Baring. 
It is therefore possible to characterise the FEA 1870 as an attempt, with the 
approval of senior members of the judiciary, to develop a legislative formula that would 
circumvent the narrow interpretation of s.7 FEA adopted by Pollock CB in the Alexandra 
case. More unusually, however, Sir Robert Collier was prepared to criticise this 
interpretation before Parliament, and there appears to be personal venom in his 
consideration of the 'failures' endured by the Palmerston administration under the existing 
legislation; 18 
'We all know that a suit was instituted against the Alexandra, and 
although it appeared that the vessel had been built for the 
Confederate Government, and was to a certain extent equipped for 
their service, still the late Chief Baron directed the jury that, because 
she was not so completely equipped as to be in a condition to 
commence hostilities when she left our ports, therefore the Foreign 
Enlistment Act did not apply .... I believe the ruling to have been 
wrong, though I am not entitled so to pronounce it ... but if the law 
18 Sir Robert's annoyance could stem from his being the legal opinion upon which Ambassador Adams had 
relied in seeking the seizure of Confederate vessels. His speech can be contrasted with how Lord Halifax 
approached the same matter when piloting the Bill through the Lords. It was his opinion that 'in the case of 
the Alexandra and of the rams, proceedings before legal tribunals resulted in a proof that the government had 
not sufficient power in the matter.' HL Deb, op. cit. n.2, col. 1679, 8th August 1870 
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was rightly laid down by the Chief Baron, that law ought to be 
amended, and no other Alexandra ought to be allowed to 
,19 
escape ... 
The tightened language of the key provisions of the new legislation, considered 
above, indicates that the judicial members of the committee were not overly eager to 
exercise a wide discretion in making the sensitive decisions required under the FEA. 
However, it was clear that they regarded these as judicial decisions. Complaints regarding 
the seizure of vessels would in the wake of this legislation have to be brought before a 
single judge in the High Court of Admiralty rather than before the judge and jury of the 
Court of Exchequer. That this change in jurisdiction was at the behest of the Commission 
suggests that it cannot simplistically be attributed to the government seeking to avoid what 
had come to be regarded as an unreliable tribunal,20 although it was unlikely that the 
executive would ever be adverse to the proposal. Nevertheless, there remained those in 
Parliament prepared to characterise this move as a conspiracy against 'the mercantile 
public,' who 'had very little confidence in the Court of Admiralty.' 21 Staveley Hill MP 
asserted that 'it was very possible that the decision of the late Lord Chief Baron in the 
matter of the Alabama (sic.) might have been unsatisfactory to the Government; but it was 
to be regretted that, after the decision had been given, the Government should, in the first 
Bill on the subject, try to do away with the old method of hearing such cases before one of 
the Judges of the Common Law Courts and a jury, and send those cases to the Admiralty 
19 HC Deb, 3rd Series, op. cit. n.2, 1'1 August 1870 
2° Commission member Vernon Harcourt MP declared that, 'the most important decision at which the 
Commissioners arrived' was that of jurisdiction, and, somewhat melodramatically, that, 'if this clause were 
omitted the Royal Commission would have sat in vain.' HC Deb, op. cit. n.2, col. 1511, 3rd August 1870 
21 ibid., col. 1502, per Mr Norwood 
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Court, where there would be no jury to hear them at all. '22 Yet rather than amounting to a 
conspiracy against "the mercantile public," or a slight against the Court of Exchequer, this 
shift in jurisdiction was made for pragmatic reasons. Firstly, there was the question of the 
experience ofthe tribunal, Commissioners considering that 'the Court of Admiralty, having 
to decide questions of prize in time of war, was the best fitted to determine questions of 
neutrality. ' 23 Secondly, there was the uncomplicated motivation of removing the 
difficulties that had been thrown up by hearing such complicated cases before juries, the 
Attorney-General stating, 'that proceedings in the Court of Admiralty would be speedier, 
cheaper and in every respect preferable.'24 Finally, almost imperceptibly, there was the 
national security justification for the shift in jurisdiction, Mr Bourke acknowledging that 
leaving cases under this Act in the hands of a jury would be to abandon them to 'be decided 
by passions and prejudices. '25 However, the doubt still lingered with some members that 
whilst 'cases which involved the question of peace or war should be tried by one of the 
Superior Courts without a jury . . . it was questionable whether any single judge ought to 
decide momentous questions. ' 26 
.•• An Old Problem? 
Parliament did not have long to wait before such "momentous questions" fell to a 
single judge under the new Act. By late November 1870 the Franco-Prussian War was 
going badly for France. Preparing to evacuate the soon-to-be-besieged Paris, the 
"Government of National Defence" contracted with the owners of the International, a 
22 HC Deb, op. cit. n.2, col. 1373, 151 August 1870 
23 HC Deb, op. cit. n.2, col. 1511, 3rd August 1870, per Mr Vernon Harcourt 
24 ibid., col. 1505 
25 ibid., col. 1512 
26 ibid., col. 1511, per Sir James Elphinstone 
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steam-ship specifically fitted to lay underwater cables and in no way adapted for purposes 
of war, to lay down in the sea a series of telegraph cables along the French coast. However 
on 28111 December 1870, on the brink of her departure from London, the International was 
detained by the Foreign Secretary, under s.8 Foreign Enlistment Act 1870, on the basis that 
she was to be employed in the military service of a foreign state in a war in which the 
United Kingdom had declared neutrality.27 
In a measure of the significance of this detention, the Crown's case in answer to the 
subsequent application for the ship's release was conducted by both Attorney-General 
Collier and Solicitor-General Coleridge. In an attempt to fit this case within the meaning of 
"military service" as provided by the interpretation clause introduced in s.30 of the new 
Act, the Crown claimed that 'laying a submarine cable is a service of a special and 
important nature, and when such service is performed in order to keep up communication 
between military forces, it is a military or naval service. ' 28 Whilst this provision 
specifically included "military telegraphy," this meant field telegraphy and as such differed 
substantially from laying an underwater telegraph cable. Nevertheless, as this provision 
was indicative rather than exhaustive, the Attorney-General urged the Court to consider 
instead, 'whether the main object of laying the cable was to subserve military operations; if 
it was, then the laying of the cable must be regarded as a military or naval service. ' 29 In a 
forceful argument he contended that when the International was contracted to lay cable, the 
French government was preparing to evacuate to Bordeaux, and given that 
'communications by land between the north and south of France were to a great extent 
interrupted, and to a still greater extent endangered by the German armies ... it is obvious 
27 Confusingly s.8 FEA 1870 is the amended version ofs.7 FEA 1819 
28 
'The International' (1871) 3 A&E 321,330 per Sir Robert Collier A-G 
29 ibid., 330 
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that the object of the cable was to open a new and safe means of communication between 
the seat of government and the armies in the field and the arsenal at Cherbourg. ' 30 
As Phillimore J undertook the first interpretation of the statute that he had helped 
draft, he did not resist the urge to congratulate himself, declaring the reformed FEA to be 
'very important and very valuable - strengthening the hands of Her Majesty's government, 
and enabling it to fulfil more easily than heretofore that particular class of international 
obligations which may arise out of the conduct of Her Majesty's subjects towards 
belligerent foreign states with whom Her Majesty is at peace.' 31 Nevertheless, in a robust 
judgment, he set out to confound those parliamentarians who foresaw the Court of 
Admiralty bending to the government's wishes. He recognised that the Court's duty was to 
perform a balancing act that would become familiar in national security jurisprudence; to 
construe the statute 'to give, if possible, due and full execution to its main purpose, and on 
the other hand not to strain the provisions of it so as to fetter the private commerce of Her 
Majesty's subjects beyond the express limits which the statute ... has prescribed. ' 32 
Whilst such a momentous decision could not be taken without a degree of 
hyperbole, Phillimore J lingering upon the backdrop of 'the terrible and devastating war, 
which ... began to cover France with blood,'33 his judgment upon the substantive question 
of whether laying a telegraph cable could in the instant case constitute "military service" 
was concise and authoritative. He firstly recognised that 'the statute, by specifying 
"military telegraphy," has not ... excluded the possibility of showing that in the particular 
circumstances of the case "postal telegraphy" may be considered as telegraphy employed in 
the military service of the state. ' 34 However, despite acknowledging that 'the present 
30 ibid., 331 
31 ibid., 332, per Phillimore J 
32 ibid., 332 
33 ibid., 333 
34 ibid., 337 
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circumstances of France are certainly such as to make the means of communication 
between her armies and her government of the utmost value to her,' Phillimore J concluded 
that military communication was neither the main object of this cable, 'nor could it, without 
additions and adaptations, with which this company has no concern, be made even partially 
to subserve this end. ' 35 The cable as laid would be suitable only for postal telegraphy, and 
'the applicants are no parties, directly or indirectly, to any intention or project of adapting 
this so to speak civil telegraphy to military purposes. ' 36 Whilst it was probable 'that the 
line may be occasionally used for military among other purposes; such a probability is not 
sufficient to divest the line of its primary and paramount commercial character, and to 
subject this company to the very severe penalties imposed by the statute. ' 37 
However, despite ordering the unconditional release of the ship, consideration must 
be given to the balance of Phillimore J's judgment. Not only did he read s.30 FEA 
expansively, allowing future government action against a wide range of figures that they 
considered to be undertaking "military service," but in an effort not to dissuade such 
prosecutions in the future, he was willing to find that the government had "a reasonable and 
probable cause" to detain the International and for making the applicants defend their 
contract with a belligerent, and in such circumstances he made no order as to costs or 
damages. 
The final case that warrants consideration also arose from the Franco-Prussian War, 
when a Prussian merchant ship, the Lord Brougham,38 was captured in the Channel by the 
French cruiser La Provence. Storms forced the French prize crew on board to anchor her 
within British waters, and in order to convey the damaged ship safely to France, the French 
35 ibid., 338 
36 ibid., 338 
37 ibid., 338 
38 An ironic name for this particular vessel, given Lord Brougham's Parliamentary support for an extension of 
categories of contraband at the outset of the American Civil War, 16th May 1861, Hansard, H.L. Deb, 3nl 
Series, vol. I 57, col. 2083 
73 
Consul at Dover engaged a British tug, the Gauntlet, to tow her to Dunkirk Roads on 25th 
November 1870. 
Again the interpretation clause in s.30 was at issue in this case, and whether in the 
light of this provision the actions of the Gauntlet constituted employment in the military or 
naval service of France for the purpose of the s.8 prohibition. The interpretation clause 
enacted; 
'That naval service shall, as respects a person, include service as a 
marine, employment as a pilot in piloting or directing the course of a 
ship of war or other ship when such ship of war or other ship is 
being used in any military or naval operation, and any employment 
whatever on board a ship of war, transport, store-ship, privateer, or 
ship under letters of marque; and as respects a ship, include any user 
of a ship as a transport, store-ship, privateer, or ship under letters of 
marque.' 
Phillimore J again resisted the argument by the applicants, 'that the interpretation 
clause limits and restrains the enacting clause, and that inasmuch as "steam-tug" is not 
among the vessels therein enumerated there is a casus omissus in the statute which disposes 
of the present case in favour of the defendants,' declaring that he was of the opinion 'that 
the interpretation clause is not of a restrictive but of an enlarging character. ' 39 The Crown 
would have to prove that the act of towing a prize vessel from neutral waters to a 
belligerent port amounted to a military service. It was therefore contended that, through 
39 Dyke v. Elliot (1871) [L R] 3 A&E 381,388 per Phillimore J 
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various factors, 'the towing was connected with the original seizure,' 40 and was an offence 
sufficient to incur the penalty of condemnation. Not only was taking a vessel from neutral 
waters into the waters of the captor's country a continuance of that belligerent act, relieving 
the captor from the necessity of protecting his prize during the transit across the Channel 
and permitting the condemnation of the Lord Brougham by a Prize Court in France, but the 
Gauntlet was furthermore under the direction of a French captain aboard the captured 
vessel, which might therefore be considered an extension of the capturing ship of war. 
However, these seemingly persuasive arguments had little impact on Phillimore J, 
who found himself 'unable to assent to the main position with respect to the completion of 
the act of capture by the employment of the Gauntlet, having regard to the circumstances of 
this case.' 41 He disputed the argument that a French Prize Court could not complete the 
capture whilst the Lord Brougham lay in neutral British waters on the basis, 'that with the 
permission of the neutral state, the prize locally situate in his waters might be condemned 
by the belligerent tribunal sitting in the belligerent state. ' 42 However, Phillimore J 
recognised that this conclusion raised more questions than it answered, asserting that 
'whether the neutral state, by such permission might not provoke a serious question as to 
the strict maintenance of her neutral character, and whether such permission must not be 
equally granted to both belligerents, and whether even such a course would not involve the 
neutral state in great difficulties, are grave considerations into which I have not to 
inquire. ' 43 This specious statement might well appear to be answered by the fact that the 
British government, in seizing the Gauntlet, clearly did intend to maintain strict neutrality 
and avoid the 'great difficulties' that Phillimore J alluded to, but he pressed on with the 
40 ibid., 389 
41 ibid., 389 
42 ibid., 392 
43 ibid., 392 
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argument that if the Lord Brougham had jure belli become a French vessel, 'then it was as 
lawful for the neutral steam-tug to tow her as it would have been for her to have towed any 
merchant vessel, originally French, across the Channel, though she had been hired for this 
purpose by the captain of a belligerent ship with the approval and intervention of the 
French consul. ' 44 As to whether the actions of the Gauntlet had relieved the belligerent 
ship from the encumbrance of protecting her prizes and enabled her either to go into action 
against the enemy or to make fresh prizes, Phillimore J skirted round the issue, concluding 
that 'the Gauntlet was in no way whatever, directly or indirectly, connected with, or 
ministering to, the capture of the vessel. She had, indeed, "reasonable ground to believe" at 
the time when she was hired that the vessel which she was employed to tow had been 
captured from the German belligerent, but that was all.' 45 Finally, he dismissed the claim 
that a captured vessel with a prize crew was a ship of war, and that to tow her therefore 
constituted employment in the naval service of the belligerent, formulaically asserting that 
the Lord Brougham 'was not commissioned, and was not a ship ofwar.'46 
The Crown appealed this decision to the Privy Council, where the judgment of the 
court was given by James LJ. His response, to arguments largely unchanged from those 
before the Court of Admiralty, differed substantially from that of Phillimore J. 
Acknowledging the argument that the supposedly "highly penal" FEA needed to be strictly 
construed, 'their Lordships have, ... no hesitation in concurring with the learned judge that 
the words in the definition can have no effect in restricting the meaning to be put on the 
words of the prohibitory section. And the whole question is really what is the meaning of 
the words in that section "naval service".'47 Whereas in the Court of Admiralty this 
44 ibid., 392 
45 ibid., 393 
46 ibid., 394 
47 Dyke v. Elliot (1872) 17 ER 373, 377 per James LJ 
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decision turned upon Phillimore J' s opinion that it was not essential for the completion of 
the capture that the prize be towed to French waters, the Privy Council asserted that this 'is 
not the only way in which ... service can be rendered to a belligerent in connection with a 
prize. It would seem to be quite as important, to say the least, to complete a capture de 
facto by lodging it in a place of safety, as to complete it de jure by bringing it within the 
jurisdiction of the captors' Prize Court.' 48 Moreover, assisting the Lord Brougham was 
comparable to providing naval service to any French warship, because the prize crew; 
'had in our waters the right of a French man-of-war, as against any 
action of our municipal law, in respect either of their prisoners or 
their booty. Their Lordships agree, therefore, with the contention on 
the part of the Crown, that it is impossible to distinguish such a ship, 
because it had been a prize, from the case of a tender, or a pinnace, 
detached for any purpose from a ship of war, or any other vessel 
taken up by or for the belligerent Power in the course of its naval 
operations. ' 49 
Finally, in response to the contention that 'naval service' must mean service directly 
connected with some warlike naval operation, James LJ found that 'detaching a prize crew 
after capture to take charge of the prize, and to bring it and the prisoners safely home, is 
essentially a warlike naval operation - as much and as important a warlike operation as the 
chase before the capture. ' 50 
48 ibid., 377 
49 ibid., 377-378 
50 ibid., 378 
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Given this decision by the Privy Council, Phillimore J's ruling that in spite of the 
threat that her actions posed to Britain's strict neutrality the seizure of the Gauntlet was 
unjustified, requires some explanation. Indeed, despite his machinations, he acknowledged 
that, 'it may indeed be, that however innocent as to intention, the Gauntlet has, as a matter 
of fact, violated the provisions and incurred the penalties of the statute; but it is certainly a 
conclusion at which the Court would be reluctant to arrive.' 51 The reason for that 
reluctance is most likely related to the role played by the Customs inspector at Dover in this 
affair. As Phillimore J related the events at issue; 'the English collector of customs tells the 
French consul that this vessel cannot remain in English waters, he is the person who 
originates and demands her removal. The consul says, and says quite truly, that he had 
accidentally found a steam-tug which would tow her away; the collector is perfectly 
satisfied; no suggestion of anything illegal in the transaction is made; and the tug proceeds 
to do her ordinary work for the ordinary price.' 52 Clearly there was some degree of 
sympathy on the part of the judge for the predicament in which government officials had 
left the owners of the Gauntlet, a sympathy which he, though not the Court of Appeal, felt 
outweighed the threat to Britain's neutrality in a war that had already ended several months 
before the trial stage of this case concluded in early August 1871. 
Freebooters and Empire-Builders under the Foreign Enlistment Act 
The amended FEA was designed to prevent the United Kingdom from being drawn 
into conflict with friendly states, regardless of whether they were already involved in a 
conflict. Under s.ll FEA, it is a criminal offence, within the United Kingdom or the 
51 Dyke v. Elliot, op. cit. n.34, 393 
52 ibid.' 393 
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dominions, to 'prepare or fit out any naval or military expedition to proceed against the 
dominions of any friendly state.' The FEA therefore became a useful means of disowning 
the embarrassing or dangerous activities of mercenaries, adventurers, traders and explorers, 
purportedly acting in the name of, and who at the very least embarked upon their follies 
from within, the British Empire. It was in just such a case that the late-Victorian judiciary 
can finally be seen to lay the ghosts of the Alexandra affair to rest. 
Colonel Sandoval, a resident alien, purchased two Krupp cannon in Sheffield and 
ammunition in Birmingham. These were shipped to Amsterdam, and there the cannon were 
installed aboard a steamer ironically named the Justitia. The ammunition was loaded into 
her hold. Sandoval then captained the Justitia on a voyage to the West Indies, before 
passing control of the vessel to the Venezuelan General Pulgar, off Trinidad. Clearly not 
eager to become involved at the business end of this expedition, Sandoval then left the ship. 
Thereafter, the steamer's arrival off the coast of Venezuela corresponded, supposedly 
coincidently, with an uprising. 53 
The British government, at the time attempting to settle its own border disputes with 
Venezuela, took a dim view of this activity. On his return to England, Sandoval was 
charged and convicted of breaching s.ll FEA. He sought a re-trial, producing paperwork 
to attest to the expedition starting out as a commercial venture and only taking on the 
"military" character forbidden under s.ll after he had left the ship. Drawing inspiration 
from the American Civil War era jurisprudence concerning s.7 FEA 1819, he argued in the 
alternative that s.ll FEA only applied to the complete 'preparation or fitting out' of an 
expedition within territory controlled by the Crown. 
53 The Justitia's limited contribution to this rising was the ineffective sheJiing of a custom-house, before she 
was damaged in a one-sided encounter with a Venezuelan warship and fled to San Domingo. 
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Not retiring before passing judgment, lest that be construed as showing doubt as to 
the interpretation of these provisions, 54 the High Court dismissed these arguments. The 
tone of the judgments was set when Day J rejected contentions that this was a commercial 
expedition, advanced on the basis of the Justitia's paperwork, on the incredible basis, 'that 
the ship's papers were thoroughly regular (which one might expect in a transaction which 
was not bona fide).' 55 Thereafter he concentrated his judgment on what constituted illegal 
equipping of an expedition under s.ll, asserting that he would not countenance an 
interpretation of the provision that would require an expedition's 'every last biscuit' be 
taken on board within the FEA's jurisdiction. All that was required was 'any overt act of 
preparation' within the Empire, in this case satisfied by the purchase of cannon and 
ammunition. 56 Day J openly adopted this broad interpretation in order that 'the 
mischievous consequences likely to ensue to this country may be prevented.' 57 Wills J, 
who similarly displayed a passion for embellishing national security concerns to amplify 
their interpretive effect that would only increase with time, 58 stated that; 
'Nothing can be more mischievous than that persons who acted as 
the present defendant had done, may suppose that they can escape 
the responsibility for acts done in violation of the municipal law 
passed to maintain the requirements of international comity - acts 
which might be followed by consequences most mischievous and 
54 R. v. Sandoval ( 1887) 56 L T 526, 527, per Day J 
55 ibid., 528 
56 ibid. 
57 ibid. 
58 See Cooper v. Hawkins (1904) 2 KB 164, 173, per Wills J, discussed in Chapter 6 
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which under certain circumstances it might be impossible to 
exaggerate.' 59 
The FEA's propensity to produce legal causes celebres was affirmed when, being 
employed in its role as the government's preferred method of distancing the United 
Kingdom from the activities of private "empire-builders,"60 it formed the basis of the legal 
fallout to one of late-Victorian imperialism's most prominent misadventures, the Jameson 
Raid. This fiasco saw Cecil Rhodes and Levander Jameson, the leading figures in the 
British South Africa Company, employ the false pretext of Boer abuses of British mining 
communities to justify an invasion and unsuccessfully attempt to subjugate the Transvaal 
Republic on 29th December 1895, using 500 men of the Company's armed forces 
(permitted to enable the Company to fulfil its government responsibilities in South Africa). 
Their real aim was to integrate the Transvaal into British South Africa, thereby extending 
the empire.61 
Jameson surrendered to the Boers on 2"d January 1896. On being handed over to 
British military authorities he was returned to England for trial, the charge alleging a breach 
of s.11 FEA by preparing and fitting out a military expedition against a friendly state 
without licence from the Crown. As might be expected, the combination of the "heroic" 
defendant,62 the media attention, and the international controversy surrounding Jameson's 
application to quash the indictment against him produced a judgment that can only be 
considered anti-climatic for the purposes of this study. The case against Jameson was, of 
59 Sandoval, op. cit. n.54, 529 
60 At least when they proved unsuccessful. For Cecil Rhodes, the exemplar "empire-builder," seized huge 
tracts of land in Matabeleland and Bechuanaland (thereafter Rhodesia) without facing government retribution. 
61 Massie, R., Dreadnought, (1992, London), Chapter 11,213-231 provides a concise overview of the raid and 
its political consequences. 
62 See the suitably sycophantic description of the raid by Poet Laureate Alfred Austin, The Times, ll 1h January 
1896 
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course, so open and shut that, despite the array of legal talent assembled by both the 
prosecution and defence, points of law on which the indictment could be disputed were thin 
on the ground. The combined talents of no less than eight eminent defence counsel 
produced the, at best speculative, argument that in s.ll 'the word "therein"63 is ambiguous, 
and might mean that the Act was in force in some other part of the dominions. ' 64 
Unsurprisingly it did not require much effort from the five prosecuting counsel, including 
both the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General, to counter that all that was required 
under s.ll was that 'the place where the Acts complained of were committed' was within 
the limits of Her Majesty's dominions.65 
Lord Russell CJ needed no faculties beyond common sense to conclude that, 'the 
area within which a statute is to operate, and the persons against whom it is to operate, are 
to be gathered from the language and purview of the particular statute. ' 66 In the instant 
case the express language of the statute militated against it being read as only applicable to 
the United Kingdom and its area of operation clearly covered Jameson's actions without 
any need to resort to an extensive interpretation of the provision in light of national 
security. The defendant was thereafter tried before Lord Russell, and found guilty. Having 
stifled courtroom demonstrations in support of Jameson, the Lord Chief Justice sentenced 
him to fifteen months imprisonment. He was pardoned after four months. 67 
This does not mean that the raid sheds no light upon judicial conceptions of national 
security in the late-Victorian era. Adopting the purpose of the FEA as their bearing, after 
Jameson's guilt had been established the courts actively sought to impose further liabilities 
63 Referring to the need for the illegal preparation or fitting out to be carried out within the United Kingdom 
or dominion territory. 
64 R. v. Jameson (1896) 2 QB 425,426, per Clarke QC 
65 ibid., 427, per Sir Robert Webster A-G 
66 ibid., 430, per Lord Russell CJ 
67 Massie, op. cit. n.61, 229 
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upon the organisers of the raid, so as to discourage future "private" attempts to extend the 
empire, even if this meant twisting traditional legal principles. 
In Burrows v. Rhodes the claimant was a member of the British South Africa 
Company's armed forces. Duped into believing that he was participating in an action 
sanctioned by the Crown to protect British citizens within the Transvaal Republic, he was 
severely injured at the Battle of Doornkop. He claimed £3000 in compensation, with the 
defendants demurring that the offence under s.ll FEA was one of strict liability, and that 
Burrows was therefore 'just as much a criminal as the defendants who had knowingly 
broken the law.' 68 The High Court held that even ifthis was the case, the claimant was not 
barred from claiming compensation from the defendant, as would ordinarily be the case if 
injury occurred during a criminal enterprise. 'Public policy' in the instant case would be 
better served by ensuring that action could be taken against the defendants' "deeper-dyed" 
criminality. 69 
Conclusion 
The Foreign Enlistment Act cases mark the first occasion in modern legal history 
when the judiciary had to undertake detailed interpretation of statutes aiming to fulfil such 
an important national security function as securing neutrality, and where their decisions 
might have a direct impact on Britain's ability to avoid entanglement in a conflict. And yet 
these cases, possibly the "missing-link" precursor to modern national security 
jurisprudence, have since been forgotten. This can largely be attributed to the legal niche 
68 Burrows v. Rhodes & Jameson [1899] I QB 816, 823, per Grantham J 
69 ibid., 831, per Kennedy J 
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in which they are found, which would not thereafter provide specific precedents, and 
should in no way tarnish their significance. 
Whilst even the post-1870 jurisprudence shows no uniform judicial response to the 
specific conflicts of interest under the FEA, it is possible to provide some explanation of 
those judgments that appear to flaunt the requirements of national security. The 
government's use of the newly enacted Foreign Enlistment Act 1870 must have appeared 
overzealous to Phillimore J. He had been a Neutrality Commissioner, and helped to draft 
the report upon which this statute was based, so it should come as no surprise that he 
considered the actions of the International and the Gauntlet to be a world away from the 
building of warships that he had sought to prevent. He considered the International to be a 
mere carrier of contraband, and his decision in the case of the Gauntlet was likely 
influenced by her actions being cleared by customs officers and through the national 
security concerns at issue being rendered nugatory by the conclusion of the war. 
In spite of these judgments successive administrations, saddled with the aide 
me moire of the payments imposed by the Alabama Claims Arbitration, 70 continued to apply 
the shipbuilding provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act more strictly than many 
commentators considered necessary.71 In marked contrast to the ordinarily laissez-faire 
policy of this era, 72 this practice including the detention of Turkish ironclads under 
construction during the Turco-Russian war of 1877,73 the 'unaccountable' removal from the 
Naval Reserve of British officers who captained vessels of the Japanese navy on their 
70 A full statement of the Award may be found in Moore, C., History and Digest of the Arbitrations to which 
the US. have been a Party, (1898, Washington), 653-59 
71 Macdonell, J., 'Some Notes on Neutrality,' (1899) 1 J. Soc. Comp. Legis. (n.s.) 62, 67: The United 
Kingdom's Proclamation ofNeutrality at the outbreak of war between the United States and Spain 'not only 
recites the Foreign Enlistment Act, but also the three rules of the Washington Treaty.' 
72 Holdsworth, W., 'The Relation between Commercial Legislation and National Defence Historically 
Considered,' (1918) 30 Jurid. Rev. 293, 307-317 
73 HO 45/9435/64038A. Long after the Alabama claims Baty continued to press that 'it can scarcely be that a 
neutral nation is bound, by the outbreak of war, to be so extremely solicitous about the interests of 
belligerents.' Baty, T., 'Some Questions in the Law of Neutrality,' (1905) 6 J. Soc. Comp. Legis. (n.s.) 201, 
208 
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voyage from shipyards in Genoa to the Far East during the Russo-Japanese War/4 and the 
seizure of the supposed torpedo boat Caroline. 75 
Suggestions that the preponderance of the judiciary that remained oblivious national 
security concerns into the 1870s are untenable. Such concerns had yet to take on the 
talismanic quality which would thereafter characterise their hold on the judiciary, and in the 
confident and liberal mid-Victorian era there was as yet little impetus towards such a 
development, coupled with judicial willingness to face down what was widely considered 
to be over-restrictive state action. 
However, through the course of these cases the judiciary exhibited a growing 
recognition of national security concerns and a willingness to consider them overtly in 
judgment. The genesis of the later approach to national security is evident. In the 
International the first judicial nod to 'interest reipublicae' 76 can be found; judicial 
shorthand for the 'sa/us populi' maxim that would thereafter colour statutory interpretation. 
By the 1880s and Sandoval the judicial transformation was complete. Not only did Day J 
and Wills J recognise the national security concerns at issue, they dramatised them, and 
they construed s.l1 FEA accordingly.77 Pollock CB must have been turning in his grave. 
74 ibid., 208 
75 National Archives, MEPO 3/167 (1904-1909) & CUST 46/314 & 46/315 (1904-05) 
76 
'The International,' op. cit. n.28, 333 per Phillimore J 
77 Sandoval, op. cit. n.54, 528 & 529 
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[5] 
Executive Expropriations of 
Land under the Defence Acts 
'[Fhe question] is whether these are rightful or wrongful acts, 
whether wrongful in the case of an individual, and rightful in the 
case of the military authorities. ' 
Sir George Jesse/ MR (1877) 
Introduction 
Property rights, and especially landed interests, have long been considered the 
preoccupation of the Victorian and Edwardian judiciary.' In an era when 'the nature and 
extent of state control over private property form[ ed] a subject of deep political and social 
interest, ' 2 this study must consider how the judiciary reconciled their supposed proclivity 
towards property interests with executive assertions of national security, the conundrum 
with which Jessel MR is wrestling in the opening epigram.3 
Most of the blame for the lack of clarity inherent in this area of law prior to the First 
World War attaches to the Stuart Kings. Their attempts to appropriate property or money 
through the royal prerogative were prominent amongst the causes of the Civil War. The 
Ship Money case4 was the most glaring example of such injudicious use of the prerogative 
1 Ewing, K., & Gearty, C., The Struggle for Civil Liberties, (2000, Oxford), 29 
2 Randolph, C., 'The Eminent Domain,' (1887) 3 LQR 314, 314 
3 Hawley v. Steele (1877) LR 6 Ch. D. 521, 528 
4 R v. Hampden (1637) 3 Howell's State Trials 825 
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litigated in this era. The majority accepted that the King could, under the prerogative, 
require his subjects to pay for the construction and upkeep of such ships as he considered 
necessary to protect the Kingdom from peril and danger without having to levy these funds 
through statute. 5 This conception of the prerogative was born of the opinion of 'lawyers 
and statesmen who, like Bacon, favoured the increase in royal authority.' 6 Dicey notes 
with some sympathy that whilst these advocates of the prerogative, 'no doubt underrated 
the risk that an increase in the power of the Crown should lead to the establishment of 
despotism,'7 they 'did not intend to sacrifice the liberties or invade the ordinary private 
rights of citizens; they were struck with the evils of the conservative legalism of Coke, and 
with the necessity for enabling the Crown as head of the nation to cope with the selfishness 
of powerful individuals and classes. ' 8 To these jurists, the prerogative was the most 
effective means of stirring the state into action, especially in circumstances, akin to those in 
Ship Money, where national security demanded action. 
However, with the defeat of these arguments on the battlefields of the Civil War, 
even Clarendon, 'one ofthe most zealous supporters ofthe King's prerogative,'9 recognised 
that when the prerogative powers of expropriation were abused, 'the law and the judges 
were looked upon by the subjects as the asylum for their liberties and security.' 10 The 
failure of the common law to constrain the prerogative in the supine Ship Money judgment 
5 Note that the minority conceived of a prerogative confmed to circumstances of emergency; 'In time of 
peace, and of no extreme necessity, legal courses must be used and not Royal power.' Ship Money, ibid., 
1162, per Croke J 
6 Dicey, A., The Law of the Constitution, (1960, lOth Ed., London), 63 
7 Such benevolence of intention is questionable, given that Francis Bacon was the last Attorney-General to 
oversee the use of torture, under the Royal Prerogative, in The Case of Edward Peacham,for Treason (1614) 
2 Howell's State Trials, 869 
8 Dicey, op. cit. n.6, 370 
9 Mackenzie, V., 'The Royal Prerogative in War-time,' (1918) 34 LQR 152, 157 
1° Clarendon, Earl of, The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England Begun in the Year 1641, (1888, 
Oxford), vol. I, 89 
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constituted a 'scandal' and resulted in the centuries of 'deserved reproach and infamy that 
attended the judges, by being made use of in this and like acts of power.' 11 
The vigorous backlash against this judgment produced considerable confusion in 
relation to the executive's power to expropriate property. In response, 'so far as concerned 
the taking of land for defence purposes in time of peace or war, Parliament from the 
beginning of the 18th century onwards had begun to step in and to confer and regulate by 
statute the necessary power.' 12 
The Origins of the Defence Acts 
In the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution and the protections afforded to 
property rights under the Bill of Rights 1689, it was clear that in peacetime 'the Crown 
[had] no power at common law to enter upon the lands of a subject, or to expropriate them, 
or to seize his goods.' 13 Thus the doctrine of "eminent domain," which provides that a 
'proprietor may be compelled to sell his property for an adequate price, where an evident 
utility on the part of the public demands it,' 14 but which had proven so prone to abuse by 
the Stuarts, was ousted from English common law.15 All that remained was an obstinate 
fragment of expropriation power, triggered upon invasion by an enemy and thereby existing 
as an element of the war prerogative. 
Expropriation of land by the state, at least in peacetime, became a matter for statute. 
From 1708 onwards, the statute book was littered with items of legislation permitting 
II ibid., 88 
12 Burmah Oil Company v. Lord Advocate [1965] A.C. 75, 121, per Viscount Radcliffe 
13 Baty, T. & Morgan, J., War, Its Conduct and Legal Results, (1915, London), 59 
14 Rankin, J., Erskine's Principles of the Law ofScotland, (1911, 21 51 Ed., Edinburgh), ii, I 
15 This doctrine remains in use in the United States, 'even in the absence of explicit provision in the written 
constitution.' Rubin, G., Private Property, Government Requisition and the Constitution, 1914-27, (1994, 
London), 12 
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distinct acquisitions of land by the state for defence purposes. During the Napoleonic 
Wars, the threat of invasion required more flexible powers of compulsory purchase. Acts 
in 1798 16 and 1803 17 provided for purchase powers limited to the duration of the ongoing 
hostilities with France. The 1804 Act, enacted when Napoleon was poised to invade, 18 
marked a further extension in the executive's power in this field. It was not limited to the 
duration of the hostilities, and furthermore provided for a scheme of compulsory 
acquisition (and compensation) under statutory powers 'for the defence and security of the 
Realm,' 19 with the acquisitions being permitted 'for such time as the exigency ofthe public 
service shall require. ' 20 This Napoleonic-era legislation moreover reaffirmed the 
monarch's prerogative to take land without consent, but only in the context of an ongoing 
invasion by enemy forces,21 providing the executive with leeway to turn to the prerogative 
should an enemy invade. It was expanded upon by a series of later enactments?2 
Unfortunately, no detailed record of the application of these schemes was maintained.23 
The Defence Act 1842 constituted an effort to impose a degree of order upon these 
disparate enactments. Passed at a time when renewed tensions with France were on the 
minds of many Parliamentarians, 24 and with the immediate intention of enabling a scheme 
of coastal fortification, this first Defence Act is clearly distinguishable from its 
predecessors. Firstly, the provisions of the Act permitting that land could be appropriated 
by the state, by compulsory purchase if necessary,25 for the purpose of 'the defence and 
16 38 Geo. III, c. 27 
17 43 Geo. III, c. 55 
18 44 Geo. III, c. 95 
19 Preamble, 44 Geo. III, c. 95 
20 s.11 44 Geo. III, c.95 
21 s.IO 44 Geo. III, c.95. See Mackenzie, op. cit. n.9, 153 
22 I & 2 Geo. IV c.69, 3 Geo. IV, c.l08, and the 2 & 3 Will. IV, c.25 
23 National Archives; HO 4517919; 'Fear of Invasion of England, 1798-1807' (1866) 
24 Less than two years previously, in October 1840, the then Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, had advised 
the British ambassador in Paris as to the destruction of his archives 'in the event of [his] coming away.' 
Woodward, L., The Age of Reform, (1962, Oxford), 239 
25 s.I9 Defence Act 1842 
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security of the realm' 26 were not restricted to time of emergency, but were applicable 'at 
any time or times hereafter. ' 27 The grant of executive discretion as to expropriation powers 
distinguished the Defence Acts from previous peacetime enactments. No longer was 
legislation required for each of the executive's expropriations of land. Instead, as Lord 
Moulton outlined when he evaluated the statute nearly eighty years after its enactment; 
'This Act gives very wide powers to the Crown. It has unrestricted 
powers of selection of the necessary lands, buildings, etc., to be 
taken. It contemplates in the first instance voluntary purchase, but, if 
that cannot be arranged, then the lands, etc., may be acquired 
compulsorily subject to certain certificates being obtained as to the 
necessity or expediency of the acquisition or in case of actual 
invasion. ' 28 
This basic procedure remained little changed by the series of Defence Acts passed 
up until 1873, although alternate, and increasingly bureaucratic, procedures by which land 
could be expropriated and vested with the Secretary of State for War waxed and waned in a 
plethora of Victorian legislation,29 culminating in the Military Lands Acts 1892 to 1903 
(MLA).30 Therefore, in assessing the response of the courts to the expropriation of 
26 s.9 Defence Act 1842 
27 
s.6 Defence Act 1842 
28 Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel [1920] AC 508, 550-551. The necessary certificates could be 
§ained from two justices under s.29 Defence Act 1842. 
9 Statutes such as the Rifle Volunteer Grounds Act 1860, the Volunteer Act 1863, the Military Forces 
Localization Act 1872, the Drill Ground Act 1883, the Artillery and Rifle Ranges Act 1885, the Barracks Act 
1890 and the Ranges Act 1891 all contained compulsory purchase provisions for defence purposes. 
30 The 1892 Act imposed a turgid procedure upon compulsory purchase. Notice of the proposed purchase had 
to be served on the owners and occupiers and a public local inquiry had to be convened to allow them to 
express their views (s.2(5)-2(7) MLA 1892). After the inquiry report into the expropriation, if the Secretary 
of State still considered the purchase necessary, he could make a provisional order to that effect. However, 
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property in the interests of national security, this study will consider litigation arising from 
any of these related statutes. 
Significantly, the procedures for acquiring land for military purposes were 'similar 
to that laid down in the Lands Clauses Consolidation Acts, which represent a 
standardisation by Parliament of the conditions which it will impose on local authorities 
and public companies seeking powers of compulsory purchase.' 31 Indeed, not only did the 
mechanics of these expropriation schemes overlap,32 but through their standing powers of 
expropriation these enactments have been described as forming 'code[s] regulating the law 
and practice of the eminent domain. ' 33 
However, it remains to be seen whether the judiciary distinguished these enactments 
on the basis of the disparate purposes for which they permitted expropriations. In 
interpreting the Defence Acts the judiciary were required to evaluate statutes directly 
concerned with national security, but without an atmosphere of imminent threat to the 
nation overshadowing claims against executive action. This chapter will examine whether 
the executive was able to use compulsory expropriation powers more broadly in the context 
of defence than in other fields, even in peacetime, through consideration of the judicial 
response to claims of nuisance brought against expropriating authorities. Attention will 
then tum to how the judiciary approached compensation claims under the Defence Acts and 
under alternate statutory expropriation schemes. Finally, analysis will tum to how this pre-
war Defence Act jurisprudence fed into the fierce debates over the relationship between 
prerogative and these statutes during the First World War, and whether any authority from 
such an order would have no effect until a private Act of Parliament was enacted to confirm it (s.2(9) MLA 
1892). 
31 Baty & Morgan, op. cit. n.13, 60 
32 s.29 Defence Act 1860, for example, allowed the military to pursue expropriation for defence purposes 
under the provisions of the Lands Clauses Act 1845. 
33 Constable, A., 'The Expropriation ofLand for Public Purposes,' 13 Jurid Rev. 164, 164 
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the 1850s onwards supported the broad expropriation power that the government claimed 
under the war prerogative. 
Consideration of the pre-war judicial decisions in these spheres will not simply 
indicate how the judiciary approached any conflict between property interests and national 
security concerns before the First World War, but also the degree to which the wartime 
expropriation cases were presaged by this earlier jurisprudence. 
Actions for Nuisance against Works under the Defence Acts 
Whilst the land owner whose property has been partially expropriated can claim 
compensation for any injurious affectation34 caused to his remaining holding by the use of 
the land acquired under statute, the same claim was not open to any neighbouring 
landowners suffering the same effects of the public works. As the Law Commission 
recently stated, 'strictly speaking, injurious affection where no land is taken from the 
claimant is not part of the law of compulsory purchase. The right to compensation is not 
dependent on compulsory purchase, but on loss in the value of land due to public works. ' 35 
Such a claimant must instead bring an action in nuisance. 36 
This section will focus upon the outcome of such actions in the context of military 
expropriations of land and draw comparison to nuisance actions against bodies enjoying 
similar powers of compulsory purchase, such as railway companies. In the cases 
considered below, whether the land purchase occurred under the Defence Acts or their 
34 See Buccleuch (Duke) v. Metropolitan Board of Works (1872) LR 5 HL 418 for a successful claim of 
injurious affectation to retained land arising from noise, dust and loss of privacy caused by the construction of 
a new road upon land the claimant had sold to the defendant. 
35 Law Commission 286, 'Towards a Compulsory Purchase Code: (l) Compensation,' (2003), para. 11.2 
36 Broadbent v. Imperial Gas (1859) 7 De G. M. & G. 436,447-8, per Lord Cranworth 
92 
close relatives, or under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845,37 the expropriating 
body asserted legislative authority as justification for its actions in response to the claim of 
nuisance. This defence required the judiciary to evaluate whether the expropriating body 
had acted ultra vires its authorizing statute. Had the Crown acted ultra vires, then its 
defence of legislative authority would fail. Therefore, in the context of the various schemes 
of compulsory purchase propagated in the nineteenth century, actions for nuisance provided 
a form of judicial review by proxy. 
The significance of property interests in nineteenth-century jurisprudence can only 
be appreciated once the privileged protections enjoyed by such concerns are recognised. 
Whereas nuisance actions could be employed to challenge the activities of the state where 
they interfered with private property, the general rule remained that civil actions against the 
Crown would not lie, and that remedy could only be attained through recourse to a petition 
ofright.38 
The mid-Victorian era initially saw the judiciary gtve little weight to national 
security concerns in the face of property interests. In Raphael v. Wigram, an injunction was 
obtained to prevent all use by the Tower Hamlets Rifle Volunteer Brigade of rifle butts that 
they had obtained near Plaistow, in Essex. Raphael was the owner of the land lying a little 
distance in the rear of the butts, and the injunction was granted upon the basis that the 
bullets which passed the butts reached his land, killing cattle grazing there and rendering it 
dangerous to go upon it.39 
37 Or the closely related Railway Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 
38 Tobin v. Reg. 14 CB (NS) 505. Note that this was no defence to liability where the officer of the Crown 
committed a criminal act; Feather v. Ref. 6 B & S 257,296, per Cockburn CJ 
39 Raphael v. Wigram (unreported), 25 July 1864. See Holt v. Gas, Light and Coke Co. (1872) 8 LR 7 QB 
728,729-30 
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Similarly, under the Rifle Volunteer Grounds Act 1860, Colonel Bigge, officer 
commanding the Middlesex Volunteers,40 obtained a lease over a rifle range at Willesden. 
However, with bullets regularly crossing his property, a nearby farmer sought an injunction 
to prevent the use of this range until it had been made safe. The defence countered, 'that it 
was necessary, for the safety of the Kingdom, that artillery and [rifle] practice at ranges 
approved of by the authorities, should not be stopped, where, ... every precaution has been 
taken to prevent accident and annoyance. ' 41 
Despite the evidence that if the Middlesex Volunteers were to be an effective force 
they desperately needed rifle practice (the farmhouse, fully 600 yards from the range and 
200 yards out ofthe line of fire, had been hit by bullets), Romilly MR concluded that 'it is 
impossible to say that this is safe now, though the defendants themselves say that it can be 
made safe. ' 42 On this basis he injuncted use of the range until it had been made safe. 
Whilst it is difficult to see why such a speculative defence was mounted, it is significant 
that Romilly MR passed no comment upon the national security concerns at issue, neither 
dismissing them out of hand nor giving any apparent weight to them. This case perfectly 
fits the proposition that, whilst Parliament can legalise acts which may be dangerous or 
may constitute a nuisance to private interests, 'the courts have invariably construed [such 
statutes] with an eye to the protection of those rights or interests which are liable to be 
interfered with. ' 43 
The judicial approach to expropriations undertaken in the interests of defence was 
reappraised in Hawley v Steele. Ash Common was a large tract of land which had been 
purchased under the terms of the Defence Act 1842 and was used for training troops from 
40 The Volunteers, together with the militia, were the forerunners of the modem Territorial Army. They were 
merged into this body in the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act 1907. 
41 Banister v. Bigge (1865) 34 Beav 287,287, per Mr. Selwyn 
42 ibid, 288, per Rom illy MR 
43 Lucas, W., 'Crown and Private Rights,' (1915) 27 Jurid Rev. 45,47 
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the nearby Aldershot camp. This action was brought after the defendant, Lieutenant-
General Sir Thomas Steele, ordered the erection of a rifle range on part of Ash Common 
adjacent to the claimant's property. The claimant sought an interlocutory injunction 
preventing the use of this range by firing parties who, from before 6a.m., undertook target 
practice from positions as close as 100 yards from his house. 
Jessel MR gave short shift to this nuisance action. In keeping with his reputation 
amongst barristers for having 'decided the case almost before they had opened it,'44 he did 
not even call the defence.45 Beyond technical grounds for dismissing the claim, the nature 
of the defendant was clearly the most significant substantive factor in Jessel MR's decision, 
for, 'if Sir Thomas Steele had been the owner of this land, and if the persons who caused 
that noise and vibration had not been troops of the Government, I should have had no 
hesitation in granting the injunction. ' 46 
At issue was whether this use of the land by the military was sanctioned by the 
Defence Acts, which necessitated consideration of what activities could be described as 
being undertaken 'for the purpose of securing the military defence of the country. ' 47 Jessel 
MR considered that if, 'the Acts of Parliament authorize ... the Secretary of State for War 
to acquire these lands for the purpose of general instruction, and that [it] the use made of 
them was a reasonable use, it seems to me no action would lie against the individual who, 
under the authority of the executive government, made such a use of the land. ' 48 
Whilst the Defence Act 1842, 'is not perhaps worded in such a way as to be beyond 
argument as to the meaning'49 of what activities could be considered to be undertaken in 
44 Jones, G., 'Jesse!, Sir George (1824-1883),' Oxford DNB, (2004, Oxford) [http://www.oxforddnb.com 
/view/article/14803, accessed 25th March 2006] 
45 Which included Sir John Holker, A-G. 
46 Hawley, op. cit. n.3, 525 
47 ibid, 527 
48 ibid, 527 
49 ibid, 527 
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the interest of the defence of the realm, Jessel MR expansively construed the possible range 
of activities that amounted to 'reasonable military purpose,' 5° concluding that 'except in the 
case of an outrageous departure from all reasonable use, it is not for a Court of Justice to 
say what is the reasonable use of land for military requirements.' Rather, it lay at the 
discretion of the government, 'to say that such land is wanted as a camp for exercise and 
instruction, such other land is wanted for a fortress, and such other land is wanted for an 
arsenal.' 51 
He did warn the authorities that it remained possible for the court to intervene where 
land taken for the purpose of a camp of instruction was used for purposes, 'so entirely 
opposite to a camp of instruction, that the court would say at once it was a mere subterfuge, 
and not a bonafide use of the land.' 52 However, 'the moment the court is satisfied that it is 
a bona fide use of the land for the purposes of a camp of instruction it appears to me that 
the court's function stops, that it has no right to say that the tents shall be pitched on 
another piece of land, or that targets are to occupy a different piece of land.' 53 
Baty and Morgan contended that Hawley evidenced a level of judicial oversight 
whereby, 'if the War Office puts the lands taken to a use not contemplated by the statute 
under which it acts, it could be restrained by injunction from so using them. The courts 
claim the right to consider whether the use to which they were put was "reasonable".' 54 
This position bears no more than a superficial resemblance to the decision in Hawley. If 
Jessel MR did not utterly abdicate judicial supervision of the vires of executive action 
where security concerns were at stake, he heavily mortgaged such oversight. This 
50 
s.9 Defence Act 1842 
51 Hawley, op. cit. n.3, 528 
52 ibid.' 529 
53 ibid, 529 
54 Baty & Morgan, op. cit. n.l3, 61 
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disinterested analysis of whether the land was being used for the stated purpose introduced 
a de facto divide between expropriation schemes for defence and for other purposes. 
The significance of this decision is best contextualized by considering the 
implications drawn from the Arlidge case,55 decided in the fateful summer of 1914. The 
House of Lords upheld an order by the Local Government Board preventing the claimant 
landlord from leasing a property that had been found by an inspector to be uninhabitable, in 
spite of his claims of procedural unfairness. Ewing and Gearty cast this famous decision as 
evidence of the Law Lords being 'prepared to bend with the political winds,' 56 even in the 
face of assertions of property interests. 
But it should hardly be surprising that, in an era when ideological battle-lines were 
frequently drawn in the courtroom and when key judicial appointments were politically 
motivated,57 a panel of predominantly Liberal-appointed Law Lords would uphold the 
public interest inherent in the Housing, Town Planning, etc., Act 1909. Conversely, 
Hawley indicates that over thirty years before it became, 'common for statutes to empower 
Government departments to decide questions affecting rights of property,' 58 judges were 
already willing to interpret expropriation powers flexibly in the interests of national 
security, even when the decision undermined the very same 'liberty of man to do what he 
chooses with what is his own. ' 59 
Baty and Morgan, however, suggest that the better companion for Hawley is the 
decision in Metropolitan Asylum v. Hill. 6° Certainly this decision is indicative of the 
respect that the legal establishment ordinarily accorded to property interests in the mid-
55 Local Government Boardv Arlidge [1915] AC 120 
56 Ewing & Gearty, op. cit. n.1, 28 
51 Stevens, R., 'Government and the Judiciary,' in Bogdanor, V., (ed), The British Constitution in the 
Twentieth Century, (2003, Oxford), 335 
58 Arlidge, op. cit. n.55, 129, per Viscount Haldane LC 
59 ibid.' 130 
60 Metropolitan Asylum District Managers v Hill (No.2) (1880-81) LR 6 AC 193 
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Victorian period (illustrated by the Solicitor-General, Sir Farrer Herschell, appearing in this 
case on behalf of the private respondents). A jury sustained the claim by Mr Hill that the 
construction of a small-pox hospital near his property constituted a nuisance. However, 
with the injunction upon the use of the hospital stayed by Pollock B, the Metropolitan 
Asylums' Board appealing on the basis that, as statute provided that, 'asylums may be 
provided under this Act for the reception and relief of the sick, insane, or infirm or other 
class or classes of the poor chargeable in unions or parishes,'61 they therefore had 
legislative authority for the construction of this hospital. The Law Lords, however, had 
little sympathy for this argument, Lord Watson asserting that; 
'where the terms of the statute are not imperative, but permissive, 
when it is left to the discretion of the persons empowered to 
determine whether the general powers committed to them shall be 
put into execution or not, I think the fair inference is that the 
Legislature intended that discretion to be exercised in strict 
conformity with private rights, and did not intend to confer licence to 
commit nuisance in any place which might be selected for the 
purpose. ' 62 
Baty and Morgan conclude that Metropolitan Asylum is authority for the proposition 
that 'unless it can be shown that the legislation has contemplated that a thing "shall at all 
events be done," the courts will presume that it cannot be done in such a way as to take 
61 s.5 Metropolitan Poor Act 1867 
62 Hill (No.2), op. cit. n.60, 213, per Lord Watson 
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away or injuriously affect the common law rights of the subject. ' 63 They use this case, 
alongside Hawley, as authority for the proposition that the Defence Acts were indeed 
'interpreted just as strictly as would be the case with a railway authority or a local authority 
enjoying similar franchises. ' 64 This general rule that the empowering statute must not 
simply sanction, but order, any expropriating action therefore applies, despite the affected 
statutes 'creat[ing] great administrative benefits for the public at large.' 65 However, given 
Jessel MR's facilitation of national security interests in Hawley, the rule in Metropolitan 
Asylum bore no relation to the judiciary's analysis of the purpose for which land was taken 
under the Defence Acts. 
Interestingly, the appellants in Metropolitan Asylum did attempt to ride the coat-
tails of Hawley in their search for a legal authority which would lead to the injunction being 
overturned. Drawing analogy to the Defence Act case, it was argued that 'the fears of 
mankind are not alone sufficient to warrant an injunction, especially in a case like this, 
where a great public benefit was intended to be, and would be, the consequence of the work 
done. ' 66 Sir Farrer Herschell, likely eager to ring-fence the radical Hawley decision from 
judicial scrutiny, parried with the contention that the decision was irrelevant because, in 
contrast to the case at hand, 'the Master of the Rolls, in refusing the injunction, suggested a 
strong opinion that the Acts of Parliament relating to that matter "looked very much like 
authority" for doing what was complained of. ' 67 So successful was this screening of 
Hawley that none of the Law Lords came to consider this central plank of the appellant's 
argument. 
63 Baty & Morgan, op. cit. n.l3, 61 
64 ibid., 59-60 
65 Lucas, op. cit. n.43, 47 
66 Hill (No.2), op. cit. n.60, 197, per Sir J. Holker QC 
67 ibid., 198, per Sir F. Herschell S-G, quoting 6 Ch. D. 521,527, per Sir George Jesse! 
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This analysis suggests that, as early as the 1870s, a judiciary ordinarily at the 
forefront of the 'national passion'68 for property was nevertheless willing to permit the 
usurpation of these interests where national security was at issue. The sophisticated 
decision in Hawley maintained all the trappings of vires review whilst minimising any 
corresponding inconvenience to the authorities by reading the powers under the Acts so 
broadly as to effectively exclude judicial oversight. In light of this success, the executive 
predictably advanced national security claims to attempt to influence the compensation 
awarded for expropriations under the Defence Acts. 
Compensation for Expropriations under the Defence Acts 
The closest that the hapless Tower Hamlets Rifle Volunteer Brigade came to seeing 
action was in legal action. Within a decade from the injunction on their use of their rifle 
range in Raphael v. Wigram,69 and their subsequently securing a licence from Mr Raphael 
allowing them to continue training, the passage of the Gas Light and Coke Company's Act 
1868 ordered that Raphael's land be expropriated for use as a private road. In their 
subsequent compensation claim for severance the Brigade did not invoke national security 
concerns, but the decision nonetheless serves to indicate the Victorian judiciary's approach 
to compensation in expropriation cases. 
Despite the Brigade's licence over the land being revocable without notice, 
Cockburn CJ held that, 'the land which has been taken and that which has been left formed 
part of the rifle shooting range, and, as such, was useful and beneficial to the owners; and 
the simple fact is, that by taking the land which they have taken the company have rendered 
68 Harris, Private Lives, Public Spirit: a Social History of Britain, 1870-1914, (1993, Oxford), 100 
69 Raphael, op. cit. n.39 
100 
the possibility of using that which is left for the purpose of a rifle range impossible, and so 
have altogether depreciated the value of that which is left.' 70 
Numerous judicial opinions from the Victorian era point to a rule of construction 
whereby a judge would, 'not . . . construe an Act of Parliament as interfering with or 
injuring persons' rights without compensation, unless one is obliged to so construe it.' 71 
Indeed, expropriation was interpreted not merely as a 'legislative or administrative act, but 
a compulsory contract.' 72 The £2,800 awarded to the Volunteer Brigade was not therefore 
unusual, and as Rubin asserts; 
'that the compensation for dispossessed landowners in the nineteenth 
century bordered on the lavish simply attested to the power and 
influence that the landed interest could still exert on contemporary 
parliaments, on the arbitrators or magistrates who fixed the amounts 
of compensation, even on the judiciary who tended to confirm liberal 
awards.' 73 
Nevertheless, where legislation did limit the categories of compensation available, 
for example, excluding from s.38 to s.50 compensation for the operation (as opposed to 
70 Holt, op. cit. n.39, 735 
71 Attorney-General v. Horner (1884-85) LR 14 QBD 245,257, per Brett MR 
72 Mann, F., 'Outlines of a History ofExpropriation,' (1959)LQR 188, 196 
73 Rubin, op. cit. n.15, 13 
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construction) of the public works for which the expropriation was required/4 the judiciary 
accepted the legislature's reasoning, 75 albeit ordinarily 'very reluctantly.' 76 
As early as 1847 there were indications that the judiciary would not interpret 
compensation provisions in the Defence Act 1842 expansively. In Re Laws the claimant 
sought compensation for the expenses of surveying his land prior to selling it under the 
Defence Act. Pollock CB considered that the Defence Act made no provision for land-
owners' costs or expenses incident to the ascertainment of the sufficiency of compensation 
where the land had not been compulsorily purchased.77 Unsurprisingly, the judges did not 
dwell on the purpose of the Act being for defence,78 but instead focused on the absence of 
such a compensation provision in the Defence Act by comparison to its specific inclusion in 
the Lands Clauses Act and Railway Clauses Act. 79 
Pollock CB also clarified, obiter dicta, that in compensating a claimant when land 
was taken compulsorily, account could be taken of, 'the value of the land, then the 
consequential injury, and, lastly, all the expense to which the party had been put in 
maintaining his action.' 80 This was accepted as settled law until the 1890s and the case of 
R. (Moore) v. Abbot, in which the applicant owner of mountain land in County Wicklow 
was served with notice of compulsory purchase under the Defence Act. An arbitrator was 
appointed to assess compensation, a practice that had been authorized under the Military 
74 Hammersmith & City Railway Co. v. Brand (1869-70) LR 4 HL 171. It was not until the enactment of Part 
I of the Land Compensation Act 1973, introduced in an effort to correct the perceived defects of the existing 
law, that there was a right to compensation where the value of land is depreciated by 'physical factors' caused 
by the use of public works. See Law Commission CP 165, 'Towards a Compulsory Purchase Code: (1) 
Compensation,' (2002), para. 9.23-9.24. 
75 Lord Cranworth accepting this narrowed the scope of compensation because 'any other construction of the 
clause would open the door to claims of so wide and indefinite a nature;'75 Rickel v. The Metropolitan 
Railway Company (1867) Law Rep. 2 H. L. 175, 198 
76 Hammersmith Railway, op. cit. n.14, 206, per Lord Chelmsford 
77 Re Laws (1847) I Exch 441,446-447 
78 To have done so would certainly have been out of character for Pollock CB. See Chapter 3. 
79 Re Laws, op. cit. n.77, 452-453, per Alderson B 
80 ibid, 441 
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Lands Act 1890,81 as juries in compulsory purchase cases were, 'found to be extremely 
liberal; and, no doubt, in the case of the War Office, their liberality would tend even 
towards extravagance. ' 82 This application challenged the validity of the appointment of the 
arbitrator, and whether he was correct to disregard re Laws in ruling that the only 
compensation available under the Defence Act was for the absolute purchase of the lands 
taken, and not for injury by severance or consequential injury. 
In deciding upon this 'case of great importance,' 83 Lord O'Brien CJ was fully aware 
of its implications for future purchases of land for defence purposes. His judgment went 
beyond the technical ground for upholding the claim; that the arbitrator had erroneously 
been appointed under the Railways Act 1851, rather than under the Military Lands Act. 84 
He also addressed the factors that should be taken into account in awarding compensation, 
and John Atkinson QC's85 assertion that, 'the measure of compensation under the Act of 
1842, and under the Lands Clauses Acts is entirely different, and the policy of these Acts 
different, ' 86 with the Defence Act restricting compensation as payable 'for the purchase of 
the Land taken and for that alone.' 87 
This argument had been raised on the basis that a more limited scale of 
compensation was appropriate because of the defence purposes for which the land was 
taken. However, Lord O'Brien CJ held that 'the meaning ofthe expression, "compensation 
for the purchase of said lands," in the Act of 1842, means compensation for turning it into a 
rifle range, with all the injurious consequences resulting from it being turned to such use. ' 88 
81 
s.11 Military Lands Act 1890 
82 R (Moore) v Abbot [1897] 2 IR 362, 389, per Lord O'Brien CJ 
83 ibid, 388, per Lord O'Brien CJ 
84 ibid, 422, per Walker LJ 
85 Then Attorney-General for Ireland, but a future Law Lord, who would have a pronounced influence on First 
World War national security decisions such as R v. Halliday, ex parte Zadig [1917] A.C. 260. 
86 R .(Moore) v Abbot [1897] 2 IR 362, 386 
87 ibid, 387 
88 ibid, 391, per Lord O'Brien CJ 
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O'Brien J elaborated upon the Lord Chief Justice's opinion, holding that whilst 'the 
Defence Act and the Lands Clauses Act start from different points of policy - that the 
former concerns the security of the realm, and the other merely objects of commercial or 
public utility or convenience,' 89 their separation was not maintained due to distinctions in 
compensation, but because of 'the peremptory power of immediate possession which the 
Crown possessed under the Defence Act. ' 90 
The icing was put on the cake when Gibson J concluded that 'no doubt the Defence 
Act is of national importance, and salus populi, suprema lex. But the safety of the state is 
best secured by a general average contribution, and not by making jettison of individual 
interests.' 91 The significance of this statement belied the brevity of Gibson J's judgment. 
Not only does it undermine Townshend's assumption that considers that within legal circles 
there was no reliance upon Cicero's maxim 'salus populi suprema lex' until the twentieth 
century,92 it would come back to haunt the executive during the First World War, when it 
was approved by the Court of Appeal in Cannon Brewery Co.93 As Rubin notes, this was 
an affirmation 'that would have been exceedingly unpalatable to the parsimonious 
Treasury. ' 94 
However, the decision in Moore would have more immediate consequences for the 
state, forming the basis for a string of challenges to compulsory purchases under the 
Defence Acts. These subsequent decisions need to be briefly considered, as they are highly 
significant not for any obiter statements regarding national security that they contain, but 
for the sophisticated way in which the judiciary approached the Defence Acts. 
89 ibid., 400, per O'Brien J 
90 ibid., 401, per O'Brien J 
91 ibid., 405, per Gibson J 
92 Townshend, Making the Peace: Public Order and Public Security in Modern Britain, ( 1993, Oxford), 4 
93 Cannon Brewery Co. Ltd. v. Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) [1918] 2 Ch. 101, 110, per Younger J 
94 Rubin, op. cit. n.15, 104 
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In Harvey v. Harkin land in Donegal was expropriated under the Defence Act 1842 
and the Lands Clauses Act 1845 for defence purposes. Harvey claimed non-payment of 
rent, asserting that the Crown had failed accurately to appraise him of the compensation he 
would attain for his land, but rather providing a gross sum including his compensation and 
that of his tenant. 
O'Brien J emphasised the vintage of the Defence Act 1842 in asserting that later 
Acts, 'were passed when more attention had been paid to the difficulties incident to the 
compulsory acquisition of land by public authority. ' 95 Nevertheless, he did not seek to 
impede the use of the Act, concluding that, 'though it is extremely difficult to put a 
reasonable construction on the Act, I have come to the conclusion that the Secretary of 
State for War has satisfied the necessary condition by offering one sum of money in this 
notice.' 96 
In Hill v. Haire a challenge was made to the enlargement of the Ebrington Barracks, 
Londonderry,97 on the basis that the power of compulsory purchase under s.2(2) Military 
Lands Act 1892 had elapsed by the time notice was served for the purchase of the land, in 
February 1898.98 Porter MR questioned whether the Military Lands Act, repealing 'seven 
Acts or parts of Acts, which are all permanent, can . . . have been intended to substitute a 
law to last only three years, and never in fact renewed?' 99 He found that as there, 'is no 
undertaking till the lands are defined, and no promoter till the lands are wanted by the 
Secretary of State ... to be determined by the Special Act, and as none of these is or can be 
95 Harveyv. Harkin [1898] 2 IR65, 70 
96 ibid., 73 
97 A military base since 1841, Ebrington Barracks was finally closed in December 2003 as a result of the 
normalisation policy in Northern Ireland in the wake of the paramilitary ceasefires. 
98 This ingenious argument was based upon the 1892 Act incorporating the Land Clauses Act, s.l23 of which 
stated that compulsory purchase of land authorized by the 'Special Act' can only take place within three years 
of the passing of that Act. It was unclear whether the MLA was the 'Special Act,' or whether this referred to 
the subsequent private Act of Parliament that the MLA required. 
99 Hill v. Haire [1899] I IR 87, 93 
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defined by the Act of 1892 alone, it follows that the Act of 1892 cannot itselfbe the Special 
Act referred to in s.123 of the Lands Clauses Act.' 100 
In reaching his decision Porter MR conceded that this interpretation ran contrary to 
the literal wording of the 1892 Act. However, 'the literal construction of the language is 
simply impossible. The true construction must be that the statute when applied to a 
particular undertaking (and so made special) shall, together with the statute confirming the 
Provisional Order, be deemed to be the Special Act.' 101 His efforts to 'fill up an ellipsis' in 
this way were predicated upon 'the scope and framework of the Act;' 102 an assertion 
carrying the implication that the purpose of the Military Lands Act was at the forefront of 
the judge's mind. This vital decision ensured that the Military Lands Acts would remain in 
force as an expropriation measure through the First World War. 103 
The next case in this rapidly unfolding stream of jurisprudence, R. (Secretary of 
State for War) v. Cork JJ, saw the Cork Justices declining jurisdiction to validate 
expropriation claims or to assess the value of land that the state was seeking to expropriate 
near the strategic harbour at Berehaven in Bantry Bay, 104 and finding that such assessment 
was a matter for a jury. Fearing that crippling compensation claims would be imposed, the 
state sought a review of this decision. 
Lord O'Brien CJ concluded that the Defence Act was applicable to this 
expropriation rather than the Land Clauses Act, and that the state could go to the justices to 
validate expropriation. This procedure was 'of great constitutional importance to preserve, 
100 ibid.' 93 
101 ibid.' 93-94 
102 ibid., 94 
103 Amazingly, the Military Lands Provisional Orders Confirmation Act 1898, confirming the Secretary of 
State's orders for the purchase of land for the purpose enlarging Ebrington Barracks (Londonderry 
(Ebrington) Barracks Enlargement Order 1898), remains on the statute books. It is, however, subject to an 
ongoing Law Commission consultation concerning its repeal (ending 5th May 2006). Law Commission 
Consultation Paper, 'Armed Forces Repeal Proposals,' (26th January 2006), 30-40 
104 Famously the scene of an abortive French invasion of Ireland in December 1796. Through these 
expropriations the area was extensively fortified and became a major Royal Navy base during the First World 
War. 
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and the Secretary of State for War was entitled to adopt it to get immediate possession.' 105 
Gibson J further asserted that s. 7 Defence Act 1860, 'enables all or any of the powers and 
provisions of the Act of 1845 given to the promoters to be used,' and that therefore 'the 
Secretary of State may, under these sweeping and comprehensive terms, use, if he sees fit, 
the provisions relating to the assessment of compensation, including those prescribing the 
tribunal.' 106 However, this did not mean that the Crown succeeded in lowering the scale of 
compensation applicable, for the court refused to regard a statutorily protected tenancy as a 
mere year to year interest. 
The last of the Irish authorities upon the Defence Acts was In re Ned's Point 
Battery. Lands near Buncrana, Co. Donegal, were taken by compulsory purchase for use as 
a camp and artillery range. 107 This case marked another debate over compensation, land 
owners claiming as a result of trespass and illegal conduct that they apprehended would 
result from the establishment of the camp. However, Gibson J asserted that, 'whether 
compensation under the Defence Act is as extensive as under the Lands Clauses Act is 
doubtful. It is certainly not greater,' 108 and compensation would not extend to merely 
apprehended, unascertainable threats to the value of property. 
Belatedly, English claimants recognised potential weaknesses in the Defence Acts 
with Blundell v The King. This petition of right was brought by the tenant for life in 
possession of an estate that lay upon the foreshores of the Mersey. In 1902 the Secretary of 
State for War notified him of plans to purchase certain portions of the estate in order to 
erect a fort, and it was agreed that compensation would be settled by arbitration. However, 
the Crown subsequently refused to pay the sum awarded for injurious affectation of 
105 R. (Secretary ofStatefor War) v. CorkJJ[1900] 2 IR 105, 123-124, per Lord O'Brien CJ 
106 ibid., 126, per Gibson J 
107 The original structure, Ned's Point Fort, was built in 1812 as a costal defence against French invasion and 
has been restored and opened to the public. 
108 in re Neds Point Battery (1903) 2 IR 191, 198, per Gibson J 
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adjoining lands on the basis that such awards were not available under the Defence Act 
1842. 
Attempting to side-step the Irish decisions as merely persuasive, Attorney-General 
Finlay109 considered that the difference between the measures of compensation available 
under the Defence Act and under the Lands Clauses Act could be attributed to 'the 
Legislature [being] influenced by the fact that land taken under the Defence Acts was 
required for purposes of urgent public importance.' 110 
Ridley J did not dismiss such contentions as clearly as his Irish counterparts, 
considering that, 'it might, indeed, be that a person whose lands were taken from him for 
the purpose of national defence should be awarded compensation on a lower scale and on a 
different basis than that allowed to persons whose land is taken for the encouragement and 
development oftraffic, industry, and commerce.''" However, he could find no evidence of 
such legislative intent, and therefore, far from dissenting from the Irish cases, he was 
'inclined to take the same view.' 112 
The sophisticated expositions of national security interests found in the above cases 
should dispel the myth that the pre-war judiciary were concerned with property interests 
above all else. In each of these cases, even in Hill v. Haire where the terms of the Military 
Lands Act 1892 appeared to place an insurmountable barrier in the place of the 
expropriation, the ability of the military to take the land in question was upheld. Yet these 
decisions are far from indicative of judicial passivity towards national security concerns. 
Whilst accepting that the judiciary could not ordinarily challenge the reasonableness of the 
military's decision as to the necessity of certain pieces of land for defence, the judges 
109 Lloyd George's wartime Lord Chancellor regularly appeared in cases discussed in this study as junior 
counsel, prior to his appointment as Solicitor-General in Lord Salisbury's third administration. 
110 Blundell v. The King (1905) 1 KB 516, 519, per Sir Robert Finlay A-G 
111 ibid., 521, per Ridley J 
112 ibid., 524, per Ridley J 
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emphasised that the purpose for which the land was taken in no way influenced the terms of 
such seizures. 
The Relationship between the Defence Acts and the Royal Prerogative 
These pre-war authorities moreover set in motion the train of legal thought that 
concluded in De Keyser's Royal Hote/ 113 and Burmah Oi/. 114 In the latter case Lord Pearce 
gave the credit to the judges in De Keyser, asserting that they, 'decided that the plaintiffs 
were entitled to compensation in the manner provided by the Defence Act 1842, and that in 
the light of the statutory provisions the Crown could not by virtue of prerogative take 
without payment.' 115 However, twenty years before De Keyser the Defence Act case-law 
had established that, 'municipal law by a series of statutes, if not by common law, provides 
for compensation either in full or with some restrictions when the subject's property is 
taken for the defence of the realm.' 116 These judges established this jurisprudence in the 
teeth of the very real national security concerns in these cases, and the assertions of the 
relevance ofthese concerns to compensation by Attorneys-General Atkinson and Finlay. 117 
Once this principle was established in the sphere of defence expropriations, the 
writing was on the wall; 'to those who had to inspect the rusty weapons of the war 
prerogative in the summer of 1914 it must or should have appeared that some of them had 
become permanently unreliable.' 118 There could be no argument that English law should 
deny compensation in time of emergency when a series of judgments upon the relevant 
113 De Keyser's, op. cit. n.28 
114 Burmah Oil, op. cit. n.l2 
115 ibid., 153, per Lord Pearce 
116 Commercial and Estates Co. of Egypt v. Board of Trade [1925] I K.B. 271,296, per Atkin LJ 
117 The future Lord Atkinson would rule in favour of the claimant in the House of Lords in De Keyser, 
although predictably he declined the opportunity to relive his unsuccessful advocacy for a lesser measure of 
compensation attending to the Defence Acts in his judgment. 
118 Burmah Oil, op. cit. n.l2, 122, Viscount Radcliffe 
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legislation established that simply because land was taken with defence purposes this did 
not affect compensation. 
All that needed to be added to such decisions was a Diceyan distrust of prerogative 
powers. In reaction to such a blend of influences the post-war judiciary could but look 
askance at the Crown's arguments in De KeyserY 9 Nineteenth-century obiter dicta 
asserting the existence of a prerogative power to expropriate land in time of invasion, 
without reference to compensation, 120 were dismissed as off-the-cuff comments ignorant of 
the significance of the Defence Acts. 121 Moreover, the nineteenth-century authorities for 
the relationship between statute and prerogative122 could be effectively dismissed as 
inaccurate opinions, out of step with the Diceyan hierarchy of norms. 123 
Conclusion 
At its inception the Defence Act 1842 established a radical procedure, providing 'a 
standing code for the taking of land, in war or peace, and whether for occupation or for 
119 Even the wartime judiciary would not have supported expropriations without compensation under the 
prerogative, government having to withdraw its case before the House of Lords when it was acknowledged 
that this position was untenable, despite having been successful in the High Court and Court of Appeal; In re 
A Petition of Right [1915] 3 K.B. 649. See Rubin, 'The Royal Prerogative or a Statutory Code? The War 
Office and Contingency Legal Planning, 1885-1914,' in Eales, R. & Sullivan, D., The Political Context ofthe 
Law, (1987, London), n.28. Notably the lower courts had failed to consider the Defence Acts jurisprudence. 
12° For example, Willes J's assertion that, 'every man has a right to the enjoyment of his land; but, in the event 
of a foreign invasion, the Queen may take the land for the purpose of setting up defences thereon for the 
general good of the nation. In these and such like cases private convenience must yield to public necessity.' 
Hole v. Barlow [1858] 4 C. B. (N. S.) 334, 345 
121 Lord Parmoor dismissed this authority as simply stating 'the general proposition that every man has a right 
to the enjoyment of his land, and then, by way of illustration, limits the application of the power of the Royal 
Prerogative to the event of a foreign invasion.' De Keyser's, op. cit. n.28, 573. 
122 For example, Lindley LJ's assertion that prerogative powers are not undermined by statute unless the 
Legislature expressly intends such an effect. Wheaton v. Maple [ 1893] 3 Ch. 48, 64 
123 Dicey's view of the prerogative as merely 'the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any 
given time is legally left in the hands of the Crown' (Dicey, op. cit. n.6, 424) is the elephant in the room in the 
House of Lord's decision in De Keyser's; unmentioned but underpinning the judicial reasoning. Dicey was 
cited in argument before the Court of Appeal. See [1919] 2 Ch. 197,203, per Lawrence KC 
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title.' 124 As Rubin asserts, the Defence Acts, 'were the only general public as distinct from 
special or private statutes which permitted the compulsory purchase of land.' 125 Whilst 
they were supposedly limited in only permitting compulsory purchase of land to be used for 
training, ordnance practice or for other purposes in defence of the realm, 126 Hawley v. 
Steele 127 clearly indicates that, even in the property-obsessed Victorian era, 128 the judiciary 
would impose no meaningful restraints upon the use of land acquired under the Defence 
Acts. 
Therefore, although the Defence Act 1842 was not included amongst Lord Atkin's 
famous list of Acts granting officers of the Crown powers that they must exercise 
reasonably, 129 Jessel MR's interpretation ofthe Defence Act stands contrary to his assertion 
that such reasonableness had always been construed objectively in English law. 130 
Impressed by the weight of security concerns at issue in Hawley, Jesse! MR required no 
evidence indicative of the reasonableness of establishing this rifle range in the interests of 
defence, and just as Viscount Maugham asserted that Mr. Liversidge would have to prove 
that the Home Secretary acted mala fides in detaining him in order for his detention to be 
invalid, 131 Jesse! MR would require proof of subterfuge on the part of the military 
authorities before he would injunct activities on land taken subject to the Defence Acts. 
Yet despite affording a broad expropriation power, over the period forming the 
subject of this study, the Defence Acts came to appear decidedly antiquated. Lord O'Brien 
CJ considered them to amount to, 'a very complicated code, [under which] it is surprising 
124 Burmah Oil, op. cit. n.12, 122, per Viscount Radcliffe 
125 Rubin, op. cit. n.15, 12 
126 
s.9 Defence Act 1842 
127 Hawley, op. cit. n.3 
128 Harris, op. cit. n.68, 116-117 
129 Liversidge v. Anderson [1942] AC 206, 229-230. In fairness to the noble Lord, his list did only detail 
offences involving the power of arrest on the basis of 'reasonable suspicion.' 
130 ibid.' 244 
131 ibid., 225 
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that the War Department do not fall into more pitfalls than they do.' 132 Moreover, they 
failed to offer 'an immediate and flexible response on the basis of the [military authorities'] 
evaluation of the military situation.' 133 
In the years preceding the First World War the military could compare the Defence 
Acts procedure unfavourably with the control which bodies such as the Local Government 
Board could exert over private property owners under novel enactments of the Liberal 
government, such as the Housing, Town Planning, etc. Act 1909.134 By comparison to the 
'old-fashioned procedure' 135 established under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, 
such legislation merely required the relevant government departments to make the 
necessary orders. The military, observing that such orders were, in prevailing legal thought 
'conclusive of [their] own validity, and cannot be challenged for the most glaring 
irregularity,' 136 were eager to gain a similar measure of freedom in their expropriations. 137 
However, given that the Defence Acts remain in effect to this day, the debate that 
raged between the military and government law officers in the early years of the twentieth 
century can be viewed with the reticence possible with hindsight. What must be 
remembered is that it was the judicial interpretation of the Defence Acts that maintained the 
usefulness of these expropriation powers. However, this sophisticated, rather than supine, 
approach to such concerns doubtless spurred on the military's desire for a comprehensive 
defence code that would oust the purview of lawyers. 
132 Cork Justices, op. cit. n.105, 123, per Lord O'Brien CJ 
133 Rubin, op. cit. n.15, 3 
134 See Arlidge, op. cit. n.55, for an example of the operation of these provisions. 
135 Ambrose, W., 'The New Judiciary,' (1910) 26 LQR 203,208 
136 ibid.' 208 
137 See Rubin, op. cit. n.l19, 147 
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[6] 
Troubles with Guns and Balloons 
'The common law rights of the subject are not to be abridged 
by mere inference and conjecture. ' 
Mr Justice Kenny (1914) 
Introduction 
Conventional conceptions regard Victorian commercial law as a product of 
laissez-faire economic policy, with little state interference in business interests on the 
basis of national security concerns. As the previous analysis of the Foreign Enlistment 
Acts indicated, the presumptions generated by the mantra of free trade were so 
pervasive in legal thought that even the limited exceptions demanded by national 
security concerns were regarded with suspicion by the courts. Returning briefly to 
Pollock CB's vitriolic judgment in the Alexandra case, laissez-faire economics were 
trumpeted as immutable 'common sense,' sufficient to undermine the 'repugnant' 
proposition that, in the interests of national security, the Foreign Enlistment Act be 
interpreted as a strict restraint on ship-building for belligerents. 1 
Whilst governments sought to dissuade subjects from trading in contraband 
goods with belligerents through Royal Proclamations, these proclamations had no effect 
upon this trade? There was little political support for extensive controls on the arms 
trade in this era, even during the Boer War. At the height of this conflict several 
German-flagged merchant vessels, supposedly bound for neutral ports, were detained 
1 Attorney-General v. Sillem (1864) 159 ER 178, 222. See Chapter 3, above, for an explanation of this 
decision. 
2 Re Graze brook, ex parte Chavasse (1865) 46 ER 1072, 1074, per Lord Westbury 
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under suspicion of trading with Britain's enemies. Yet they were soon released in 
accordance with the demands of free trade. The government was unwilling to risk 
international outcry by seizing shipping in accordance with the broad interpretation of 
the 'continuous voyage' doctrine adopted by United States courts during the American 
Civil War? 
It is easily forgotten how short-lived this orthodoxy had been in the mid-
Victorian era.4 Not until the repeal ofthe Corn Laws in 1846 were the last vestiges of a 
much more interventionist commercial policy expunged from the statute books. This 
policy, historically caricatured as unsophisticated protectionism, smote by Peel in the 
interests of the nation,5 was instead regarded by its advocates as a vital barrier against a 
hazardous dependency upon foreign supplies.6 This policy's lineage reaches back into 
the seventeenth century, when authority can be found for a prerogative allowing the 
state to enter private land to excavate saltpetre (a compound required in the manufacture 
of gunpowder), 7 which has been interpreted as an embryonic right of the Crown to 
'maintain a domestic armaments capability.'8 Equally significant, the Navigation Acts 
1651 and 1660, which required that British merchants use British ships to transport their 
goods, were imposed 'with a view to capturing [Dutch] trade, and of thus undermining 
their sea power.'9 
Ever the legal historian, Holdsworth used his 1918 Rhodes lecture to vent his 
frustration at the contrast between these laws, sensibly imbued with these 
3 See Henderson, R., 'Contraband Consigned to Neutral Ports,' (1900) 12 Jurid Rev. 131, 131-133. This 
doctrine was actually derived from Lord Stowell's assertion that a vessel 'merely touching' a neutral port 
could not change the nature of its voyage if its cargo was ultimately destined for a belligerent. The Maria, 
5 Ch. Rob. 368 
4 Holdsworth describing it as 'both a new and an insular phenomenon.' Holdsworth, W., 'The Relation 
between Commercial Legislation and National Defence Historically Considered,' (1918) 30 Jurid Rev. 
293,294. 
5 Barnes, D., A History of the English Corn Laws, from 1660-1846, (1930, London), 272-284 
6 Hilton, B., Corn, Cash, Commerce: The Economic Policies ofthe Tory Governments 1815-1830, (1977, 
Oxford), 20-26 
7 Re The King's Prerogative in Saltpetre (1606) 12 Rep. 12 
8 Lustgarten, L. & Leigh, 1., In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy, (1994), 
Oxford, 323 
9 Holdsworth, op. cit. n.4, 298 
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'considerations connected with national defence,' 10 and the pre-war dominance of 
Victorian commercial law. He considered that the United Kingdom's failure to match 
protectionism with protectionism had handed Germany an economic advantage in the 
prelude to the First World War, 11 and lamented that only after the outbreak of the 
conflict were 'such questions as the maintenance of the supply of shipping, of materials 
for the manufacture of munitions of war, of the food supply, and of amicable relations 
between employer and employed, [again] considered from the point of view of national 
defence.' 12 
With the nation's commercial law apparently so unprepared for war in 1914,13 it 
might be presumed that the judiciary remained as stalwart in their defence of mid-
Victorian liberal economics as their predecessors in the Court of Exchequer. Some 
judges, notably Kenny J, from whom this chapter takes its opening epigram, 14 would 
cling to economic liberalism until the eve of the First World War. Indeed, even 
Holdsworth concedes that it was not until placed under the test of a struggle for national 
survival that laissez-faire economics were 'found to be signally wanting.' 15 
However, as Porter notes, over the course of this study, factions within the 
political mainstream became increasingly willing to 'chip away' at liberal dogma in the 
face of security threats. 16 This chapter will focus upon cases relating to both the 
domestic production of armaments, and the import of weapons into the United Kingdom. 
These "armaments cases" involved issues as diverse as Crown exemption from patent, 
contracts in restraint of trade and legislation restricting the arms trade. Holdsworth 
would consider that, prior to the First World War, security requirements were 
10 ibid., 293 
II ibid., 295 
12 ibid., 293-294 
13 Foxton provides a comprehensive explanation of the wartime alterations to commercial and corporate 
law; Foxton, D., 'Corporate Personality in the Great War,' (2002) 118 LQR 428 
14 Hunter v. Coleman (1914) 2 IR 372, 397, per Kenny J. It must, however, be noted that Kenny J's 
assertions likely had an ulterior motive tied to prevailing political conditions in Ireland. 
15 Holdsworth, op. cit. n.4, 294 
16 Porter, B., Origins of the Vigilant State, (1987, London), 21 
115 
inadequately protected in all of these areas of law. This chapter will assess whether, in 
these areas of law, elements of the judiciary were among the vanguard that Porter 
recognises as being willing to grasp the national security nettle. 
A tale of Arms and a Man 
The arms in question were 13,875 breech-loading Martini-Henry rifles. The 
weapon, newly introduced into British Army service, was a marriage ofthe Henry rifled 
barrel and von Martini's breech, which utilized an internal coiled-spring activated 
striker. 17 It improved upon its predecessors in every respect, and would remain the 
mainstay of the infantry for the next thirty years. 18 In the immediate aftermath of the 
Franco-Prussian War, with the European powers seemingly wiiling to go to war for the 
most improbable reasons after half a century of relative peace and the power balance 
having so unexpectedly shifted in favour of the unknown quantity of a reunified 
Germany, the military were understandably eager to provide this revolutionary weapon 
as standard issue. Production at the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield Lock 
commenced on 3rd June 1873, but this sole source of supply could not match the 
demands ofthe military. 19 
Therefore the War Office requested tenders for the provision of the rifles in 
question from private firms of gunsmiths within the United Kingdom. On 29th April 
1872, the Secretary of State for War accepted the London Small Arms Company's 
17 See National Archives, SUPP 5/889 and SUPP 5/892, detailing the reports of the Special Committees 
(under General Russell) into the British Army's adoption of a breech-loading rifle. 
18 See 'The Future Weapon of the British Soldier' Living Age, May 1869. This article extols the virtues 
of the new breech-loading rifles in florid terms; 'We have advanced out of darkness and doubt into light 
and certainty, from some of the worst types of the system to an arm which, we believe, is superior to any 
other military breech-loader at present existing.' 
19 National Archives, Supp 5/892 
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tender. Production quickly commenced at the firm's ordnance factory, with the order to 
be fulfilled by 1st January 1874.20 
The problem with this arrangement was Charles Kuhn Prioleau, holder of a 
patent permitting the exclusive manufacture and use of the Martini breech-action in 
small arms. Prioleau's shadow has long hung over this study, and from the clandestine 
nature of his dealings it has appeared appropriate until now to leave him in the 
background, masked behind his firm; Fraser, Trenholm & Company of Liverpool and 
Charleston, the company which bankrolled the CSS Alabama and Florida and the 
owners of the Alexandra.21 
After the collapse of the Confederacy, Prioleau extricated himself from the 
bankruptcy of his company and remained in England. 22 Ever the opportunist, he 
realized that months after the Royal Small Arms Factory had commenced production of 
the Martini-Henry rifle, the unique Martini breech-action had yet to be patented within 
the United Kingdom. Through armaments industry contacts that only the foremost 
blockade runner in the bloodiest conflict in the history of the United States could amass 
he spent £25 acquiring a fourteen-year patent. These letters of patent were profitably 
assigned to Dixon, the managing director of the newly incorporated National Arms and 
Ammunition Company?3 And having created this latest legal imbroglio, Prioleau again 
leaves the pages of this study, having done more than any other man to bring the 
national security implications of their decisions to the attention of the mid-Victorian 
judiciary.24 
20 Dixon v. London Small Arms Co. (1875-76) LR 1 Q.B.D. 384, 386-387 
21 Sil/em, op. cit. n.1 
22 During the late 1860s Prioleau was involved in various actions against the United States, which gained 
ownership of all Confederate property on the surrender of the secessionist states. The Mary LR (1867) 1 
A & E 335 and LR (1868) 2 A & E 319. See also Prioleau v. United States & Johnson (1866) LR 2 Eq 
659 
23 The record of incorporation can be found at the National Archives, BT 31/1681/5980 
24 Much of the personal, litigious and entrepreneurial life of Charles Prioleau can be pieced together from 
the Fraser Trenholm archive, at the Liverpool Maritime Museum. See particularly Box 6 (detailing legal 
actions) and Box 9/3 (detailing business dealings, 28th October 1871 to 2"d September 1872). 
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The difficulty facing Dixon's efforts to gain compensation for this breach of 
patent was that the Crown, as grantor of patents under s.6 Statute of Monopolies 1624, 
was not subject to their effects. As Cockburn CJ held in Feather v. Reg., 'in granting a 
privilege, otherwise of universal application, the Crown will not be bound, unless it 
expressly declares its intention to that effect; and that grants of privilege, however 
general in their terms, can, in the absence of express words to bind the Crown, be taken 
only as conferring the privilege as against the subject, exclusive ofthe Crown.'25 
With the accuracy of this statement of law forcefully affirmed by the Court of 
Appeal,26 and thereafter not seriously questioned in the House of Lords, the case turned 
upon distinguishing the instant case from the rule established in Feather. Sir Vernon 
Harcourt QC,27 argued on behalf of Dixon that the rule in Feather applied only to the 
Crown and its servants, and that the Crown's contract with the London Small Arms Co. 
was merely 'to provide and deliver. '28 This arguably meant that London Small Arms 
Co. did not have to manufacture the weapons themselves to satisfy their contractual 
obligations. They 'were mere contractors who undertook to supply certain 
manufactured articles to the Crown. '29 
To counter these arguments, the Crown placed its senior law officers at the 
disposal of London Small Arms, with the patent specialist, Sir John Holker A-G,30 
leading the case in the Court of Appeal. Seemingly in light of his expertise in the field, 
Sir John opted to play a straight bat, and did not set national security arguments before 
the court. He instead argued that 'there can be no distinction whether the Crown orders 
25 Feather v. Reg. ( 1865) 6 B. & S. 257, 286 
26 Dixon, op. cit. n.20, 396, per Mellish LJ 
27 At this time making full use of his years in opposition, prior to undertaking the post of Home Secretary 
in Gladstone's second administration. Harcourt was to play a crucial role in the fight against Fenian 
terrorism in the 1880s and was instrumental in the foundation of the Police Special Branch. See Porter, 
or cit. n.16, 3 5-50 
2 Dixon v. London Small Arms Co. (1876) 1 AC 632,635 
29 ibid., 635 
30 Hamilton, J., 'Holker, Sir John (1828-1882)', rev. Mooney, H., Oxford DNB, (2004, Oxford), [http:// 
www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/13509, accessed 21 51 March 2006) 
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its own servants to manufacture, or gets its agent, an independent contractor, to do so; in 
either case the manufacture is by the Crown.'31 
Sir John's omission proved to be of little consequence, for the Court of Appeal 
proved more than willing to supply national security arguments to cover the Crown's 
contracting-out for the supply of rifles in the instant case. The interests of public policy 
were achieved through fudging the facts of the case. Kelly CB considered that 'the 
Crown directly employed the company to manufacture 13,000 [sic] rifles,'32 by-passing 
the contention that the contract did not require London Small Arms to manufacture the 
arms, but merely supply them (which it should have done legally). 
Mellish LJ also considered that the issue at stake was if, 'admitting that the 
Crown is entitled to get the thing manufactured by its servants, is the Crown also 
entitled to get it manufactured by employing a contractor to manufacture it?'33 He at 
least supported this conception of the position of London Small Arms, considering it to 
be 'plain [that] the Crown was to provide the steel tube and the stock for each rifle, and 
that then the contractor was to manufacture the steel tube and the stock into a perfect 
Martini-Henry rifle, which was to be inspected during the process of manufacture by the 
Crown's officers at the particular place where it was to be manufactured.' 34 
Whilst these judicial assertions singularly fail to deal with Sir Vernon Harcourt's 
argument, by accepting the contract as one to manufacture rather than supply, the Court 
of Appeal was able to fit this case within an extension of the Feather doctrine to allow 
contravention of patents on 'the express authority, for the use and for the benefit, ofthe 
Crown. ' 35 Therefore, 'there was no difference in contemplation of law between the 
Queen manufacturing these rifles herself, that is, in the workshops belonging to the 
31 Dixon, op. cit. n.20, 388, per Sir J. Holker A-0 
32 ibid., 392-393 
l3 ibid.' 397 
34 ibid., 397. See also 403, per Grove J. 
35 ibid., 395, per James LJ 
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government, or by an independent manufacturer or contractor. ' 36 However, only one of 
the four judges explains why they were so eager to re-conceptualise the relationship 
between the Crown and London Small Arms and to extend the Feather doctrine. Kelly 
CB concluded that the Crown's power to grant patents (whilst not being governed by 
their effects): 
'like all other branches of the prerogative, is for the benefit of 
the public. That power is of the very highest importance to the 
very first requirements of the nation. Supposing a war to break 
out, it may be of the greatest importance that 100,000 rifles 
should be supplied with the least possible delay to enable our 
armies to take the field, and without waiting until one patentee 
could supply one part and another patentee another part. It is, 
therefore, greatly for the benefit of the nation itself that the 
Crown should have the power to take into its own hands the 
entire manufacture, irrespective of the rights of patentees. '37 
With no war prerogative relating to patents, Kelly CB recognised that limiting 
down the scope of Crown action under its exemption from the patents that it grants 
might endanger national security. With the support of his fellow judges, he regarded 
the necessity of dynamic Crown action under this prerogative as so significant that he 
was prepared to twist the facts of this case in order to ensure that the Crown could freely 
circumvent the intellectual property rights of individuals, both in wartime, as in the 
example concluding his judgment, and also where such action was simply desirable in 
the interests of defence, as in the instant case. 
36 ibid., 392-393, per Kelly CB 
37 ibid., 394, per Kelly CB 
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The House of Lords unanimously recoiled from this heretical encouragement of 
state interventionism in commercial dealings. Interestingly, although London Small 
Arms was represented by the newly appointed Solicitor-General,38 no national security 
issues were raised in his argument in support of the Court of Appeal decision. More 
interesting still, Lord Cairns LC led the House in judgment against the government. It 
might be speculated that only fifteen years after his famous triumph over the detention 
of the Alexandra, Lord Cairns continued to uphold Prioleau's interests. However, it 
maybe safer to suggest that this puritanical Ulsterman 39 continued to oppose state 
intervention in commerce, even to uphold the interests of national security, on the same 
basis as his eloquent pleadings in Attorney-General v. Sillem.40 
Lord Cairns adopted a narrow interpretation of the relationship between the 
Crown and London Small Arms, finding no relationship of agency and no delegation of 
authority, but simply an 'ordinary case of a person who has undertaken to supply 
manufactured goods, who has not got the goods ready manufactured to be supplied, who 
has to make and produce the goods in order to execute the order which he has 
received.'41 Therefore, on the facts ofthe instant case the Crown's ability to circumvent 
patent monopolies was not extended. 
Indeed, the Lords glossed over the public interest raised in the Court of Appeal. 
Kelly CB 's discussion of national security concerns was unmentioned in any of their 
five judgments. Lord Cairns certainly did not do the argument justice with his 
perfunctory assertion that this was a case 'of considerable general interest.' 42 Lord 
Hatherley gave more time to the issue, but only to state that, 'whilst building their ships 
in their naval arsenals, the Crown and its officers would be entitled to make use of the 
38 Sir Hardinge Giffard, the future Lord Halsbury LC, was appointed in 1875, and had yet to find a seat in 
the Commons when he acted in this case. See Heuston, R., Lives of the Lord Chancellors, 1885-1940, 
(1964, Oxford), 23-25 
39 Steele, D., 'Cairns, Hugh McCalmont, First Earl Cairns (1819-1885)', Oxford DNB, (2004, Oxford), 
[http://www .oxforddnb.com/view/article/4346, accessed 21 51 March 2006] 
40 op. cit. n.l, 183-194 
41 Dixon, op. cit. n.28, 645 
42 ibid.' 639 
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very largely multiplied patent inventions which exist with reference to the construction 
of a ship.' 43 This evidently fails to weaken Kelly CB's concerns regarding periods 
when national security requires the Crown to tum to private suppliers. 
The Court of Appeal's judgment in Dixon may be regarded as an aberration. 
Indeed, closer inspection of the career of Kelly CB would suggest that he was the ring-
leader of this uprising against prevailing economic orthodoxy. Kelly CB was, by 
politics, an unreformed protectionist who as Solicitor-General had followed Disraeli and 
Bentinck in their rebellion against Peel's leadership of the Tories during the repeal of 
the Com Laws.44 But even if this decision might therefore be dismissed as the dying 
embers of an earlier mode of protectionism through state intervention in the market, it 
nonetheless remains a bright, if quickly extinguished, spark of judicial deference to 
national security burning even in the mid-Victorian era. 
Contrastingly, bearing out Allen's appraisal that Kelly CB 'would judge on the 
merits of the case and was distinguished from some younger judges by his ability to 
look beyond decided cases to general principles,' 45 it must be remembered that the 
Lords failed to overrule Kelly CB's conclusion that the Crown's exemption from a 
patent monopoly could be extended. They merely dismissed the flawed attempt to do so 
in the instant case.46 As Lord O'Hagan asserted, in language which presages the great 
dissenting judgments ofthe twentieth century, ifthe courts are to uphold, 'a Royal order, 
relied upon as authorizing injurious interference with profits which are solemnly 
secured to [the patent holder] by royal grant, [it] should be clear and unequivocal.'47 
43 ibid., 647 
44 Allen, C., 'Kelly, Sir Fitzroy Edward (1796-1880)', Oxford DNB, (Oxford, 2004) [http:// 
www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/15295, accessed 21 51 March 2006) 
45 ibid. 
46 In the long-run, this view of delegation of this exemption from the Crown (in writing) would be 
vindicated, through the intervention of statute. Sees. 55-58 Patents Act 1977 
47 Dixon, op. cit. n.28, 645; This statement also constituted a powerful support of the patent system, which 
had been under siege since the mid-nineteenth century. See Machlup, F. & Penrose, E., 'Patent 
Controversy in the Nineteenth Century,' (1950) 10 JEH I 
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In a marked divergence between this rhetoric and reality, Dixon's National Arms 
and Ammunition Co., starved of the government work that the Martini patent was 
intended to exploit, fell victim to the vagaries of the gun-trade and was wound up in 
1883.48 
A Tale of Arms and Two Men 
Nearly two decades after the House of Lords' decision in Dixon another novel 
weapon, and two extraordinary figures, would cause the appellate court once again to 
consider the national security implications of its decision in a commercial action. The 
first individual in question was Thorsten Nordenfelt, described by Lord Macnaghten as 
'a Swedish gentleman of much intelligence ... and of great skill in certain branches of 
mechanical science.' 49 Nordenfelt was a gunsmith, and the inventor of one of the 
world's first rapid-fire infantry weapons. Although his weapon was clearly inferior to 
the famous Maxim gun, developed contemporaneously by his rival, Hiram Maxim, 
through the "proactive" marketing of the nefarious Basil Zaharoff, 50 Nordenfelt's 
company secured contracts to supply rapid-fire weapons to states across Europe. 
Revolutionary though his machine-gun was, Maxim's trade would suffer 
without access to these profitable European markets. In 1888 he bought out Nordenfelt 
in a take-over, worth nearly £300,000, that was arranged by Zaharoff. 51 The sale 
agreement included a restraint of trade clause, providing that for twenty-five years from 
the date of the take-over Nordenfelt would not: 
48 
'Economic and Social History: Industry and Trade, 1500-1880,' Stevens, W., A History ofthe County 
of Warwick: Volume VII: The City of Birmingham ( 1964, Oxford), 81-139 
49 Thorslen Nordenfe/1 v. Maxim Norde nfell Guns and Ammunition Co. [1894] AC 535, 559 
50 Zaharoff engineered 'the notorious sysleme Zaharoff' by pitting countries against each other in order to 
generate demand for armaments. Davenport-Hines notes that, after selling one of the world's first 
submarines to Greece in 1885, he whipped up fear of this threat to enable him to sell two similar vessels 
to Turkey in 1886. Davenport-Hines, R., 'Zaharoff, Basil (1849-1936)', Oxford DNB, (2004, Oxford) 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/38270, accessed 21 51 March 2006] 
51 Nordenfe/1, op. cil. n.49, 539 
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'engage except on behalf of the company either directly or 
indirectly in the trade or business of a manufacturer of guns, 
gun mountings or carriages, gunpowder-explosives or 
ammunition, or in any business competing or liable to compete 
in any way with that for the time being carried on by the 
company.'52 
Exceptions were provided for Nordenfelt's unrelated interests in submarines, 
explosives that were not gunpowder-based and metallurgy. Nevertheless, in September 
1890, having acrimoniously resigned his post on the board of Maxim Nordenfelt Guns 
the previous January and with his fortune dwindling at an incredible rate,53 Nordenfelt 
took employment with a Belgian machine-gun manufacturer. Maxim brought an action 
to injunct this employment on the basis of the partial restraint of trade clause. 
In a decision still the basis for the law of restraint of trade, Bowen LJ, after a 
comprehensive review of existing case law, held that; 
'general restraints, or, in other words, restraints wholly unlimited in 
area, are not, as a rule, permitted by the law, although the rule admits 
of exceptions. Partial restraints, or, in other words, restraints which 
involve only a limit of places at which, of persons with whom, or of 
modes in which, the trade is to be carried on, are valid when made 
52 ibid., 538-539 
53 Having been represented by three barristers, two of them QCs, in the High Court and Court of Appeal, 
by the time the case was heard in the House of Lords Norden felt, then bankrupt, had to represent himself. 
Lord Macnaghten commented that 'Nordenfelt received over £200,000 for what he sold. He may have got 
rid of the money. I do not know how that is.' ibid., 574 
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for a good consideration, and where they do not extend further than 
is necessary for the reasonable protection of the covenantee. ' 54 
Exceptions to these two general rules could be made on the basis of public 
policy. In the instant case the restraint was of both a general and a partial nature; 
limited respect of the activities it covered and general in its global scope. Whilst both 
parties therefore raised public policy arguments, this study will focus upon the national 
security arguments raised by several judges to justify the opinion that the global 
restraint was valid. Such concerns were not universally raised. Indeed, Bowen LJ 
briskly dealt with the issue, asserting, 'that it would almost amount to legal pedantry if 
Courts of Law were to discover in Mr. Nordenfelt's covenant the elements of danger to 
the commonwealth. ' 55 Other judges regarded the fact that, 'the covenant is part of a 
transaction for securing to an English company the inventions and business of a 
foreigner, ' 56 as a sufficient public policy justification for the restraint of trade. Lindley 
LJ was quick to forget the principles of free trade between nations when he asserted that 
'our predecessors, from whom we inherit this branch of the law, would never have 
thought it contrary to public policy to prevent a man from assisting foreigners to 
compete with an English trader who had bought his business. '57 
Lord Macnaghten captured the national security concerns that he perceived to be 
missing from the Court of Appeal's reasoning in concluding that, 'it can hardly be 
injurious to the public, that is, the British public, to prevent a person from carrying on a 
trade in weapons of war abroad.' 58 Lord Watson·similarly doubted, 'whether it be now, 
or ever has been, an essential part of the policy of England to encourage unfettered 
54 Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Company v. Nordenfelt [1893] 1 Ch. 630, 662 
ss ibid.' 667 
56 ibid., 650, per Lindley LJ 
57 ibid., 651; This statement appears particularly dubious in light of the fact that Hiram Maxim did not 
become a naturalized British subject until 16th September 1899. See National Archives, HO 
144/449/830533 
58 Nordenfelt, op. cit. n.49, 574 
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competition in the sale of arms of precision to tribes who may become her antagonists 
in warfare. ' 59 
Lest these opinions of the late-Victorian House of Lords be misconstrued as 
pacifist, the emphasis of their statements is heavily upon the nature of the company 
trading with foreign powers, rather than the destination of the arms. It was accepted 
that arms would be sold to governments of states, 'great and small, civilized and savage, 
who for purposes offensive or defensive desire to possess, and have the means of paying 
for, Nordenfelt guns with suitable ammunition. '60 What mattered in the instant case 
were Lord Watson's doubts over whether in the context of such trade, 'at any period of 
time an English Court would have allowed a foreigner to break his contract with an 
English subject in order to foster such competition. '61 
The Nordenfelt case calls into question judicial conceptions of national security. 
Bowen LJ may have had a reasoned national security justification for his concern that it 
may be illegal to restrain Nordenfelt from advising the British government,62 but the 
same cannot be said for the unrealistic national security concerns raised in the House of 
Lords. The idea that there was a risk of Nordenfelt working for foreign powers was 
absurd when it is considered that Maxim Nordenfelt Guns had effectively cornered the 
global market in machine guns by the mid-1890s. Worse was the Victorian horror at 
the prospect of 'tribes'63 gaining possession of automatic weapons. During the First 
World War it would be licensed derivatives of the Maxim gun, in the hands of European 
armies, which would extract a toll amongst British forces unimaginable to the late-
Victorian judiciary. 
59 ibid.' 552 
60 ibid., 552, per Lord Watson 
61 ibid., 554 
62 Nordenfelt, op. cit. n.54, 667 
63 There is little chance that, at the height of European imperialism, such a loaded term as 'tribe' would be 
used to describe other European nations. This is therefore an excellent indicator of what the judiciary 
perceived as threatening national security in the 1890s. 
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Bowen LJ rhetorically questioned whether 'a contract by which [a person] 
consents to the transfer of the business of making guns and ammunition for foreign 
lands to an English company, with whom he undertakes not to compete so long as the 
old trade is flourishing in their hands, is against the policy of English law?'64 Had they 
enjoyed the benefit of hindsight and the vantage point of time from which the 
Nordenfelt case can now be considered, his fellow judges may have been more reticent, 
' 
rather than answering with reasoning based upon specious conceptions of national 
security. 
The case proved to be a turning point in the careers of both protagonists. Whilst 
Nordenfelt was forced to flee to Paris to escape his debts and passed into obscurity, 65 
Maxim was knighted for his inventions in 1901. When he died in his old age in 1916, 
his weapons were already synonymous with industrialized warfare on an unprecedented 
scale. 
Acceptable Restrictions on the Arms Trade? 
This section of the chapter considers the judicial attitude to attempted 
restrictions upon the trade of arms to and from the United Kingdom where security 
concerns were at issue. It culminates in a consideration of the neglected case of Hunter 
v. Coleman. 66 However, it is necessary first to contextualise that decision, concerning 
an import ban upon armaments applying to Ireland, in the ongoing debates within this 
area of law. Even at the height of the Victorian embrace of free trade, governments 
appreciated the potential threat that trade posed to national security, particularly trade in 
armaments. Consequently, through a series of general and specific enactments 
64 Nordenfelt, op. cit. n.54, 667 
65 In Re Nordenfe/t, ex parte. Maxim-Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co. [1895) 1 Q.B. 151 
66 Hunter, op. cit. n.14 
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nineteenth-century governments augmented their ability to restrict either the import or 
the export of arms, depending upon the nature of the threat. 
As late as 1845, the latest in a line of Customs Acts that stretched back to the 
Stuart era prevented the import of foreign arms and ammunition into the United 
Kingdom 67 and permitted the government to issue orders in council preventing the 
export of arms, ammunition, military stores or anything that could be converted to a 
military use.68 However the opening up of Britain's ports to foreign imports led, in s.41 
Customs Act 1853, to a position whereby, 'it shall be lawful to import into the United 
Kingdom any goods which are not by this Act or any law at the time of importation 
thereof prohibited. '69 Relevant to. this chapter's consideration of the armaments trade, 
s.45 provided that 'the importation of arms, ammunition, gunpowder or any other goods 
may be prohibited by proclamation or order in council.' 70 In essence, 'the Acts of 1853 
and 1876 introduced a new policy by permitting importation unless it was prohibited, as 
a substitution for [a customs system working on the basis of] absolute prohibition unless 
there was permission.'71 
The scope of these enactments was contested amongst Victorian jurists. Amid 
the attempts of Gladstone's first administration to tackle the Franco-Prussian War's 
implications, just days after taking office, questions were raised in the House of Lords 
as to whether government had the power to restrict the trade in arms with the 
belligerents. Lord Halifax, the Lord Privy Seal, responded that, 'there was no doubt the 
government had the power of prohibiting the export of munitions of war, or of any 
articles tending to increase the naval or military force of any other country; but it could 
only be exercised by a complete and entire prohibition, affecting all other countries 
indiscriminately - and this had never that he was aware been exercised, nor did the 
67 
s.63 Customs Act 1845 
68 s.ll2 Customs Act 18 45 
69 s.41 Customs Act 1853 
70 This provision was re-enacted as s.43 Customs Consolidation Act 1876 (CCA) 
71 Hunter, op. cit. n.l4, 391, per Moriarty {Irish A-G) 
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Government think it expedient that the export of munitions of war to belligerents should 
be absolutely prohibited.' 72 Predictably, Lord Cairns disputed any conception of these 
powers that would prevent exportation to belligerents, asserting that their exercise was 
limited to, 'the purpose of keeping such munitions and stores in this country for the 
benefit of this country.' A power which 'must apply to all countries and places 
whatever ... could not be applied to the present emergency to prevent the supply of 
munitions to belligerent Powers.' 73 
Whilst maintaining the possibility of imposing such constraints upon trade in the 
interest of national security, Lord Halifax continued that the government did not at that 
time 'think it expedient that the export of munitions of war to belligerents should be 
absolutely prohibited.'74 However, not tied to his client's interests as he had been in the 
great Foreign Enlistment Act cases of a decade before, and specific to the instant 
circumstances, Lord Cairns raised the issue that 'whether it was expedient now to give 
the Crown power to prohibit the export of munitions of war to either of the belligerents 
was a different question, on both sides of which much might be said; but it could hardly 
be discussed at this period of the session.' 15 
The immediate danger posed by the Franco-Prussian War passed with France's 
capitulation, without recourse to these powers or consequent judicial pronouncement as 
to their scope. Indeed, on the eve of the First World War it was noted how little use had 
been made of powers to prohibit the importation of arms into the United Kingdom by 
proclamation then seventy years old.76 
However, Lord Cairns' appraisal of the CCA was seemingly affirmed through 
the enactment of the Exportation of Arms Act 1900, entitled 'an Act to amend the Law 
relating to the Exportation of Arms, Ammunition, and Military and Naval Stores.' This 
72 HL Deb, 3nl Series, vol. 203, col. 1677, 8th August 1870 
73 ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 ibid. 
76 Hunter, op. cit. n.14, 389, per Kenny J 
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legislative response to the siege of the foreign legations during the Boxer Rebellion in 
China was deemed necessary 'to prevent such arms, ammunition military or naval stores, 
being used against Her Majesty's subjects or forces, or against any forces engaged ... in 
military or naval operations in co-operation with Her Majesty's forces.' 77 A sizable 
British contingent was amongst the forces of the Eight-Nation Alliance that relieved the 
besieged legations. 78 
The Act was rushed through Parliament to replace a proclamation issued 
pursuant to the CCA, Attorney-General Sir Robert Finlay informing the House of the 
weakness of these existing provisions, for although 'there is power to prohibit 
exportation of arms . . . there is no power of discriminating between countries.' 79 
Similarly, as part of the government's response to agrarian unrest in Ireland, 80 the 
supposed limitations upon the CCA required the enactment of provisions within the 
Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act 1881 to give government complete control over the 
importation81 or possession82 of arms and ammunition into Ireland. 
Ironically, in light of the difficulties that were to follow, this legislation was only 
allowed to lapse in 1906.83 Within a decade, the progress of the Home Rule Bill 
through Parliament would produce an increasingly volatile situation in Ireland. 
Nationalist support for the Bill was so fervent, and unionist opposition so stalwart, that 
two private armies, the unionist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the nationalist Irish 
Volunteer Force (IVF), began recruiting and training. As long as both forces lacked 
arms, neither could pose a serious threat to British governance. Therefore, on 4th 
77 
s.l Exportation of Arms Act 1900 
78 See Keown-Boyd, H., The fists of righteous harmony: a history of the Boxer uprising in China in the 
year 1900, (1991, London), 158 
79 HC Deb, 4th Series, vol. 87, col. 232, 31 51 July 1900 
80 See Haire, D., 'In aid of the civil power, 1868-90,' in Lyons, F. & Hawkins, R., Ireland Under the 
Union, ( 1980, Oxford), 115-148 
81 s.3 Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act 1881 
82 s.2 Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act 1881 
83 The 1881 Act was absent from the Expiring Laws Continuance Act 1906. The attitude of Asquith's 
Liberal administration was summed up by Augustine Birrell, who on taking office as Chief Secretary of 
Ireland in 1907, declared in a speech in Halifax that, 'Ireland is at this moment in a more peaceful 
condition than for the last six hundred years.' See, anon., Is Ulster Right? ( 1913, London), Chap. 13 
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December 1913, a proclamation was issued under s.43 Customs Consolidation Act 1876 
prohibiting the importation of arms, ammunition (unless intended for sport) or 
explosives (unless they had an 'unwarlike purpose') into Ireland.84 
The unenforceability of this proclamation was dramatically displayed by the 
UVF's Lame gun-running of200,000 rifles in April 1914. It was further highlighted by 
blundering attempts by the authorities to seize weapons landed during the IVF's 
Howarth gun-running of July 1914.85 However, this study is less concerned with these 
dramatic escalations in the "Ulster Crisis" and its domination of British politics in the 
prelude to the First World War, than with how the courts approached the proclamation 
amid these charged circumstances; a reaction tested by the case of Hunter v Coleman.86 
Hunter & Co., gunsmiths with weapons en route from Hamburg when the 
proclamation was issued, sought damages for conversion after their property was seized 
by the defendant customs officer when it arrived at the port of Belfast and was 
subsequently destroyed by the police. This claim unsurprisingly succeeded before a 
Belfast jury, a decision which the government equally unsurprisingly appealed. The 
perception that the Court of Appeal's decision can be attributed to the divided loyalties 
of a largely Protestant senior judiciary in Ireland, 87 caught between a proclamation that 
they opposed politically and the need to uphold the rule of law so openly flaunted by the 
unionist leadership, 88 has likely contributed to the decision being largely forgotten, 
despite Kenny J's assertion that, 'it is scarcely possible to conceive of a case of greater 
constitutional importance than the present. ' 89 However, regardless of such underlying 
motivations, the majority opinion resonates strongly with the 'passivist'90 interpretation 
of statutes in light of national security concerns soon to be adopted in the wartime cases, 
84 Hunter, op. cit. n.l4, 372-373 
85 Stewart, A., The Ulster Crisis, (1967, London), 88-105 
86 Hunter, op. cit. n.l4 
87 Kenny J in particular is cited in unionist literature of the era. See Carson, E., 'Introduction,' in Balfour, 
A., eta/., Against Home Rule, (1912, London), 7 
88 The case was heard from 4th to 81h May 1914, less than two weeks after the Larne gun-running. 
89 Hunter, op. cit. n.l4, 384 
90 Simpson, A., 'The Judges and the Vigilant State,' (1989) Denning LJ 145, 157 
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whilst Kenny J's dissent offers a tantalizing glimpse of how an openly "militant" 
judiciary might react to assertions ofthe requirements of national security. 
The first point of significance is that, while the Crown did not even attempt to 
assert a prerogative power 91 to restrict the importation of armaments in time of 
emergency, comment from all three judges suggests that such an assertion would have 
succeeded. 92 However, the majority dismissed Hunter's claim of an 'inalienable 
common law right of the subject to import arms from abroad,' given that 'such a right, 
if it ever existed, had been expressly taken away by statute, in England, as far back as 
the matter has been traced. '93 
Whilst a statutory right was granted in the Customs Consolidation Act 1876, the 
majority found this to be subject to the limitations upon such importation which could 
be imposed under of s.43 of this Act. Despite this provision being 'very brief and very 
vague in its terms,' 94 Dodd J was able to divine that, 'far from this being a trade 
section ... the words at the beginning sufficiently indicate that it was prima facie for 
matters other than those of trade, that is to say, for matters affecting the peace and safety 
of her people and her forces, that such an unqualified power was given. '95 This lack of 
qualification was compounded by the refusal of the majority to examine why His 
Majesty apprehended a threat to His subjects or forces in Ireland or whether this threat 
was capable of justifying the imposition of such a proclamation.96 
The majority further dismissed the contention that the King's ability to 'prohibit' 
the import of arms into the United Kingdom did not encompass the lesser power to 
restrict importation into Ireland alone. Lord Cherry CJ simply dismissed such an 
interpretation of the Act on the basis that it ran contrary to 'every argument of 
91 During the passage of the Exportation of Arms Act Sir Robert Finlay A-G had maintained that there 
remained a prerogative power over the arms trade, but 'we might have some interesting State trials 
through not having recourse to legislation.' HC Deb, 4th Series, vol. 87, col. 232, 31" July 1900 
92 Hunter, op. cit. n.14, 375, per Dodd J, 388, per Kenny J, 404, per Lord Cherry CJ 
93 ibid., 380, per Dodd J 
94 ibid., 401, per Lord Cherry CJ, 
95 ibid., 381 
96 ibid., 382, per Dodd J 
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convenience and common sense. '97 However, in an evaluation of the proportionality of 
executive action under the CCA, Dodd J considered that 'if it is not necessary for the 
purpose the King has in view to exclude them [armaments] from Great Britain, then to 
include Great Britain would extend the proclamation further than was requisite, and 
would [constitute] an abuse of power. ' 98 Quite how this embryonic proportionality test 
would ever constrain executive action is a mystery, as Dodd J considered that in the 
1876 Act Parliament had granted the Crown complete discretion as 'the sole judge as to 
the danger, the emergency, and the need. '99 
Kenny J's dissent defies analysis. Rather than a conceptually sound dismissal of 
the conception of s.43 CCA as an emergency power, the reader faces a diatribe. 
Impassioned attempts to refute each Crown argument with statements of individual 
freedom each more extravagant than the last produce a judgment where arguments sit 
uncomfortably together or tail off only to resume with a vengeance several pages later. 
The former Solicitor-General for Ireland drew attention to the rights that the 
proclamation claimed to abridge, 'trading rights established by the great Charter and 
[the] equality of treatment that the Act of Union secured to the people of Ireland,' noted 
that it was possible 'that such a power of repeal might by statute be reposed in the 
King,' but concluded that 'grave considerations' militated against the CCA 1876 being 
interpreted as encompassing such a power. 100 
Kenny J first considered the Proclamation's purpose, finding that despite the 
Attorney-General's description of s.43 as 'an emergency provision,' the Proclamation 
did not contain 'anything in the nature of a recital or statement to the effect that a state 
of war or any threatened danger to any part of the realm existed, or, in fact, that any 
97 ibid, 402 
98 ibid, 381 
99 ibid., 381 
100 ibid, 385 
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emergency had arisen to provoke the exercise of those extreme powers.' 101 Despite 
Attorney-General John Moriarty pleading that 'people cannot shut their eyes to what is 
going on,' Kenny J persisted in his surreal attempt to divorce the Proclamation from the 
reality of events in Ireland, maintaining that 'a very difficult and, I think, ambiguous 
section of a statute is not to be aided in its interpretation by circumstances which, 
however much the subject of popular report, were not cognizable by the Court on the 
present argument.' 102 In what amounted to a blinkered, Diceyan pronouncement that 
the law took no cognisance of a state of emergency short of war, 103 Kenny J considered 
that the validity of the Proclamation must be interpreted on the basis that 'the United 
Kingdom was in a condition of absolute peace and tranquillity.' 104 
However, even if Kenny J had accepted the existence of an emergency, he 
wound still have found the Proclamation invalid. Opposing division of the CCA 
provisions restricting importation into those that raised revenue (such as the restrictions 
on silk) and those concerned with defence of the realm, Kenny J found 'nothing to 
suggest that arms and munitions of war should be referred to a principle or category 
different from that of other commodities,' 105 and concluded that the Customs Acts 'do 
not purport to do more than encourage and protect trade and commerce and secure the 
levy of Customs duties.' 106 He therefore accepted that 'if the proclamation had 
prohibited importation of arms into any part of the United Kingdom, no exception could 
possibly be taken to it, for the legislature has unmistakably conferred on the King the 
power of general prohibition.' 107 So exercised, 'this tremendous power of closing uno 
flatu all the ports of the United Kingdom ... would not ... necessarily favour any one 
101 ibid.' 386 
102 ibid.' 386 
103 Dicey, A., Introduction to the Study ofthe Law of the Constitution, (1960, lOth Ed., London), 230-31. 
See Chapter 2. 
104 Hunter, op. cit. n.l4, 386 
105 ibid.' 390 
106 ibid., 390-91. In a ham-fisted attempt to make the law fit his argument Kenny J justified this 
conception of s.43 CCA as a trade provision by refusing to read 'any other goods' as ejusdem generis to 
arms, ammunition and gunpowder. 
I 07 ibid., 388 
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part of the realm to the detriment of another.' 108 However, 'as the Customs Acts deal 
with and are enacted in the interests of trade and commerce . . . it would be opposed to 
those interests and to the principle of trade equality if the power of differentiation 
existed.' 109 
Speed Limits and National Security 
The last brief case study in this chapter concerns production of military balloons 
at a Crown factory at Aldershot. In 1905 this might be assumed to be a less than 
security-charged context. However that was to change when a War Office engine driver 
was officiously charged and convicted of breaking speed limits of 2 m.p.h., imposed 
through bye-laws in the town of Aldershot, 110 in a truck transporting a load of coal 
supposedly urgently required for production at the factory. 
Hearing an appeal of this magnitude, the Lord Chief Justice, clearly receptive to 
the security-centred arguments raised by the Attorney-General, pronounced 'that, in a 
case solely with reference to the use of a Crown locomotive by a Crown servant in the 
performance of military duties, we ought to hold that the section does not prohibit that 
act, and does not bind the Crown in that sense.' 111 Wills J 112 went even further in 
upholding the appeal, considering that forcing the military to obey speed limits in 
peacetime might bring about the end of the British Army; 'An army cannot exist, at 
least it cannot exist for any useful purpose, without there being opportunities for 
108 ibid' 395 
109 ibid, 397 
110 Under s.4 Locomotives Act 1865 
111 Cooper v. Hawkins (1904) 2 KB 164, 171, per Lord Alverstone CJ 
112 Wills J read s.ll FEA 1870 broadly in the light of security concerns in R. v. Sandoval ( 1887) 56 L T 
526. See Chapter 4. 
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manoeuvring and practising, which could not be carried out on any large scale if 
regulations ofthis kind were to be enforced.' 113 
Conclusion 
Even in an era where the 'larger principle' governing commercial law was 'that 
English industry and trade ought to be left free,' 114 the judiciary were able to find a role 
for what might be considered the "lesser principle" that even the interests of commerce 
must bow to the requirements of national security. Dixon v. London Small Arms Co. 115 
may indicate that in the mid-Victorian era few judges would voice such concerns aloud, 
but as the Franco-Prussian War-era Parliamentary debates concerning the national 
security provisions of the CCA 1853 show, even Lord Cairns was willing to conceive 
that circumstances may require government to take on "emergency" powers to constrain 
the threat posed by the trade with the belligerents undertaken by figures like Prioleau. 
By contrast, Cooper v. Hawkins suggests that by the Edwardian era the judiciary were 
falling over themselves to facilitate security concerns in otherwise innocuous 
circumstances. 
In the later years covered by this study, the judicial position may well have 
shifted along those lines suggested by Lord Watson in Nordenfelt. He asserted that, 'the 
general policy of the law is opposed to all restraints upon liberty of individual action 
which are injurious to the interests of the State or community.' 116 In accordance with 
this statement's corollary, the House of Lords in Nordenfelt showed itself willing to 
permit exceptional restraints where the actions of an individual potentially endangered 
security. So pervasive was this evolved judicial perception of how threats to security 
113 Cooper, op. cit. n.lll, 173, per Wills J 
114 Nordef!folt, op. cit. n.54, 665, per Bowen LJ 
115 Dixon, op. cit. n.20 
116 Nordenfe/t, op. cit. n.49, 552, per Lord Watson 
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played into the relationship between personal liberty and community interests, that by 
1914 Kenny J was obliged to convolute circumstances and ordinary principles of 
interpretation in order to conclude that Hunter v. Coleman was not a case affected by 
such concerns. 117 Before the First World War, for the majority of judges, to 
acknowledge such concerns was to concede to them. 
117 Hunter, op. cit. n.l4, 386 
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[7] 
The Greatest Service a Judge can Provide 
Is to lay down the Law for his Country 
'The great merit of the Common Law is that it will justify even an 
unprecedented course of action if it is fairly covered by the maxim 
sa/us respublicce suprema lex. ' 
Sir Rufus Isaacs & Sir John Simon (1913) 
Bringing Order out of Chaos 
Over the period covered by this study, judicial approaches to national security 
concerns might seem mired in confusion. Yet, amid this confusion the talismanic maxim 
sa/us populi suprema lex emerged, bestriding the pre-war "old world" and the new "Age of 
the Emergency Code" 1 which the United Kingdom entered in 1914. So pervasive was the 
theory that, in the excerpt from the Law Officers' opinion opening this chapter, parts of the 
executive clearly conceived that sa/us populi could, of itself, stand as a justification for 
executive action? 
With this development, the theory of a period of transition in judicial attitude 
appears, prima facie at least, to be borne out in the jurisprudence re-evaluated in the above 
chapters. It is, for example, possible to perceive the pre-war judiciary's inexorable progress 
towards the supine interpretive position traditionally associated with the wartime 
1 See Chapter 1 
2 National Archives, WO 3217112, 'Martial Law in the United Kingdom. Opinion of the Law Officers ofthe 
Crown, 17th July 1913.' 
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jurisprudence. Pollock CB's hostility towards government arguments predicated upon 
security concerns in the early 1860s3 seems far removed from Lord Watson's efforts in the 
mid-1890s to invent national security concerns. 4 Similarly, the judiciary's careful appraisal 
of what national security required (and significantly what it did not) in the Defence Act 
cases5 from the 1890s onwards, appears irreconcilable with the reticence shown towards 
such issues in the House of Lords decision in Dixon, just three decades earlier.6 
However, a convincing analysis of the judiciary's emerging national security 
consciousness before the First World War must avoid merely charting the hitherto 
neglected jurisprudence of a bygone era. This conclusion will reunite the disparate strands 
of jurisprudence considered in the body of this study, drawing together these milestones 
and dead-ends through an explanation of the evolution of interpretive approaches to 
security concerns. Fulfilling this task requires a detailed analysis of the nature of the 
jurisprudential shifts over the course of the half-century preceding the First World War, and 
should serve to affirm or dispel the possibility, raised in this study's introduction, of the 
mid-Victorian judiciary obeying common law interpretive principles in the face of 
executive assertions of security concerns. Judging by the common-law world's deification 
of Lords Shaw7 and Atkin8 for their mere lone dissents in this regard, such an era of robust 
scrutiny of executive action would seemingly amount to many a constitutional jurist's 
"paradise lost." 
In the course of this study's investigation of developing national security 
jurisprudence it has uncovered an evolving cast of subterfuges and smokescreens in which 
distinguished judges have engaged to 'enable them to suppress the apparent contradiction 
3 Attorney-General v. Sill em ( 1864) 159 ER 178 
4 Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfe/t Guns and Ammunition Co. (1894) AC 535 
5 R (Moore) v. Abbot [ 1897] 2 IR 362 
6 Dixon v. London Small Arms Co. (1876) 1 AC 632 
7 R. v. Halliday, ex parte Zadig (1917] AC 260 
8 Liversidge v. Anderson [ 1942) AC 206 
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between the rule of law and the executive's predominance in this field.' 9 During the period 
studied, ever more elaborate ploys were developed to this end, each worth examining as 
their legacy lives on long after the cases in which they were developed have faded into 
obscurity. 
This conclusion must further evaluate how the pre-war judicial conception of sa/us 
populi fed into these discussions between government and the military as to the degree to 
which statutory authority would be necessary to acquire the powers required to sustain the 
war effort. Finally, in the light of these conclusions, it is necessary to re-evaluate the 
relationship between this hitherto forgotten case-law and the First World War 
jurisprudence, and briefly to consider the enduring influence of these decisions. 
A Golden Age or an Eldorado? 
This study began as a quest; an expedition through the yellowing pages of forgotten 
law reports in search of a halcyon age of judicial robustness in the face of security 
concerns. If any period of modem legal history could support such jurisprudence, logic 
dictates that the confident mid-Victorian era would be the strongest candidate. Indeed, 
those academics who have paused to consider the period have concluded that thereafter 
'one can detect a gradual, but steady, decline' in judicial liberalism. 10 This research has 
therefore analysed the development of national security case-law in the fifty years prior to 
the First World War- the hitherto acknowledged dawn of modem security jurisprudence. 
And yet this study has found no activist period, no Camelot, no golden age, but rather a 
9 Lustgarten L. & Leigh, 1., In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy, (1994, 
Oxford), 330 
10 Ingraham, B., Political Crime in Europe: A Comparative Study of France, Germany and England, (1979, 
Berkeley), 209 
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mirage, shimmering tantalisingly throughout the mid-Victorian era and on closer inspection 
vanishing, insubstantial. In its stead, unexpectedly modem jurisprudence is found. 
This is not to say that the judicial conception of national security did not evolve in 
the pre-war era. Despite the case-law considered in this study demonstrating a degree of 
consistency in how salus populi was applied as an interpretive tool, these decisions do 
evidence that over the course of this study the judiciary were prepared to acknowledge 
national security concerns and tum to this maxim in ever broader circumstances. In order 
to demonstrate this dichotomy at work, it is necessary to analyse the pre-war judiciary's 
willingness to recognise that national security concerns were in play, as distinct from the 
judicial attitude towards such concerns where they are found to be at issue. 
It is scarcely surprising that the mid-Victorian judiciary displayed a healthy 
scepticism of national security concerns, especially in the maritime context in which 
Pollock CB encountered them in Attorney-General v. Sillem. It is possible that he did not 
appreciate the degree of threat that Confederate shipbuilding posed to the security of the 
United Kingdom, and might well have been blinded by concerns that such seizures were 
undertaken for no other purpose than to appease the Federal government, when he 
stridently asserted that 'we have nothing to do with the political consequences of our 
decision.' 11 
With the furore in the aftermath of Sillem, the judiciary became more accepting of 
the security interests at stake during the American Civil War. This is evident in Cockburn 
CJ's jury direction in Jones which accepted that the Foreign Enlistment Act constituted, 'a 
very important Act of Parliament, without which the neutrality of this country could not be 
maintained, or would at least be seriously jeopardized.' 12 
11 Sillem, op. cit. n.3, 214 
12 R v. Jones (1864) 4 F & F 25,37 
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However, this did not mean that the mid-Victorian judiciary would apply such Acts 
blindly. In his judgment in the Gauntlet, Phillimore J may have emphasised the importance 
of the FEA, 13 and that the security purposes behind the Act would ordinarily need to be 
balanced against the interests of commerce, 14 but he rejected the charge that the laying of 
the telegraphy cable was other than a commercial enterprise. 15 He refused to recognise that 
there were interests at stake that could call the sa/us populi maxim into effect. 
As late as the mid-1870s, and the judgment of the House of Lords in Dixon, the 
judicial reluctance to contemplate security concerns is evident. 16 Yet by the 1890s this 
reticence towards sa/us populi was replaced by judicial efforts to uncover national security 
concerns where none had been argued. Judgments within this trend include Lord 
Macnaughten's efforts to apply national security as a public policy reason in favour of a 
contract preventing a person from trading in weapons abroad. 17 However, Lord Alverston 
emerges as one of the most serious offenders, in Cooper v. Hawkins, with his engineering 
of hypothetical security concerns that might be jeopardised if War Office drivers were not 
exempted from speed limits in the most everyday of circumstances. 18 
Such judicial inventiveness pre-dates similar examples, in both World Wars, of the 
courts taking it upon themselves to fill in 'absent facts like the missing pieces of a jigsaw 
puzzle' 19 when supposed security issues were raised. In the First World War case of ex 
parte Leibmann this inventiveness is clear from the insistence that, as spying was 'the hall-
mark of German kultur,' there would be a general danger of rumour mongering, signalling 
with lights or using radios and the ongoing 'employment on a scale hitherto unknown of 
13 
'The International' (1871) 3 A&E 321,332 
14 ibid., 332 
15 Ibid., 338 
16 Dixon, op. cit. n.6 
17 Nordenfe/t, op. cit. n.4, 574 
18 Cooper v. Hawkins (1904) 2 KB 164, I 71 
19 Lustgarten & Leigh, op. cit. n.9, 331 
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carrier pigeons,' if a population of people of German origin or with German associations 
were left at large?0 Moreover, in Shaw v. Lincoln Wagon, no less a judge than Atkin J 
decided, contrary to the advice of the Minister of Munitions, who appeared as a third party, 
that the manufacture of railway wagons constituted 'munitions work' 21 because it involved 
the production of items which might be 'adapted for use in war. ' 22 
In Liversidge v. Anderson, Lord Wright sought to outdo his predecessors, asserting 
that 'all the circumstances of national safety to which this House adverted in R. v. 
Hallida/3 are present in this war, only with vastly increased urgency and gravity, because 
German methods for effecting the poisonous infiltration among British or allied subjects of 
their purposes and schemes have been immensely more subtle and ingenious than in the last 
war. Even a judge may be allowed to take notice of the import of words like Fifth 
Columnists and Quislings and the like. ' 24 Thus, judicial acceptance of, and even invention 
of, sa/us populi issues in some of the twentieth century's most significant security cases 
marked the flowering of an approach conceived by generations of judges prior to the First 
World War. 
It is unsurprising that, given the developing threats to the United Kingdom in the 
late-Victorian era, the resultant 'growing sense of the fragility of civilization'25 would filter 
into the judiciary's amenableness to security arguments. Yet even prior to this sea-change, 
where the judiciary did accept that security concerns were at issue, this study has shown 
that they would interpret the law to facilitate the public interest embodied in the sa/us 
populi maxim. It should be remembered that despite this maxim not being rejuvenated 
20 R. v. Superintendent of Vine Street Police Station, ex parte Liebmann (1916) 1 KB 268, 275, per Bailhache 
J 
21 
s.9 Munitions of War Act 1916 
22 Shaw v. Lincoln Wagon and Engine Company (1916) 32 TLR 470,472 
23 Halliday, op. cit. n.1 
24 Liversidge, op. cit. n.8, 265 
25 Townshend, Making the Peace: Public Order and Public Security in Modern Britain, (1993, Oxford), 38 
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until Phillimore J's judgment in the Internationa/,26 this does not mean that the term's 
substance was not already alive in the law. 
Such facilitation is evidenced as early as attempts by the dissenting judges in 
Attorney-Genera/ v. Sill em to read s. 7 FEA sufficiently broadly to encompass the building 
of the Alexandra, as can be seen in Pigott B's assertion that 'any act of equipping, 
furnishing or fitting out done to the hull or vessel, of whatever nature or character the act 
may be, if done with the prohibited intent, is expressly within the plain language and also 
within the evident spirit of the enactment. ' 27 
This approach is also clearly displayed in the level of 'good faith' review set by 
Jesse} MR in Hawley v. Steele, affirming that the judiciary would not become involved in 
more than a cursory analysis of whether the government had employed expropriated land 
for the purposes established in the Defence Act 1842.28 Moreover, once Kelly CB had 
accepted that there was a defence purpose at issue in the purchase of Martini-Henri rifles in 
Dixon, he was prepared to extend the principle by which the Crown is exempted from 
patent rules in order to cover such a contracting-out of production. 29 Similarly, sa/us 
populi is clearly facilitated by Porter MR's acceptance of the Crown's contention that the 
expropriation provisions of the Military Lands Act 1892 amounted to a permanent statute in 
Hill v. Haire, in spite of his recognition that this conclusion ran contrary to the literal 
meaning of that enactment. 30 
Together, these decisions confirm that even in the Victorian era the judiciary were 
willing to adopt a purposive interpretation of statutes providing the government with 
security powers. The finest example of such functionalism in the security sphere is 
26 
'The International, ' op. cit. n.I3 
27 Sillem, op. cit. n.3, 240, per Pigott B 
28 Hawley v. Steele (1877) LR 6 Ch. D. 52 I, 528 
29 Dixon v. London Small Arms Co. (1875-76) LR I Q.B.D. 384,394 
30 Hill v. Haire [I899] I IR 87, 93-94 
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provided by the majority in Hunter v. Coleman. Lord Cherry CJ and Dodd J adopted an 
interpretation of the Customs Act, contrary to prevailing comment as to its limitations, in 
order to assist the requirements of national security in a situation of emergency. They did 
so without paying heed to the claimant's assertions of the scope for executive abuse of 
these powers, considering that this position could be reassessed if such abuse came to 
fruition.31 
Within the United Kingdom, certainly from the mid-Victorian period onwards, a 
majority of judges have followed a functionalist approach to legal problems involving 
security concerns. Judicial functionalism, by which interpretive techniques were adapted to 
accommodate sa/us populi where necessary, therefore transcends the period of the First 
World War. The wartime jurisprudence may have gravitated towards the banner that 
Scrutton LJ hoisted with his pithy assertion that 'the war cannot be waged on the principles 
of the Sermon on the Mount. By the same token it cannot be waged according to the 
Magna Carta. ' 32 But this statement of interpretive principle did not mark a new departure, 
it affirmed this established judicial approach to national security, to the point where it 
became ingrained within the common law. As Lord Reading asserted, the difference 
between the wartime jurisprudence and earlier interpretive approaches in light of sa/us 
populi lay in the degree to which state action could be accommodated, and not in the 
principle; 'in time of war that which it might well be an exaggeration in time of peace to 
describe as dangerous to the safety of the realm, [could be so construed] and action might 
be justified which could not be justified in time of peace. ' 33 
In line with this assertion, pre-war judicial functionalism did not necessarily equate 
to acquiescence to the demands of the executive. The Defence Act cases denote careful 
31 Hunter v. Coleman (1914) 2 IR 372,403, per Lord Cherry CJ 
32 Ronnfeldt v. Phillips (1918) 82 JP Jo. 480,482 
33 R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Sarno ( 1916) 32 TLR 717, 720 
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judicial consideration of those elements of the legislation which required interpretation in 
light of sal us populi, and the attempts of a string of Law Officers to expand this favourable 
mode of interpretation into parts of the Acts, notably the mechanisms for compensation, 
where security concerns did not apply. Describing such jurisprudence as displaying 
"robust-functionalism" may appear to constitute an oxymoron, but it serves to convey the 
sophistication of the pre-war judiciary's conception of sa/us populi as an interpretive 
device, when Gibson J was able to assert that, 'no doubt the Defence Act is of national 
importance, and sa/us populi, suprema lex. But the safety of the state is best secured by a 
general average contribution, and not by making jettison of individual interests. ' 34 The 
decision in Abbot was certainly functionalist, Gibson J and his fellow judges accepting the 
national security concerns at stake where land was expropriated for defence purposes. But 
this excerpt displays the care taken to divide the issues in this case; ruling an expropriation 
as ultra vires may have adversely impacted upon national security, but permitting the state 
to default on compensation could gamer no such benefits. Such careful judicial 
consideration of whether national security was really at issue would not survive the early 
twentieth century arms race, let alone the First World War. 
Of course, this overview does not pretend to enter the mind of every judge in the 
pre-war era and explain how thy perceived or reacted to security issues, but it instead 
attempts to aggregate the judiciary's approach. As Oliver Wendell Holmes once asserted, 
the personality of the judge remains the 'inarticulate major premise in judicial logic. '35 
Having argued above that the ratio of Pollock CB's judgment in the Sillem case 
indicates that he did not accept the relevance of national security concerns, his assertion 
that 'in the present enlightened state of the civilised world, it may turn out that the doctrine 
34 Abbot, op. cit. n.5, 405 
35 Lochner v. New York (1905) 198, US 45, 76 
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and those principles are to be preferred which would make us prosperous in peace rather 
than those that would make us successful in war,'36 may place him amongst the small cadre 
of judges willing to challenge not simply the existence of national security concerns but 
their interpretive value. He certainly endured, albeit posthumously, the back-biting from 
government that goes with this territory. 37 
However, if one sparrow does not make a summer, then Pollock CB alone cannot 
change the common law consensus with regard to national security.38 Attorney-General v. 
Sillem should be regarded as an exception to the common law's interpretive approach to 
sa/us populi, born of specific circumstances, and not as evidence of a mid-Victorian 
positivist or normative guiding rule, if for no other reason than that for the next two 
decades the judiciary busily endeavoured to free themselves from the burdens of the 
Alexandra debacle. 
The Secret Identities of Salus Populi 
In some decisions, such as the majority position in Hunter,39 this functionalist 
character of judicial interpretation is overt. However, it is rarely easy so to uncover judicial 
approaches to national security concerns. Those judges who are less open about, or less 
comfortable with, this common interpretive position in relation to security concerns, have 
not been so brazen in professing its functionalist nature. Interestingly, the lasting evolution 
in judicial thinking that did occur over the period examined within this study did not 
concern the approach to security issues, but the manner in which such members of the 
36 Sillem, op. cit. n.3, 221 
37 HC Deb, 3rd Series, vol. 203, col. 1366, 151 August 1870, per Sir Robert Collier (A.G.) 
38 Although if he carries with him Bramwell B in tow, then, as has been shown, he can spectacularly, if 
temporarily, affect a particular stream of security jurisprudence. 
39 Hunter, op. cit. n.31 
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judiciary masked their functionalist role. Three techniques, evident throughout twentieth-
century jurisprudence, took on their modem guise during the pre-war period. 
The most prominent subterfuge, popular amongst judges long before the period of 
this study, was to engage in linguistic machinations, or quite simply 'humbugging;'40 
packaging their judgments in a manner that suggests a relationship less subservient to the 
requirements of national security than their judgment warrants. The best known historic 
example of this practice came in the celebrated Georgian case of R. v. John Wilkes, where 
the radical dissident was declared an outlaw after he failed to appear on charges of seditious 
libel. Lord Mansfield opened his judgment with the assertion that 'uudges] must not regard 
political consequences; how formidable soever they might be: if rebellion was the certain 
consequence, we are bound to say fiat justitia, ruat coelum.'41 This 'resounding rhetoric,'42 
capped by the positivist credo that justice should be done even if the heavens fall as a 
result, constituted a dramatic deception. As Lord Denning explained, 'Lord Mansfield had 
his tongue in his cheek. He did have regard to political consequences. He did not want to 
make John Wilkes a martyr. So he found a technicality by which he set him free. ' 43 
Such positivist reasoning became a more prominent feature of English jurisprudence 
after Bentham's critique44 of the normativist conception of the judicial role in Blackstone's 
Commentaries.45 By the 1860s it provided the public conception of the judicial role in 
developing the common law. It is therefore all the more obvious that such reasoning is 
deployed to divert attention from Channell B's functionalist interpretations of security 
requirements in his judgment in Attorney-General v. Sill em; 
40 Simpson, A., In the Highest Degree Odious: Detention Without Trial in Wartime Britain, (1992, Oxford), 
30. Foxton similarly refers to the divergence of judicial rhetoric and reality. Foxton, D., 'R. v. Halliday, ex 
parte Zadig in Retrospect,' (2003) 119 LQR 455, 494 
41 R. v. John Wilkes ( 1770) 4 Burr 2527, 2562 [Let justice be done, though the sky may fall as a result] 
42 Denning, Landmarks in the Law, (1984, London), 274 
43 ibid., 275 
44 Bentham, J., A Comment on the Commentaries, (1977, London), 194-198 
45 Blackstone, W., Commentaries on the Laws of England, (1977, Chicago), Vol. I, 69-70 
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'In days long past judges, I think, often invaded what we now 
consider the sole province of the legislature. They interpreted 
statutes to include cases which they assumed to think ought to have 
been included; thus not merely constituting themselves as legislators, 
but also as legislators ex post facto. That I think will never be done 
again . . . If it is in the interest of the nation that the law shall be other 
than we interpret it, if our construction of this Act of Parliament may 
endanger the peace of the nation, then I say that it be the duty of 
Parliament to enact a new law; but it is not our duty to look 
elsewhere than at the present statute for an interpretation of it. ' 46 
It would surprise anyone unfamiliar with the intervening one hundred and forty 
years of national security jurisprudence that such a denial of the influence of national 
security concerns on judicial reasoning is to be found in an opinion that ultimately supports 
the legislative interpretation sought by the govemment.47 
However use of positivist ruses declined from the late-Victorian period onwards. 
As judicial egos rapidly swelled to fulfil to the role of the courts as the 'guardians of 
liberty' under the Diceyan conception of the rule of law, 48 the language of deception altered 
accordingly. By the First World War, the concept of a normative effort to balance between 
the rights of the individual and the public interest was loudly asserted by a judiciary that, in 
reality, baulked at the thought of undertaking any such analysis. Perhaps the best known 
46 Si/lem, op. cit. n.3, 237 
47 Paradoxically, what will surprise those familiar with the development of national security jurisprudence in 
the twentieth century, is that this ploy is found in a dissenting opinion. 
48 Dicey, A., The Law ofthe Constitution, (1960, lOth Ed., London), 137 
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example of an assertion of this ilk was Lord Atkinson's claim that, 'however precious the 
personal liberty of the subject may be there is something for which it may well be, to some 
extent, sacrificed by legal enactment, namely, national success in the war or escape from 
national plunder or enslavement. ' 49 
This shift to normative assertions pre-dated the First World War, being evident, for 
example, in Lord Watson's judgment in Nordenfelt. Here the public policy concerns 
inherent in preventing 'unfettered competition in the sale of arms of precision to tribes who 
may become ... antagonists in warfare,' 50 were affirmed as out-weighing Nordenfelt's 
interest in not being prevented from carrying on his trade after a spurious balancing 
exercise. 
However, it must be remembered that the dynamic that Dicey established between 
the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty can mean all things to all men, if only 
because 'it was ultimately impossible to reconcile his emphasis on the rule of law with the 
unlimited sovereignty of Parliament. ' 51 This inconsistency allowed many judges to adapt 
their previously positivist ruse to draw attention away from the abdication of their 
interpretive functions in the security context. Positivist smokescreens are still implemented 
where judges wash their hands of a matter by declaring that their hands are tied by the 
actions of Parliament. Such statements would be widely employed by the wartime 
judiciary, and can be traced back to common ancestors, most prominently Channell B's 
judgment in Sillem. 
For example, in 1918 Scrutton LJ defended the judiciary's 'failure to interfere' with 
official action on the basis that 'Parliament has allowed certain action and has laid down 
49 Halliday, op. cit. n.7, 271. This untruth was considered sufficiently comforting to the judiciary to warrant 
repetition in Liversidge, op. cit. n.8, 257, per Lord MacMillan 
'
0 Nordenfe/t, op. cit. n.4, 552, per Lord Watson 
'
1 Allan, T., Law, Liberty and Justice: Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism, (1993 ), Oxford, 16 
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certain rules in statutes. The only duty of the judge is to enforce and administer those 
statutes. ' 52 One war later and the same formula was still relied upon, Lord Wright asserting 
in Liversidge that 'Parliament excludes the jurisdiction of the courts and substitutes in the 
one case a specially constituted administrative body, in a case like the present, the Secretary 
of State. In no case are ordinary legal rights to be affected unless and then only to the extent 
that Parliament has enacted to the contrary.' 53 Into the 1970s Lord Denning adopted the 
same well-worn excuse; 'our history shows that, when the state itself is endangered our 
cherished rights may have to take second place ... time after time Parliament has so enacted 
and the courts have loyally followed. ' 54 
The third ploy within the judicial arsenal requires less skill to effect, but carries the 
complication that, if misguidedly employed, it can result in a judgment seemingly out of 
touch with reality. Essentially, the judge can embellish the threat raised by the state to the 
point where it can be considered to trump competing interests. Charges of exaggerating 
threats have long been levelled against the executive, Simpson asserting that, where a 
government is mindful of public opinion and therefore unwilling to shoulder even potential 
security risks because of the possible repercussions, the blackest interpretation of threats to 
the sal us populi will often win through. 55 
In the context of the pre-war judiciary, Wills J pursued a particularly embellished 
argument in his judgment in Cooper v. Hawkins, where he contended that enforcing the 
speed limit against the War Office driver in the instant case was but the thin end of a wedge 
52 Scrutton, T., 'The Law and the War,' (1918) 34 LQR 116, 119. He went on to assert that 'the judges do not 
consider it their duty to run the war, and they take the view that the responsibility for infringements on the 
previous liberties of British citizens is with Parliament, who authorized these infringements, and with the 
executive, who exercise the powers conferred by Parliament,' 130. 
53 Liversidge, op. cit. n.8, 264 
54 R. v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, ex parte Hosenba/1 [1977] 1 WLR 766, 778 
55 Simpson, op. cit. n.40, 13 
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that would end in disbandment of the British Army because of its supposedly restricted 
capacity for conducting manreuvres or training. 56 
A similar exaggeration is perpetrated by Lord Alverstone in Brailsford, a case as yet 
unconsidered in this study, but in which this point is well illustrated. In affirming 
convictions for causing a public mischief against two defendants who had forged passports 
to Russia, the Lord Chief Justice adapted Crown assertions that such actions might cause 
harm to relations between states, by inventing the danger of Britain becoming involved in 
war with Russia to protect these subjects. 57 
The Pre-War Jurisprudence and the Wartime Decisions 
The employment of these judicial subterfuges, together with the historic military 
paranoia engendered through incidents such as the attempts to bring Governor Eyre to trial 
for his abuse of martial law powers during the Morant Bay uprising in Jamaica, 58 served to 
protect respect for the judicial position in national security cases until the First World War. 
However, partly as a result of fears of judicial activism produced by these deceptions, 'the 
military had come to favour a code which would spell out precisely what powers they had if 
war came.' 59 
This conclusion will not detail the tortured birth of the United Kingdom's first 
emergency code, for this process has been well documented by Rubin. 60 It suffices to note 
that the delegation of this unprecedented degree of power to the executive through the 
various incarnations of DORA was conceived from the outset as much as a check on 
56 Cooper, op. cit. n.18, 173 
57 R. v. Brailsford and Another (1905) 2 KB 730, 745 
58 Townshend, op. cit. n.25, 47 
59 Simpson, A., Human Rights and the End of Empire, (200 1, Oxford), 80 . 
60 Rubin, G., 'The Royal Prerogative or a Statutory Code? The War Office and Contingency Legal Planning, 
1885-1914,' in Eales, R. & Sullivan, D., eds., The Political Context of the Law, (1987, London) 
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judicial scrutiny of the government's 'vexatious orderings,' 61 as it was 'a legal technique 
for minimising parliamentary control, ' 62 or a platform 'to facilitate advance planning and to 
encourage clear judgment among officers on the ground. ' 63 
However it was conceived, DORA produced 'the harnessing by the state, on an 
unprecedented scale, of the power and resources of the nation towards the war effort. '64 
Against such a backdrop, this study does not constitute a supercilious effort to undermine 
the significance of the First World War jurisprudence, but an attempt to redress the lack of 
consideration given to the interpretive approach to national security concerns espoused by 
previous generations of judges and to re-evaluate the wartime case-law as a development of 
this approach. 
Even with the bloody stalemate of the First World War at its most intractable, the 
implications of the wartime legislation were evident to Bowman. Writing, as Townshend 
asserts, from the safe distance of the Michigan Law Review,65 Bowman asserts that 'the 
outlines of this legislation . . . stand out sharp against the past. A precedent has been 
established. And such precedents are not unlikely to be followed. ' 66 What might be said of 
DORA may equally be said of its interpretation. But to expect similar deference to the 
executive during the Second World War is not to expect the precedent to be twisted to the 
degree that it applies to peacetime or to lesser emergencies; 'wartime and immediate post-
war decisions ought not to be treated with reverence. ' 67 
Prior to the Civil War, the Stuart judiciary supported for the application of the royal 
prerogative 'through the narrow pedantry with which they bent before precedents, without 
61 Clarke, S., 'The Rule of DORA,' (1919) I JCLIL (3rd series) 36, 36 
62 Simpson, op. cit. n.59, 80 
63 Lustgarten & Leigh, op. cit. n.9, 325 
64 Loughlin, M., Public Law and Political Theory, (1992, Oxford), 162 
65 Townshend, op. cit. n.25, 57 
66 Bowman, H., 'Martial Law and the English Constitution,' (1916-17) 15 Mich.L.Rev. 93, 125 
67 De Smith, S., Judicial Review of Administrative Action, (1973, London), 290 
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admitting any distinction between precedents drawn from a time of freedom and precedents 
drawn from the worst times of tyranny. ' 68 Similarly, Ewing and Gearty recognise that 
whilst judicial 'deference to the executive in war time is perhaps understandable and 
perhaps even appropriate, ... it was to lead the judges down an unfortunate path which not 
only made a mockery of Dicey's faith in the self-correcting mechanisms of the British 
constitution but also led to a total abdication by them of their role.' 69 
However, it is unjust to heap blame upon the wartime or post-war judiciary without 
acknowledging that common law rules of interpretation of security legislation were settled 
long before the First World War. Ironically, Lord Atkin best summarises this situation in 
his assertion that 'in this country, amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent. They may 
be changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace.' 70 Amongst the wartime 
judiciary there was indeed an acceptance that the law performed an enhanced version of the 
function established in peacetime. The existence of national security concerns barely 
warranted consideration, they were accepted as self-evident. All that remained was to 
employ the historic method of interpretation in such circumstances, and adopt most benign 
the construction of the relevant statutes and secondary legislation to enable the executive to 
tackle the threat. Well might Coke have concluded that 'the surest construction of a statute 
is by the rule and reason of the common law,' 71 but constitutional lawyers must 
acknowledge that these rules have to date enjoyed an at best cursory relationship with 
interpretation techniques where national security concerns are at issue. 
In conclusion, the blameworthiness of the wartime judiciary is greatly diminished 
upon reconsideration of Campbell's conclusion that DORA produced a 'threefold 
68 Green, A Short History ofthe English People, (1877-80) Vol. 2, Chap. 8, Sect. 2 
69 Ewing, K. & Gearty, C., The Struggle for Civil Liberties, (2000, Oxford), 87 
70 Liversidge v. Anderson [ 1942] AC 206, 244 
71 Quoted in Dyzenhaus, D., Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems; South African Law in the Perspective of 
Legal Philosophy, (1991, Oxford), 5 
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diminution of the judicial role.' 72 Firstly, he conceived of 'a great attenuation, and in some 
cases the virtual extinction of, the doctrine of ultra vires.' 73 However, as this study has 
shown, in relation to the Defence Acts to take just one example, judges were willing to 
attenuate the principles of vires review in the national security sphere long before the First 
World War. 74 
Similarly, Campbell considered 'the particular "judge-proof' manner in which the 
powers under the DORR were generally structured.' 75 Yet even prior to the turn of the 
twentieth century efforts at judge-proofing were common, as seen in relation to the FEA 
1870, and such efforts were certainly not confined to the national security sphere. 76 
Finally, the grant of 'quasi-judicial powers' to the executive was certainly not a 
novel development at the outbreak of the First World War. Lord Wright accepted, in 
Liversidge, that 'in ordinary administrative measures, the legislative practice of substituting 
for the jurisdiction of the court that of a specially constituted tribunal is well established.' 77 
In support of this proposition he cited with approval Lord Haldane LC's judgment in the 
pre-First World War Arlidge case, that under the Housing and Town Planning Act 1909 
'jurisdiction, both as regards original applications and as regards appeals, was in England 
transferred from courts of justice to the local authority and the Local Government Board, 
both of them administrative bodies.' 78 
Admittedly, the system established under DORA did "throw" a judiciary 
historically conditioned to expect a suspension of habeas corpus in order to tackle 
individuals who posed a threat in such circumstances, for Halliday found Lord Finlay LC 
72 Campbell, C. Emergency Law in Ireland, /918-25, (1994, Oxford), 116 
73 ibid., 116 
74 Hawley, op. cit. n.28 
75 Campbell, op. cit. n.72, 116 
76 Ambrose, W., 'The New Judiciary,' (1910) 26 LQR 203,207 
77 Liversidge, op. cit. n.S, 264 
78 Local Government Boardv. Arlidge [1915] A. C. 120, 132 
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marvelling at the fact that 'the Legislature has selected another way of achieving the same 
purposes, probably milder as well as more effectual than those adopted on the occasion of 
previous wars,' 79 whereas the more astute Lord Shaw lamented how Regulation 14B paid; 
'formal respect to the procedure of remedy, but [operated] to deny 
the remedy itself by inferring the repeal of those very fundamental 
rights which the remedy was meant to secure. This is to allow the 
subjects of the King by law to enter the fortress of their liberties only 
after that fortress has been by law destroyed.' 80 
More by accident than by design, the executive had developed a mechanism for 
administering the wartime state that threw the inadequacies of judicial interpretive methods 
in this field into sharp relief. Therefore, it is necessary to add to Campbell's list the serious 
diminution of judicial power occasioned when the executive realised the interpretive 
position adopted by the judiciary in relation to national security concerns, and thereby 
discovered its ability to act with virtual impunity in this sphere. This neutralisation of the 
judicial smokescreens with which the pre-war judiciary had cloaked their weakness 
produced by far the greatest diminution of judicial power. 
The military's false fear of the judiciary left only contempt when the First World 
War exposed them, not as 'lions under the throne,' 81 but as paper tigers. But during the 
Irish War of Independence, General Macready, having lost the celebrated habeas corpus 
action of Egan v. Macready,82 would threaten to arrest even the Master of the Rolls, if he 
79 Halliday, op. cit. n.7, 270 
80 ibid.' 294 
81 Gardiner, 'History of England' vol. iii (1883), 2 
82 Egan v. Macrea~ [1921] I IR 265 
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sought to serve writs for the claimant's release.83 By the 1970s, after another half century 
of compliant jurisprudence, the judiciary could scarcely be considered to be even 'mice'84 
in the pocket of the Home Secretary when security concerns were at issue. Rather, the 
standard British Army handbook on low intensity conflict85 approached 'law and the legal 
system merely as weapons in the armoury ofthe government, and view[ed] the legal system 
and its officers in a highly manipulative light.' 86 
83 Ewing & Gearty, op. cit. n.69, 365-367 
84 R. v. Home Secretary, ex p Budd(l94l) 2 AllER 70, per Lord Atkin 
85 Kitson, F., Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping (1971, London) 
86 Lowry, D., 'Terrorism and Human Rights: Counter-Insurgency and Necessity at Common Law,' (1977-78) 
53 Notre Dame Lawyer 49, 76 
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